

1: Lattimore

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AI 1 Sinkiang AI 1

[For a history of relations between Sinkiang and China, Russia, England, France, and their effect on trade, communications and provincial government, see Category 116, pp. 45-102.]

174 in Moslem lands, a line of hereditary religious potentates, the Khojas, established itself beside the Khans.¹³ By the seventeenth century, the Khojas had displaced the last quarreling heirs of the Moghuls and taken over direct rule of the Sinkiang oases.

In the steppe, power was divided among three groups of nomads. In Russian Inner Asia the Kazakhs and other Turkish-speaking nomads prevailed. On the east, after many tribal wars, the dominant Mongol power was that of the Khalkhas of Outer Mongolia. In the center, in northern Sinkiang and western Mongolia, were the Oirats or Western Mongols — called "Kalmuks" by the Russians.¹⁴

174 By the year 1400 — when the Mongols in western and southern
175 Inner Asia had taken to the Turkish language and to Islam — the Oirats, who remained Mongol in speech and hostile to the Moslems, had become a warlike league which repeatedly invaded western Inner Asia and attacked the southern oases and Tibet. In the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries they struck eastward and nearly made themselves masters of the whole of the ancient Mongol homeland. It was to break their power that the Manchus, who had conquered China in the preceding century, invaded Sinkiang in the eighteenth century, conquered the Western Mongol Confederation, and established strong military garrisons. In the same period the Russians began their expansion into Siberia and Inner Asia, and the British their expansion over India up to Afghanistan, the Pamirs, and Tibet. This triple process marks the confluence of modern world history.

175 In the nineteenth century there were prolonged and bloody Moslem rebellions against the Manchus both in China and in Sinkiang. It was only after the suppression of these rebellions

¹³ This line was founded by Khoja Makhtum Azyam, who had come to Kashgar from Bokhara and who claimed descent from the prophet Mohammed. The possession of lands and revenues made the Khojas feudal nobles as well as hereditary religious officials.

¹⁴ Traditionally, the Oirats were a tribe from the region of Lake Baikal and the present Buryat Mongolia. The tribes of this region were half forest hunters, half pastoral nomads. The Oirats were placed in Inner Asia in the course of the regrouping and redistribution of Mongol tribes brought about by the conquests of Jenghis Khan.

A New Center of Gravity in the World 17

that Sinkiang was placed under a form of administration comparable to that of other Chinese provinces. In 1884 it ceased to be a possession, and became a Chinese province. 175

Under the Chinese Republic, since 1911, Sinkiang has continued to be nominally a province like any other province; but in actuality the tendency of governors of the province has always been to rule as independent war lords. Sometimes this independence has been carried so far that governors have conducted their own foreign relations with Russia and India and have even treated the National Government of China almost as if it were a foreign power. China's present problem in Sinkiang is how to deal with the relations between the Chinese provincial authorities and the national government, the relations of both the provincial authorities and the national government with Russia and India, especially Russia, and the effort of both provincial and national Chinese authorities to maintain themselves in the face of the nationalist demands of the non-Chinese population of Sinkiang. 175 186 668

Nationalism in Sinkiang is a modern outgrowth of traditional Mohammedan and tribal rebellions against Chinese rule. It began to take newer forms in the 1930's, when Sinkiang fell under the rule of a Chinese military adventurer named Sheng Shih-ts'ai. Since Sheng could not call on China for military reinforcements for fear of being supplanted, he followed a new policy of seeking support from each subject nationality separately, while at the same time preventing any coalition of nationalities. He also increased trade with the Soviet Union, obtained Soviet loans, and sent Uighur and other students to the Soviet Union for technical training. In 1943 he broke with the Russians and came to terms with the National Government of China. A policy of "firmness" toward the non-Chinese peoples was then reasserted; but in the meantime political nationalism had taken root. 186 668

There are now two major nationalist movements in Sinkiang. One follows a policy of "Sinkiang for the Uighurs." It seeks to win autonomy from the Chinese and at the same time to assert

000 British finally decided, the position of foreign powers and foreign trade would deteriorate. London's policy therefore switched over to support of the Manchus, to whom in the years after 1867 British banks extended a number of advances and loans. These helped finance the pacification force which the Manchus in 1867 began to organize to regain control of China's rebellious North-western Provinces. These were the first foreign loans obtained by China and it is noteworthy that they were made available for military rather than productive purposes.

Yakub Beg, Inner Asian Adventurer

648 To the British in India, however, apprehensive about Russia
175 and desirous of Central Asian trade, the future of Sinkiang was too important to be allowed to depend solely on the slow and uneven progress of Manchu arms. By the end of the 1860's, the adventurer Yakub Beg had already been in power in Sinkiang for half a decade. High British officials, influenced by a series of optimistic reports from Shaw and other travelers and agents in Sinkiang, came to feel that Yakub Beg was well entrenched in power. They saw in his "strong state" a possible "convenient buffer," not only between China and Russia, but also between British India and expanding Russia.¹³ In language that has a quaintly modern ring, they referred to Central Asia as an area where "Russian influence immediately fills any space that is left vacant by the English powers. This political process has been aptly compared by a very high authority to the natural rushing of air into a vacuum."¹⁴ Informed British writers pointed with alarm to the progress of relations between Yakub Beg and the Russians. This had occurred, they explained, because of the failure of Britain to respond to earlier overtures from the Kashgar ruler, who had been left with no alternative but "to obey the law of . . . POLITICAL GRAVITATION, under which his small kingdom, in com-

¹³ Sir Valentine Chirol (part author), article "China," in *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 10th ed., Suppl. Vol. III, p. 31, London, 1902.

¹⁴ Sir Richard Temple, *India in 1880*, London, 1880, p. 434.

Anglo-Russian Rivalry over Sinkiang 33

mon with all small States similarly situated in isolation between two large Powers, existed, viz. to lean upon one or the other."¹⁵ At the very time that London policy was supporting the recovery of Manchu authority in China, therefore, the British in India ended the policy of "watchful waiting" and in the 1870's threw aid and support to Yakub Beg.

This celebrated and colorful figure first appeared in Sinkiang in 1864, in connection with an effort to re-establish Khoja power. The Khojas had been hereditary Moslem potentates in Sinkiang from the fifteenth to the seventeenth century, when they were driven out, first by the Mongols and then by the Manchus. They found refuge in Khokand (modern Ferghana), from which base they made periodic sorties toward Kashgar and other towns in the Tarim Basin. When the Manchus lost control of Sinkiang during the Moslem uprisings of the 1860's, the Khojas struck again. In 1864 a descendant of the former Khoja ruling house of Kashgar led a small band of men from Khokand eastward into Sinkiang. By 1865 he had taken over Kashgar and Yarkand. His chief of staff was Yakub Beg, a Khokandi of humble birth whose youth had been spent as a dancing boy. In his manhood he turned to soldiering, and he played a part in the struggles of Khokand and neighboring Khanates to resist the tide of Tsarist expansion.

After the first wave of successes in the western Tarim Basin, the Khoja prince under whom Yakub Beg was serving devoted himself to dissipation. Yakub Beg soon displaced him and rounded off the Moslem reconquest of Eastern Turkistan by seizing Aksu, Khotan, and Urumchi.

Soon after seizing power, Yakub Beg had tried to buttress himself against the Manchus by securing recognition as an independent sovereign from his two powerful neighbors, Russia and British India. The British response, after an initial period of hesitation, was encouraging. For just as the Russians were arousing British sensitivity about India, the British were bringing pressure on Russia's weakest point, the Black Sea area. To this end the British, and particularly the British Indian Government, desired¹⁶

¹⁵ Showers, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

648 "to build up a common front between Great Britain and Islam
175 against Russia. . . ." ¹⁶ As part of this program the British encouraged the pretensions of the Sultan of Turkey to the Caliphate — that is, to the primacy of the entire Islamic world, in the hope that the Sultan would direct that world against Russia.

When Yakub Beg, who had taken the title of Atalik Ghazi, sent an envoy to India in late 1869, he was received much more warmly than earlier emissaries from Kashgar. Partly this was because C. U. Aitchison, former Secretary of the Punjab Government, was now Secretary of the Foreign Department directly under the Governor General. More important was the fact that the attitude of the Government of India toward Inner Asian states was now colored by the conception of an Islamic front against Russia, in which Sinkiang might well play an important part. Even in its internal policy the Government of India was at this time in the process of swinging away from the pronounced anti-Moslem phase which characterized the decade after the great rebellion of 1857-1858, the outbreak of which had been attributed by the Government of India chiefly to India's discontented Moslems.

Yakub Beg's envoy was "honorably received" in Lahore by the Lieutenant Governor of the Punjab and then granted an interview in Calcutta by the Viceroy. The envoy transmitted Yakub Beg's request that a British officer pay "a friendly visit" to the Atalik Ghazi's court in Yarkand. The Viceroy agreed to send T. Douglas Forsyth to Yarkand, but strictly as an amicable gesture and not for any official business: his "sole purpose" was to be that of "opening up and giving impulse to the trade with that country." ¹⁷ Yakub Beg's envoy was permitted to buy four hundred muskets in Calcutta to be carried over the mountains to Yarkand. Forsyth

¹⁶ Arnold J. Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs 1925*, Vol. I, *The Islamic World Since the Peace Settlement*, London, 1927, pp. 40-41; and L. E. Frechling, "Anglo-Russian Rivalry in Eastern Turkistan, 1863-1881," *Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society*, Vol. XXVI, London, 1939, p. 479.

¹⁷ Sir T. Douglas Forsyth's *Report of his visit to Yarkand*, in *Parliamentary Papers*, House of Commons, London, 1871, Vol. LI, p. 46.

Anglo-Russian Rivalry over Sinkiang 35

soon left at the head of a small party, but on his arrival at Yarkand he found that Yakub Beg was far away fighting around Urumchi. He thereupon turned around hastily and just managed to cross the mountains back to India in 1870, before snow closed the passes for the winter. 648 175

When a later envoy, Yakub Beg's own nephew Saiyid Yakub Khan Tora, appeared in India in 1873, he was received most warmly and was aided in journeying on to Constantinople. There, the Sultan gave the high title of Amir-ul-Mu'minn (Commander of the Faithful) to Yakub Beg, and advised him to be friendly with Britain and shun dealings with the Tsar. The Sultan also sent Yakub Beg two hundred rifles, three cannon, and three army officers as instructors. As Yakub Beg's envoy traveled through India on his return journey, he was joined by a well-staffed British mission, again headed by Forsyth. Together they crossed over the Karakoram Pass to Kashgar, where in 1874 Forsyth signed a treaty which threw Sinkiang open to trade with India and accorded Yakub Beg the high privilege — unprecedented for any other Central Asian ruler — of exchanging with India envoys carrying the full status of Ambassador. The Forsyth Mission reported that Yakub Beg was securely entrenched in power; British strategists began to look forward to setting up a protectorate over Sinkiang; arms flowed from India to Yakub Beg via a trading company established in 1873 under Government of India inspiration, and in 1876 the Government of India formally ratified the Treaty of 1874.

One year later Yakub Beg was dead, his power shattered, and his realm overrun by Manchu forces.

The Russians, in contrast to the British, had always regarded Yakub Beg coldly. They were extracting many concessions from the Manchus and had no desire to alienate Peking by recognizing the pretensions of Yakub Beg — who, in any event, was an old enemy of theirs and had fought against them before he left Russian Turkistan. They felt that his regime could become a rallying point for the Moslems of all Inner Asia, including Russian Turkistan, against the power of the Tsar. Uneasy Russian officers termed

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Kashgaria "a powerful Mussulman State, to which as to a center would be drawn the sympathy of the population, not only of the weak Mussulman States which had preserved their independence, but also of the population of the provinces which we had conquered. The importance of Kashgaria in our eyes was, moreover, increased in consequence of the attempts of the English to draw this country to their side so as to incorporate it, (1) in a neutral zone of countries, which was to separate Russia from India, and (2) to acquire in Kashgaria a fresh market for the sale of their manufactured goods."¹⁸

Throughout the period of Yakub Beg's rule Tsarist officers took care to safeguard what they considered to be Russia's basic strategic and commercial interests in Sinkiang. Strategically, their chief concern was with the Ili River Valley, an ancient inland trade and military highway between Russia and China, which a titled Russian historian has termed as important to Russia as the Khyber Pass was to the British in India.¹⁹ About the time of the first Forsyth visit to Yarkand in 1870, Yakub Beg, who was operating around Urumchi, turned westward and seemed to be making a movement in the direction of Ili. "Under the spur of Yakub Beg's move, and concerned for the safety of this trade route, Russia in 1871 moved troops into Kulja and occupied the territory of Ili. . . ." ²⁰ To reassure the Manchu Court in Peking, Tsarist officials announced that the occupied area would be returned as soon as Manchu forces were strong enough to maintain effective control there.

Impressed if not intimidated by Russian military action, Yakub Beg agreed in 1872 to Tsarist proposals for opening Eastern Turkistan to Russian commerce. Up to then he had tried to seal off his state against Tsarist merchants, largely from fear that they might pave the way for political penetration. His sweeping commercial treaty with Forsyth in 1874 was doubtless intended in

¹⁸ A. N. Kuropatkin, *Kashgaria*, Calcutta, 1882, pp. 4-5.

¹⁹ A. Lobanov-Rostovsky, "Russian Imperialism in Asia: Its Origin, Evolution, and Character," *Slavonic Review*, London, Vol. VIII, 1929-1930, p. 44.

²⁰ H. B. Morse, *International Relations of the Chinese Empire*, 3 vols., London, 1918, Vol. II, p. 331.

Anglo-Russian Rivalry over Sinkiang 37

large part to balance the British against the Russians. Worse still, from the Russian point of view, was Yakub Beg's action, during the winter of 1873-1874, in accepting arms from the Sultan of Turkey and the title of Amir — the latter in such a way as to make Sinkiang something like a vassal state of the Sultan. Turkey was then the bitterest of Russia's enemies and strongly under British influence. Tsarist officers considered Yakub Beg's action tantamount to waving a red flag in their faces.²¹ The Tsarist Governor General of Turkistan concentrated troops in 1874-1875 in locations where they could best be deployed against Kashgar. Perhaps they actually would have been used against Yakub Beg had not a serious uprising broken out in Khokand, in 1875, draining off all Tsarist troops available in the area. In 1876, however, a Russian mission under Kuropatkin descended upon Yakub Beg and made a peremptory demand for strategic posts in the mountain passes west of Kashgar. Yakub Beg reluctantly but speedily acceded.

Yakub Beg's position, by 1876, was in fact becoming very difficult. To the west and north stood the menace of unfriendly Russia. To the east, the Manchu pacification force under the indomitable Tso Tsung-t'ang was moving slowly but relentlessly in Yakub Beg's direction, having already occupied Barkul, Hami, and Kuchengtze. Tso's forces, moreover, were by 1876 receiving at Kuchengtze (a little more than one hundred miles east of Urumchi) important grain supplies from the Russians — thanks to an agreement negotiated in 1875 between Tso and the famous Russian explorer, Colonel Sosnovskii. Funds to purchase that grain came in part from loans to the Manchus by British banks in China.

The British, still interested in preserving Yakub Beg's realm — for, despite their loans, they did not believe that the Manchus would be able to reconquer Eastern Turkistan — tried to medi-

²¹ Kaufmann, the Tsarist Governor General of Turkistan, is said to have spoken of Kashgar as "*une création de Monsieur Forsyth*" and to have charged the British with making a strong Muslim state out of a hitherto unimportant country. (Louis E. Frechtling, *British Policy* [an unpublished Oxford dissertation], p. 62 n.)

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175 ate between him and the Manchus. Sir Thomas Wade, the British minister to Peking, proposed to the Manchus in 1876 "that Yakub Beg would surrender should China allow him to keep his kingdom under Chinese suzerainty. When the offer was reported to Tso he memorialized the throne that the status of Yakub was purely a domestic question and if Britain wished to create a buffer state in Central Asia she was herself well able to furnish the territory."²² Whether or not Yakub Beg felt himself cornered, he did dispatch to London his nephew and chief adviser, Saiyid Yakub Khan Tora. Wade also journeyed on leave from Peking to London, and secret negotiations began on the basis of Wade's formula. Wade acted as intermediary for the Manchu minister in London, while Sir Douglas Forsyth served as go-between for Yakub Beg's envoy. Meanwhile Tso's soldiers penetrated deeper and deeper into Sinkiang. Even before a decisive battle was joined, Yakub Beg's forces became confused and disheartened, and Yakub Beg himself took (or was given) poison and died.²³ In the ensuing disorder Manchu dominion was quickly reasserted over the entire province, except for Russian-held Ili.

The Age of Stable Empires before the Russian Revolution

000 The Russians were in no hurry to return Ili. They had expected the Manchus to win, and their grain supplies had played a significant part in the victory. But the Tsar did not intend to go unrecompensed. As early as March 1876 a conference of the half-

²² A. W. Hummel (ed.), *Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period*, 2 vols., Washington, D. C., 1944, Vol. II, p. 766, article on Tso by Tu Lieh-che.

²³ There are many conflicting accounts of Yakub Beg's death. Mohammed Yusuf Effendi, a Turkish officer — one of the three originally lent as "instructors" by the Sultan in 1873 — has left us a valuable eyewitness account. His version is that Yakub Beg became prostrated after bleeding from the nose. Previously he had been despondent but not ill. The cause of the bleeding is unknown, but Yusuf Effendi believed "the probability is that the Ameer was poisoned." Statement of Mahd. Yusuf Effendi, September, 1878, in *Parl. Papers*, House of Commons, 1880, Vol. 78 (c. 2470), pp. 21-23. According to Bales, "the Chinese seem to have had no doubt about Yakub Beg taking his own life." (W. L. Bales, *Tso Tsung-t'ang*, Shanghai, 1937, p. 365, citing Nien P'u, VIII, p. 22).

* 563 197 province. The next largest group, the Kazakhs, are the preponderant nationality in northwestern Sinkiang, in the area bordering the Kazakh S.S.R. of the Soviet Union, and are also found along the Mongolian frontier. Kirghiz comprise the highest proportion of the population of the upland areas bordering on the Kirghiz S.S.R., and are also found in the Pamirs. The Mongols are the major nationality in northeastern Sinkiang, in the area bordering the Mongolian People's Republic, and are also found in the Tien Shan, in the heart of the province. The Iranians, who are sometimes called Tajiks or Sarikolis, though small in number relative to the other peoples of Sinkiang, form the major section of the population of the Tashkurgan Valley, adjacent to the Tajik S.S.R.

Thus Uighurs, Kazakhs, Kirghiz, Mongols, and Iranians are each distinguished by the fact, clearly revealed in the accompanying sketch map, that they form the local majority in some clearly defined part of the province, in addition to being in a minority in other parts of the province. In contrast, none of the remaining peoples is the major nationality in any area of significant extent. At best they exist as isolated local majorities in villages or towns, as in the case of the Chinese, who form two thirds of the population of the capital city of Urumchi. Since the Chinese, Russians, Manchus, Uzbeks, and Tatars are all people lacking a territorial base, the only viable nationalities in Sinkiang in terms of national consciousness combined with a territorial base for existence as a nationality are the Uighurs, Kazakhs, Kirghiz, Mongols, and Iranians.

Nationalities and Their Characteristics

1. THE UIGHURS, THE MAJORITY PEOPLE OF SINKIANG

* 563 101 175 The use of the name Uighur has been revived in Sinkiang only in recent years. Historically it first appears in the records of the Tang Dynasty (618-907 A.D.) as the name of a tribal confederation of pastoral nomads living along the Selenga River, in what is now the northern part of the Mongolian People's Republic.

The Peoples of Sinkiang

123

From 745 to 840, warriors of this confederation penetrated into Inner Asia north and south of the Tien Shan. In 840 the Uighur power in Mongolia was destroyed by Kirghiz from the Lake Baikal-Yenisei area. Some of the Uighur warrior class succeeded in withdrawing southwest, where they took over the oases north of the Tien Shan, infiltrated in large numbers into the oases south of the mountains, and made themselves the rulers of a settled population. From Chinese transcriptions of the name Uighur, like *Hui-hu* and *Wei-wu-erh*, there was eventually formed the name "Hui" or "Hui-hui," the popular Chinese term for all Moslems.

The people or peoples among whom the Uighurs were absorbed but to whom they gave their name had for half a millennium or so enjoyed several flourishing civilizations. From the oases of easternmost Sinkiang have been recovered documents dating from the first century A.D., written in the Sogdian script. The language of these documents has been identified as belonging to the Indo-Iranian group; the main centers of the Soghdians were Samarkand and Bokhara, but their language was widely used in Inner Asia, especially by traders. The Khotan oasis has given up documents in the Tokharian language and also in the Saka language, also belonging to the Indo-Iranian group, which date from 200-400 A.D. and are written in the Kharoshthi script, which came from India. The Saka civilization was related to the Kushan culture in northwestern India, and like it showed marked Hellenistic influences. In the same period there flourished in the Kucha and Turfan oases a civilization which also used the Tokharian language. What is most interesting about this language is that it belongs, like the Indo-Iranian languages just mentioned, to the larger Indo-European family, but unlike them has more affinity with languages of the "Kentum group" spoken in western Europe than with those farther east.

Besides speaking Indo-European languages the pre-Uighur peoples were distinguished by their devotion to Buddhism and Greco-Buddhist art, and to Manichaeism. The most important literary and artistic treasures from the Tarim Basin are connected with these religions.

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Uighur
Kazak

- *563 churchgoers and have a low opinion of the clergy. A common saying is, "Do what the mullah says, not what he does."
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- 793 The intimate ties between the upper lay and ecclesiastical strata enhance the importance of religion. Such literary works as are possessed by the Uighurs are mainly of a religious or didactic character and both historical and contemporary Uighur literature stresses the role played by the church in the struggle of the Uighurs against oppression by the Chinese and earlier rulers.

2. OTHER NATIONALITIES WITH A TERRITORIAL BASE

- *563 Kazakhs. The Sinkiang Kazakhs, who officially number 318,716 people, share a common history with the Kazakhs of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic in the U.S.S.R.
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- *563 As a separate nation they appear comparatively late in history. They were originally a part of the Ulus or heritage of Chagatai, one of the sons of Jenghis Khan, and then became part of the Uzbek Khanate, one of the successor states of the Ulus or appanage of Juchi, eldest son of Jenghis, called by the Russians the Golden Horde. The Uzbek Khanate suffered from constant friction among tribal Sultans and Princes. In the middle of the fifteenth century two Sultans of the Barak clan, which was the most powerful opponent of Abul-Khair, the ruling Khan, left the Uzbek confederation and migrated to the neighboring Khanate of Mogulistan, taking their tribal subjects with them. The Mogul Khan — who controlled the territory from east of Tashkent to Jungaria — hoping to find in them allies against his rivals the Uzbeks, ceded to them a stretch of grazing lands from north of the River Chu to west of the River Sary-su. The transformation of this small splinter group into a national and political unit was not accomplished until the end of the fifteenth century, when the Uzbeks conquered the southern oasis regions of Inner Asia and, through close contact with the sedentary oasis population, ceased to be pastoral nomads. At that time, several tribes separated from the Uzbek Khanate and remained in the northern steppes, joining the Kazakhs, whose border was thus moved far westward into what is today called the Kazakh steppe. The diverse tribal origin of the
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The Peoples of Sinkiang

129

Kazakhs is indicated by the name "Kazakh," which is believed to mean "a fugitive or masterless man who has separated himself from his tribe" (or overlord). The same name, modified by Slavic pronunciation, was adopted by the Russians, Poles, and Ukrainians who became the Russian Cossacks.

In the sixteenth century the newly formed Kazakh Khanate split into three hordes, forming a loose federation which united only rarely, under stress of war. This deterioration of the former unity was a result of the increased wealth of the Kazakhs, obtained by their conquest of some of the southern oasis regions from the Uzbeks in the sixteenth century, which made the individual tribal Sultans less dependent on the economic and political protection of the Khan. Of these three hordes, it was the easternmost, or the "Old Horde," whose grazing lands reached east of the present Soviet-Chinese border into Sinkiang.

During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the Russians began to penetrate into the territory of the Kazakhs and by the end of the nineteenth century had succeeded in colonizing the territory of the three hordes, except for the easternmost part of the Old Horde which remained under Chinese domination. Even after the drawing of a border line between the bulk of the Kazakhs in the west and the small splinter group in Chinese territory, however, many aspects of the common historical development continued, since the nomads were no respecters of national boundaries and migrated back and forth across the frontier which cut through their tribal lines.

The main grazing grounds of the Sinkiang Kazakhs are along the borders between Sinkiang and the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic and between Sinkiang and the Mongolian People's Republic. From the Tekes and Kunguz Rivers in the Ili region they range northeastward to the Chuguchak region and then southeastward along the Mongolian Altai. There are even Kazakhs on the other side of this frontier, under the sovereignty of the Mongolian People's Republic.

The Kazakhs are pastoral nomads, herding sheep, goats, horned cattle, horses, and camels. Felt tents are used in the summer, but

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566 nese history are comparable to other historical phenomena, and
 174 can therefore be intelligibly described in universally accepted
 114 terms. Western scholars, even when dealing with an outlying
 province like Sinkiang, must keep abreast of the discussions
 among Chinese social scientists.

The Residue of History

• 175 In their first great historical period of penetration into Inner Asia under the Han Dynasty, for about two hundred years before and two hundred years after the birth of Christ, the Chinese were concerned primarily with defending the frontier of civilization in China against barbarian incursions from Mongolia and Inner Asia. The maintenance of this frontier was, for the state itself, a perpetual expense, not a profitable expansion. Trade there was, and individuals grew wealthy by it, but the Chinese were not "imperialists" planting the flag farther and farther forward in order to have trade follow it. They were not opening up colonial conquests in order to get at bulk supplies of cheap raw materials — the costs of transport were too high — nor was there a surplus of production in China forcing them to seek new markets.³

The curiosities and luxuries brought to China through the Inner Asian trade contributed to the ostentation of the court. On the other hand the commodities going by caravan from China to Inner Asia consisted in large part of tribute collected by nobles and by the state, before being consigned to the hands of privileged merchants, and therefore were in fact a tax on the people. Certainly the volume of goods leaving China was not determined by the buying power of Inner Asia, because the Chinese records

³ Frederick J. Teggart, in his *Rome and China: A Study of Correlations in Historical Events*, Berkeley, 1939, lays great emphasis on "interruption of trade" along the Silk Route through Inner Asia as a cause of "correlated" wars on the Roman and Chinese frontiers, but does not raise the question of the difference between profitable expansive trade and trade which, though politically promoted in order to keep warlike barbarians contented, is a drain on the civilized country providing commodities for the barbarians.

Social Structures: The Living Past

187

show clearly that the amount of trade allowed was politically regulated. 175

In this period the standard of Chinese policy was to see that the settled oases were not used as bases by the steppe tribes and exploited by them as sources of food and subordinate man power. To some extent, Chinese garrisons were established in the oases. In addition, the petty rulers of the oases were brought on state visits to the Chinese Court, and occasionally they were punished if they aided the nomads — and if China at the moment was strong enough to punish them.

Relationships of this kind, as we know from the history of other countries, are part of the origins of feudalism. The rulers of the oases, whom the Chinese called "kings," had their own kind of power in their own states; but when they became the personal instruments of Chinese policy — and also when they were made personally responsible for tribute to the nomads — the kind of power which they had in their own states was altered. They could then properly be called "vassals."

The parallel Chinese policy among the nomads was to encourage war between tribes in order to prevent unity of the tribes against China. In spite of everything the Chinese could do, however, the nomads at times had the upper hand. They then thrust in between China and the oases, exacting a severe tribute from the oases and demanding disguised tribute or subsidy from China. Feudalism was fostered by these relationships. The frontier chieftain who in return for a subsidy or a regional monopoly of trade undertook to keep other "barbarians" at a distance was in fact experimenting with early forms of feudalism, and with the feudal identification of power with personal status and personal obligations.

When China could not hold these frontier chieftains under control as vassals, a decentralized feudalism succeeded the imperially centered feudalism. Nomad chiefs, in competition with each other, laid parts of North China under tribute. In the four hundred years of confusion between the fall of the Han Dynasty in A.D.

- 175²²⁰ and the founding of the T'ang Dynasty in 618, a decentralized feudalism with no strong imperial overlord spread from the Great Wall far into China.

In the seventh, eighth, and ninth centuries, on the other hand — when under the T'ang Dynasty the power of China was even more broadly asserted over Inner Asia than it had been under the Han Dynasty — the local feudalisms of Inner Asia were again oriented toward the imperial center of China, either in subordination or in opposition.

Thus the society of the Orkhon Turks of Outer Mongolia had at one time been tribal. Both in their period of subjection to the Chinese from 630 to 680, however, and later when they themselves began to conquer other nomads and to become the overlords of oases, their institutions began to redefine the obligations of subjects and the rights of rulers in a manner that showed an emerging feudalism.⁴

In the oases, in this period, the Chinese pilgrim Hsuan Tsang in the early seventh century said of Turfan that high officials met every morning to make administrative decisions. They did not keep records, but there was already a rudimentary bureaucracy, as officials were assigned to look after the land, the census, and irrigation. In Kucha, the "king" and his high officials met in council in the middle and at the end of every month, and the decisions of this council were also discussed with the heads of the monasteries before they were promulgated.⁵

In the eighth century, all the households in Lukchun, near Turfan, were in 716 mentioned as listed by the officials according to whether they paid tribute or not. A document unearthed by Sir Aurel Stein at Dandan Oilik, near Khotan, dated March 23, 768, mentions annual tribute paid by the peasants in the form of

⁴ Much the most detailed attempt that has yet been made to reconstruct the society of the Orkhon Turks and related peoples is that by A. Bernshtam, *Social-Economic Structure of the Orkhon-Yenisei Turks of the VI-VIII Centuries*, Moscow, 1946 (in Russian).

⁵ Hsuan Tsang, in the edition entitled *The T'ang Dynasty Record of the Western Regions*, Shanghai, 1922, Vol. 1; also Li Kuan, *Research on Sinkiang*, Chungking, 1944, p. 191 (both in Chinese).

Social Structures: The Living Past 189

crops.⁶ These peasants may have been individual serfs, or they may have been collective tribute-payers of the kind described by Vinogradoff in his discussion of the origins of serfdom: 175

In a state of backward agriculture and natural economy it will sometimes be more profitable for the conquerors as well as the conquered to leave the dependent population in their own households and on their own plots, at the same time taxing them heavily in the way of tribute and services. . . . We shall not be astonished to find, therefore, in the Hellenistic states of Asia a population of peasants who seem to have been in a condition of hereditary subjection and adherent to the glebe or the great estates of the Seleucid kings.⁷

This kind of system, Vinogradoff thought, might be traced as far back as the Persian monarchy. He added: "In any case these peasants were certainly not slaves, while, on the other hand, their condition was closely bound up with the cultivation of the estates on which they lived."

The next great period of decentralization was in the tenth, eleventh, and twelfth centuries when no one empire held either the whole of China or the whole of Inner Asia. In this period overlordship passed, on the whole, from settled peoples to nomads or peoples of nomad origin in North China, Northwest China, and Inner Asia. The trend toward a feudal development of society, however, continued. In periods of Chinese empire, as we have seen, frontier chieftains were accepted as vassals whose duty was to hold in check the more distant tribes; and conversely, when nomads ruled over settled lands they took into their service part of the ruling class, whom they deputed or made vassals for the collection of tribute.

In this period the Uighur Turks, nomads by origin, who had branched off from the stock of the Orkhon Turks of Outer Mon-

⁶ Obata, *History of Civilization in the Western Regions*, Chinese translation from the Japanese by Cheng Yuan-fang, Shanghai, 1934, pp. 60-61.

⁷ Paul Vinogradoff, article "Serfdom," *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 11th ed., Cambridge, 1911, Vol. XXIV, p. 664.

175 golia, built up the most powerful state in Sinkiang. The oases of Komul and Turfan were the main Uighur centers; and the Uighurs became of special importance when, after being conquered by the Mongols at the turn of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, they were able to provide the Mongols with bureaucrats who could read and write, plan the regular collection of taxes, and handle the engineering problems of an irrigated agriculture.

Accompanying the Mongols, their influence reached eastward into China and westward as far as Russia. Vernadsky points out that the Uighurs had three kinds of large landed estates: those of local nobles; those of members of the family of the Khan or supreme ruler, and those of the Khan himself. Other lands seem to have been granted in return for military and other services, and resembled the fief in Europe, and Vernadsky even suggests that this form of land grant, when used by the Mongols in Russia, may have had an influence on the development of the Russian *pomestie*.⁸

Out of the Mongol conquests at the beginning of the thirteenth century arose the greatest centralized empire that ever occupied China and Inner Asia. Its subdivision between descendants of the "golden clan" of Jenghis, its attempts to create a centrally controlled bureaucracy controlling the subdividing tendency of feudal inheritance, and its trade all revealed a rapidly developing feudalism. Both in the sudden burst of its original conquests and in the relatively rapid weakening of its administrative structure, the Mongol Empire is the best of all illustrations of that discrepancy between the effective geographical ranges of military conquest and economic and administrative integration which played so great a part in the alternating cycle of centralization and decentralization.

The limits of bureaucratic centralization under feudalism are shown by the failure of Jenghis Khan's own concept of empire. He provided for feudal kingdoms and smaller fiefs grouped

⁸ G. Vernadsky, "Feudalism in Russia," in *Speculum*, Cambridge, Mass., 1939, Vol. 14, No. 3 (July), p. 312.

Social Structures: The Living Past 191

around an imperial center, with bureaucratically appointed governors who, in each domain, would represent the imperial interest and authority; but real power soon reverted to the local authority.⁹ Within fifty years the major Mongol kingdoms and empires began in fact to become independent of each other, though ceremonial respect for the Great Khan was maintained for longer. Within a hundred and fifty years the whole system had fallen to pieces. 175

This period was matched by the next three hundred years of decentralization — from the middle of the fourteenth century to the middle of the seventeenth century. In China, this was the time of the Ming Dynasty; but although the dynasty was strong in China, its range of penetration into Inner Asia was extremely shallow.¹⁰ In Sinkiang and the heart of Asia — the region which, in this period, was most distant from any center of imperial power — the society of the nomads showed the readiness with which it could, after being built up into a vast system of empire, fall apart into small tribal fragments. This process of devolution showed that in spite of the unlimited mobility of which a nomadic society is capable, the natural unit of survival is a relatively small cluster of families or clans, moving within a relatively restricted geographical orbit of migration, maintaining its livestock in good condition through the changing seasons of the year.

In the same period the settled oasis society "devolved" back to its essential unit — the self-contained oasis. As in the past, however, the self-sufficiency of the individual oasis as an economic unit of production and a social unit of organization was modified by the similarity of all oases to each other, which encouraged uni-

⁹ B. Vladimirtsov, *Le Régime social des Mongols. Le féodalisme nomade*. French translation from the Russian original, by Michel Carsow, Paris, 1948, p. 129. See also V. V. Bartold, *Sketch of the History of Semirechie*, p. 43 of the Frunze (Kirghizistan, 1943) reprint of a study first published in *Notebooks of the Provincial Civil Commission of Semirechie*, II, Vernyi, 1898 (in Russian).

¹⁰ D. Pokotilov, *History of the Eastern Mongols During the Ming Dynasty from 1368 to 1634*, St. Petersburg, 1893, Part I; translation of the Russian text by Rudolph Loewenthal, Chengtu, *Studia Serica Monographs*, Series A., No. 1, 1947.

- 175 formity of culture. In this period of political disunity and decentralization, the expansion of Islam continued to enhance the cultural uniformity of the oasis world.

175 The ascendancy of Islam among the religions of Inner Asia had
779 begun before the Mongol Empire and continued through that period and on into the time of political disintegration. The Arabs under Kutayba invaded Western Turkistan and perhaps reached Kashgar at the beginning of the eighth century.¹¹ By the middle of the tenth century — when Buddhism, Nestorian Christianity, Manichaeism, Zoroastrianism, and other religions were still strong in the settled oases — Satuk Bughra Khan of the Khara-Khanid Turks, who were at that time in control of Kashgar and other oases, was converted to Islam.¹² In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries the Inner Asian rulers who claimed imperial Mongol descent rapidly went over to the language and culture of the Turks and to the religion of Islam. In the meantime the conversion to Islam of the Uighur Turks of the Urumchi-Turfan region had been going on since the eleventh century, though Buddhism and Nestorian Christianity lingered until the sixteenth century.

At the beginning of the fifteenth century the development of the institutions of Islam in Sinkiang made a long step forward with the arrival in Kashgar of the Khoja Makhtum Azyam, a learned theologian of Bokhara and a descendant of the Prophet.¹³ He was granted land by the Khan of Kashgar, and from the later struggle for the control and revenue of this estate there developed a new mode of politics, that of the Khojas.

The two sons of the first Khoja founded rival sects which were at the same time political factions, that of the Ak Tagh or White Mountains and that of the Khara Tagh or Black Mountains. At

¹¹ See W. Barthold, *Turkestan Down to the Mongol Invasion*, translated from the original Russian [1900] and revised by the author with the assistance of H. A. R. Gibb, London, 2nd. ed., 1928, especially Chapter II.

¹² According to Barthold, *op. cit.*, pp. 254-255, this event must be regarded as a mixture of history and legend; but the rapid spread of Islam among the Inner Asian Turks at this time is beyond doubt.

¹³ A. N. Kuropatkin, *Kashgaria: Eastern or Chinese Turkistan*. Translated from the Russian by Walter E. Gowan, Calcutta, 1882, p. 102.

Social Structures: The Living Past

193

first the heirs of the Khoja line were attached to and patronized by the rulers of the greater oases, and received successive grants of land, both in what is now Sinkiang and in what later became Russian Turkistan. Eventually they themselves became rulers, but the combination of religious authority and secular rule did not put an end to the rivalry between the two sects and did not provide unity or continuity of rule.

Land was held both by the Khoja family and by mosques as corporate institutions. Some of the deeds granting land to the Khojas show that there were grants which conveyed titles and privileges in addition to the land. Grants to mosques were called *wakf*, and the *wakf*-lands gave rise to a special class of managers with rights and interests of their own (see Chapter V). Since the grants included rights over the serfs on the land, a clerical feudalism became established parallel to secular feudalism.¹⁴

In the first half of the seventeenth century, while the Manchus were gathering headway for their conquest of China from the east, the oases of southern Sinkiang passed completely under Khoja rule. In 1622 the leader of the White Mountain faction, Mullah Fazil, with the aid of the powerful Khojas of Khokand, captured Kashgar. Shortly thereafter Khoja Hidayat Ullah, also known as Hazrat Apak, whose shrine at Kashgar is still venerated, became the ruler of all the oases of the Tarim Basin. Though a Moslem "saint," he negotiated with the Dalai Lama at Lhasa and was alternately in alliance and at enmity with the Jungar Mongols of northern Sinkiang.¹⁵ "His bearing exercised a marvellous effect on the people, and his appearance amongst them produced the most extraordinary manifestations of fascination. Some wept with joy, some sang with delight, others danced and leaped and whirled around, and others again fell senseless to the ground,

¹⁴ For Khoja land deeds granted at Yarkand in 1587, 1592, and 1602, and at Kucha in 1608, and collected by the nineteenth-century English traveler Shaw, see *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*, Extra No., Calcutta, 1897, Vol. 66, part 1, pp. 2-3. For *wakf* deed in the Khoja period, see G. Raquette, *Eine Kaschgarische Wakf-Urkunde aus der Khodscha-Zeit Ost-Türkestans*, Lunds Universitets Årsskrift, N. F., Avd. 1, Bd. 26, Nr. 2.

¹⁵ Kuropatkin, *op. cit.*, p. 105.

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175 whilst all were irresistibly attracted to him by an ecstatic devotion
779 of spiritual love."¹⁶

We have some notes on the theocratic feudalism of the Khojas made by the Portuguese Jesuit Father Bento de Goes, who reached Yarkand, then the capital of the Kashgar kingdom, toward the end of 1603. In February, 1604, he described Yarkand as an emporium on the long overland route between China and Europe. The severity of Moslem rule was such that as soon as the Friday service was over, twelve men left the mosque with scourges to punish those who had not attended the service.

175 Both trade and mining were administered under the feudal
779 practice of granting privilege and monopoly. The right of or-
661 ganizing and leading a caravan was sold by the "king" to the
highest bidder, who then became an "ambassador," with absolute authority over those traveling with the caravan. He recovered a part of his investment by selling positions under his authority to four associates, who also received the title of ambassador; another seventy-two privileged travelers also paid for their places in the caravan.

Similarly, the monopoly for exploiting the famous jade of Kho-tan was also for sale. "For a high price the king sells the quarrying rights to some merchants, without whose consent no one is allowed to take away any stone as long as the contract lasts."¹⁷

175 It was a little more than a century after their conquest of China
578 that the Manchus invaded Sinkiang in 1755. Their campaign was aimed at the Jungars or "East Wing" of the Western Mongols, called Kalmuks by the Turkish-speaking peoples of Inner Asia and by the Russians. The Jungars at this time had for decades, under a succession of military leaders, been fighting savagely among themselves, had been intermittently exercising overlordship in Tibet and over the oases of the Tarim Basin, and more recently had several times defeated the Northern Mongols or

¹⁶ Ney Elias, in *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*, 1897, pp. 6-7.

¹⁷ C. Wessels, *Early Jesuit Travellers in Central Asia, 1603-1721*, The Hague, 1924, pp. 24-25 and 28.

Social Structures: The Living Past 195

Khalkhas of Outer Mongolia. It was the breaking of the Jungar power that rounded out the Manchu Empire by giving the Manchus control over Outer Mongolia, Sinkiang, and Tibet.

There were two distinct phases of this conquest. In the north, the power of the Jungars was broken by terrible massacres. It is said that half of the population was killed, 20 per cent died of disease, another 20 per cent fled into the steppes of Southern Siberia, and only 10 per cent survived, scattered through the land. Such figures, deriving from the eighteenth century, do not represent statistical accuracy, but they do indicate with rough accuracy the scale of devastation.¹⁸

In the south, there were massacres in some of the smaller oases and deportations from some of the larger oases in order to deplete their military man power. From the Kashgar region some 12,000 people were deported to the Ili Valley and settled on state lands. It is from these deportees that the Taranchis (literally "cultivators") of the Ili region are descended.¹⁹ Militarily and administratively, however, the problem of the Tarim Basin was easier to handle than that of Jungaria; the Manchus established garrisons, and then imposed an imperial superstructure on top of the existing social order.

In Jungaria, the terrible massacres made it necessary to bring in a new population, under state supervision. The population became highly diversified, and ever since that time the administration of Jungaria has involved problems of the conflicting interests of different peoples. In order to replace some of the Mongol population, some of the tribes akin to the Jungars who had been at war with the Jungar federation and had fled to Russia were invited back; those who did not return but remained in the region

¹⁸ Fan Wen-lan and others, *A Short General History of China*, Shanghai, 1947, pp. 663-664. See also Wei Yuan, *The Sacred Military Records* (an account of the Manchu imperial campaigns), first published in 1842; also Chun Yuan, *General Records of the Western Regions*, a work written in 1776 but first published in Tientsin in 1818, Ch. 3, p. 26; another edition of this work is *Informal Records of the Barbarian Regions* (all in Chinese).

¹⁹ See Ch. IV.

- 175 of the lower Volga are the Mongols whom the Russians call Kal-
578 muks. The princes of the returning Mongol tribes were treated
168 as favored vassals of the Manchu Emperor.

In addition, settlements were established wherever cultivation was profitable. The settlers included the Taranchis, deported from the Tarim Basin; Manchu troops settled as military colonists; and a certain number of Chinese and Chinese Moslems. Under this colonization policy the land under cultivation in Ili and Jungaria increased from an estimated 240,000 *mu* (approximately 40,000 acres) at the end of the eighteenth century²⁰ to an estimated 700,000 *mu* (approximately 116,666 acres) at the end of the nineteenth century.²¹

- 175 In Sinkiang, as in China itself a century earlier, where the Manchus had come to power at the end of a period of terrible devastation, early Manchu policy endeavored to bring land back under cultivation by a policy of lenient taxation. Thus in Turfan and Komul Uighurs bringing land back under cultivation were allowed about five acres to a household, with seeds, implements, and working animals furnished by the state. For the first four years, after deducting seed grain from the harvest, 60 per cent of the remaining grain was to be kept by the cultivator and 40 per cent paid to the state. From the fifth year, a somewhat higher land revenue was to be assessed.²²

In Ili and Jungaria the Manchu settlers, being regarded as unquestionably loyal to the Manchu dynasty, were granted land at the rate of roughly three acres for each man (presumably each man of military age), with seeds, implements, and work animals. Some especially favored Manchus received six acres. Chinese criminal exiles, in contrast, received only two acres. The Manchu land could be considered as held on feudal tenure, inasmuch as all Manchus, Solons, and Sibos were subject to call for military

²⁰ *Sacred Military Records*, as cited, Ch. 4, figure for 1795.

²¹ Wang Shu-nan and others, *Hsinchiang T'u Chih*, or *Sinkiang Gazetteer*, compiled in 1911, published at Tientsin in 1923, Ch. 30, pp. 2-3 (figure for the period 1900).

²² *Hsinchiang T'u Chih* as cited, Ch. 28, p. 11.

Social Structures: The Living Past 197

service. In 1812, however, an imperial decree allowed the garrison commander at Kulja to divide the Manchu-held land as permanent private property, exempt from tax. Under the terms of grant, such land was not to be leased to others for cultivation, and if farm hands were hired, they must be Manchus.²³ In the course of time, however, these terms became a dead letter and the land was freely leased and even sold to Chinese cultivators, officials and merchants. 175

In their main lines the structures of both the settled and the nomad societies of Sinkiang, as administratively revised under the Manchu Empire, outlasted the great Moslem rebellions of the nineteenth century and the Chinese Revolution of 1911. They even proved strong enough to contain the gradual commercialization of economic life during the past hundred years. Only now are they finally breaking down, caught between a securely established socialized state in Soviet territory and a rapidly spreading social revolution in Chinese territory. 178
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As they break apart, these structures reveal a multiple stratification, the layers of which can be classified both socially and historically. Socially, they are graduated from arbitrary powers and privileges at the top to disfranchisement at the bottom. Historically, the stratification is more confused. In the alternating cycles of feudalism centralized under a strong imperial overlordship and feudalism decentralized under local oasis-states and rulers of nomad tribes, the incoming phase never completely swept away and replaced the institutions and administrative practices of the outgoing phase. Some of the characteristics of decentralization always lingered here and there, though unevenly, in the strongest phases of centralization; and conversely, even when oases were most completely independent of each other politically, and nomad tribes rejected the overlordship of other nomad tribes, the larger community of the oasis society as such and the society of the pastoral nomads as such was never entirely obliterated.

²³ *Institutes of the Manchu Dynasty*, edition of 1818, section "Shih Li" ("Precedents"), Ch. 842, p. 13 (in Chinese).

At the Crossroads of Inner Asia

209

influence greatly strengthens the Iranian Government. In the long run, on the other hand, there is an ironic resemblance between American influences and Russian influences: both promote modernization, and new social ambitions, much more rapidly than the traditional British type of policy. The difference is that Communist Russians, out of theoretical conviction and by planned methods, dismantle social structures that have survived from the Middle Ages; Americans, pursuing economic efficiency and promoting education to serve economic efficiency, unheedingly undermine medieval institutions as they go along, and destroy the prestige of the way of thinking that goes along with the institutions. 000

Sinkiang under the Japanese Shadow

In measuring the recession of the old forms of empire and overlordship in Inner Asia in their relationship to the rise of the Soviet forms of power and prestige, it becomes clear that the retreat of Britain began long before it became visible. The withdrawal, carried out with such skill and orderliness by the British Labour Government, after the war, had been made inevitable by the Baldwin-Chamberlain years of appeasement of Germany and Japan under a Conservative Government. The consequences of the policy that culminated in Europe at Munich can be instructively studied in Inner Asia in the decade between Japan's invasion of Manchuria in 1931 and Pearl Harbor in 1941.

After World War I, observers of the Japanese General Staff were sent to Sinkiang. There seems to have been a plan for providing Japanese military instructors in the Ili region, but the project failed for lack of funds.⁴ By the 1930's, Japanese interest in Moslem lands and Moslem politics had been systematically organized. Contacts were made in Turkey and Iran as well as in Sinkiang, and also among Chinese Moslems in China proper. The names of three paid Japanese agents, Moslems with Turkish 175

⁴ P. T. Etherton, *In the Heart of Asia*, London, 1925, pp. 125-126.

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names, are given by a well-informed German writer.⁵ One of them had been in Germany. They penetrated into Soviet Turkistan as well as into Sinkiang, and while the German writer says that he does not know what they accomplished in Soviet territory, he asserts that "they did succeed in arousing the feelings of the Sarts [Uighurs] in Sinkiang, and it is undoubtedly through the propaganda of these men that the Sart Rebellion of 1933 and 1934 took place."

The year 1933 was critical for another reason. At the end of February and the beginning of March, the Japanese overran the province of Jehol and annexed it to their puppet state of Manchukuo. In this campaign a hundred thousand square miles of territory, much of it mountainous and all of it extremely primitive in communications, was taken in only ten days — by the use of motorized columns. It was this campaign of 1933, and not that of the Germans in Poland in 1939, that first demonstrated on a really large scale the military potential of air-supported motorized columns, carrying their own maintenance and disregarding old precepts by moving with their flanks exposed and leaving enemy troops in their rear to be mopped up later.

In previous years the American explorer Roy Chapman Andrews had shown that motor vehicles could range widely through Mongolia, the Swedish explorer Sven Hedin had shown that a motor caravan could penetrate through Inner Mongolia to Sinkiang, and the French Citroën expedition had made the journey in the reverse direction. The Japanese campaign in Jehol therefore demonstrated that at any moment a Japanese column could strike all the way to Sinkiang, cut communications between China and Soviet territory, and put the Japanese Army in a position to make bids for alliance both to Turkish-speaking Moslems in Sinkiang and to the virtually independent war lords of the Chinese Moslems in Northwest China.

⁵ Anonymous, "Durchdringungspolitik in Zentralasien," *Berichte des Asien-Arbeitskreises*, Vienna and Peking, No. 1, February 1939. The author is described as having spent twelve years of travel in Central Asia, and was apparently a Nazi Intelligence agent.

At the Crossroads of Inner Asia

211

175 ●

All through the first years of their resistance to Japanese invasion the Chinese were never free of the danger of such a flanking move. The danger did not lessen until the increasing dispersion of Japanese forces after Pearl Harbor made it difficult for them to assemble the vehicles and supplies for such a drive. It was this danger that was the primary justification for the stationing of a Russian motorized unit at Komul, in Sinkiang. Only motorized mobility could counter the danger of a raiding Japanese motorized column. The Chinese had no units of the kind needed; the Russians did, and for this reason the Chinese Government, though intensely suspicious of the Russians, did not protest against Russian occupation of the oasis at the point of convergence of motorable routes from China, from Inner Mongolia, and from Soviet territory.⁶

Immediately after the Jehol campaign, and until Soviet aid enabled Sheng Shih-ts'ai to consolidate himself in power in Sinkiang, the shadow of Japan stretched visibly into Inner Asia. Ma Chung-ying, the Chinese Moslem adventurer who challenged Sheng Shih-ts'ai for power, had at least two Japanese advisers at his headquarters.⁷ In addition Ma's chief military adviser, a Turk from Istanbul named Kamal, may have had Japanese connections. Kamal had studied as an officer in both Germany and France before 1914. In the first World War he was taken prisoner by the Russians, and after the war he reached Harbin, where he taught Turkish in a school. It may be conjectured that he was sought out by the Japanese agents at this time.

Be that as it may, Ma himself is described by the German source already cited as "practically and morally supported" by the Japanese, by the Chinese National Government (which considered him a dangerous troublemaker in his native province, Kansu, and was satisfied to see him move into a more distant one), and by "the British régime in India," all of whom "hoped, through a

⁶ See Owen Lattimore, Introduction to Martin R. Norins, *Gateway to Asia: Sinkiang*, New York, 1944, p. 17.

⁷ See, among others, Aitchén K. Wu, a civil servant of the Nanking Government, who visited Ma's headquarters: *Turkistan Tumult*, London, 1940, pp. 236-237.

175 Tungkan [Chinese Moslem] regime, to set up an obstacle to the penetration of Soviet Russian influence."⁸

Willingness to flirt with Japanese penetration into Sinkiang as a lesser danger than Russian penetration, in spite of the damage done to Chinese control over Sinkiang and to British interests in that province, was a characteristic of the appeasement policies of the time, in Asia as in Europe. For, curiously enough, even the Nazi writers whose articles were published for the purpose of stimulating anti-Soviet feeling did not attempt to conceal the fact that it was Japan that was taking the initiative and that the Russian policy in Sinkiang was defensive in nature and designed to counter a Japanese penetration that had already begun.

Thus the anti-Soviet exile Fuad Kazak states that Japanese expansion was making the Soviet Union feel insecure along its entire frontier with China.⁹ The German writer already cited, attributing the uprising at Komul in 1933-1934 to Japanese agents, goes on to say that "this thrust of Japanese policy toward the west must have been the main ground on which Soviet Russia considered it necessary to bring the Province of Sinkiang under its knout."¹⁰ And finally in 1934 Yurenev, then Soviet Ambassador in Tokyo, said to Ambassador Grew that General Hayashi, who had just become Japanese War minister, "had constantly worked against Soviet Russia, particularly in Sinkiang."¹¹

In the same interview with Mr. Grew Mr. Yurenev made a remark which opens the way to an understanding of the British policy of that time. "He also said that according to his information England is showing a distinct pro-Japanese tendency. England, he said, is in a very difficult position because she has good

⁸ Anonymous, *op. cit.*, pages 7, 9, and 15. It should be noted, as a sign of the confusion of the times and the versatility with which individuals turned and twisted, that after their defeat both Ma Chung-ying and Kamal eventually passed under Russian protection.

⁹ Fuad Kazak, *Osttürkistan zwischen den Grossmächten*, Königsberg-Berlin, 1937, p. 75.

¹⁰ Anonymous, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

¹¹ Joseph C. Grew, *Ten Years in Japan*, Simon & Schuster, Inc., New York, 1944, pp. 123-125.

At the Crossroads of Inner Asia 213

reason to be afraid of Japan becoming too strong."¹² The Soviet Ambassador seems to have detected a hesitancy in British policy that is echoed by a double note running through the British writing of this period: hope that Japan might take over part of the traditional British opposition to Russia, and anxiety because, while the Japanese might at some time in the future clash with Russia, they were in the meantime, year by year, encroaching on British trade and political interests everywhere in Asia. This double note was sounded characteristically by Sir Eric Teichman, the greatest British political expert of his time on the Inner Asian frontiers of China. Summing up the situation in Sinkiang, he referred half in complaint and half in sympathy to the Japanese who, claiming "to be the bulwark against the advancing waves of bolshevism in the Farther East, render confusion worse confounded by the steps which they find it necessary in their own interests to take in Inner Mongolia and North China."¹³

Under the double pressure of fear of Russia and nervousness in face of an unpredictable Japan, British policy as reflected by British writers was intensely suspicious of Sheng Shih-ts'ai, especially in the reform period of his administration of Sinkiang, and looked with favor on Moslem religious politics as a safeguard against nonreligious nationalism. The Moslem leaders in southern Sinkiang, who held out longest against Sheng Shih-ts'ai, were accordingly looked on with favor; they were described as friendly to British travelers, and as having "formed friendly relations with the British Consul-General" at Kashgar.¹⁴ Later, when a fresh Moslem-led rising against Sheng Shih-ts'ai broke out in 1937, *The Times* said that "these events would seem to mean the temporary collapse of Soviet political influence in Kashgaria."¹⁵

The British policy, or drift, was not successful in any way. The Japanese never quite came to the point of going to war with Russia. British influence waned even in the Kashgar-Yarkand-Khotan

¹² Grew, *op. cit.*, p. 125.

¹³ Sir Eric Teichman, *Journey to Turkistan*, London, 1937, p. 191.

¹⁴ Peter Fleming in *The Times*, London, 7 December, 1935.

¹⁵ *The Times*, 21 August, 1937.

175 region, in which it had always been strongest; and Sheng Shih-ts'ai, in the years in which his policy was most active, most progressive, and most successful, bracketed the British with the Japanese as imperialists menacing Sinkiang. Partly as a device for turning the pressure of the nationalisms of the Uighurs and others away from his administration, he directed it against the British. The shadow of Japan over Sinkiang never hardened into the reality of a Japanese invasion or even raid; but in the years in which British policy appeased Japan the shadow of Britain over Sinkiang wore thinner.¹⁶

The Chinese Revolution Reaches Sinkiang

175 It was only after Russian revolutionary influences had become
648 strong and well established in Inner Asia, and after the decline of British power and prestige in the 1930's had obviously begun that the effects of China's own revolution really began to penetrate into Sinkiang. In the 1911 Revolution, all that really happened in Sinkiang was that the title of the Manchu Empire passed to the Chinese Republic. The governing group remained essentially the same, guided by the strong hand of Yang Tseng-hsin. That same strong hand sealed Sinkiang off from the stormy events and heady ideas of the Second or "Great" Revolution of 1925-1927.

175 Revolutionary developments began with the Moslem and na-
648 tionalist risings at the beginning of the 1930's, which were rebel-
669 lions against Chinese rule that turned into revolutions against the traditional social orders of Sinkiang. By an odd twist, however, it was these rebellions that gave the first opportunity of action for those Chinese in Sinkiang whose minds were also turned toward revolution.

There seems little doubt that Sheng Shih-ts'ai, at the time he came to power, was a mixture of the revolutionary and the mili-

¹⁶ For contemporary expressions of Chinese hostility to Britain on the subject of Sinkiang, see Edgar Snow, *Battle for Asia*, Random House, New York, 1941, p. 307 and note, citing the most important independent Chinese newspaper, *Ta Kung Pao*; also Martin R. Norins, *Gateway to Asia: Sinkiang*, New York, 1944, pp. 48 and 56, also citing Chinese sources.

At the Crossroads of Inner Asia

215

tary adventurer. In the Northern Expedition of 1927 he had accompanied the famous First Army column which was commanded by Chiang Kai-shek with Ho Ying-ch'in as Chief of Staff and Pai Chung-hsi as Assistant Chief of Staff, and had himself served in the Planning Section of the Staff. He had, therefore, watched at close hand those military leaders of the Kuomintang who boldly used class conflict to create a situation in which they could control the balance of power. They developed, and for a time seemed to have perfected, a method of riding the revolutionary tiger without losing control of it and becoming unable to dismount. Sheng Shih-ts'ai may well have thought, when he first assumed power in Sinkiang, that he too could use the methods of revolution without losing control of the process of revolution.

What Sheng Shih-ts'ai faced in Sinkiang was not revolution, but a widespread rebellion which could not be suppressed by force with the military resources at his command. On the other hand, he had no mandate to protect the vested interests of the colonial Chinese families that had long been established in the province. He was a newcomer. There lay before him the opportunity to take command of the situation if he could do so by use of the means available to him.

These means included:

1. Getting material aid from the Russians, in return for preventing Japanese infiltration into Inner Asia.

2. Getting the Russians to repatriate, into Sinkiang, Chinese troops which, after being defeated by the Japanese in Manchuria, had retreated into Siberia and had there been interned. As a Manchurian Chinese himself, he could present himself to these troops as a sympathetic commander, while they in turn had no local political loyalties in Sinkiang, and made him independent of reinforcements sent from China.

3. Concessions to Uighur and other non-Chinese political leaders at the expense of the old Chinese official clique in Sinkiang — a clique to which Sheng was not bound, and whose interests he did not have to defend, if by abandoning them he could create new interests allied to himself and dependent on his new policy.

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175 As was shown in Chapter III, Sheng's "nationality policy" was
 648 worded as if it had been based on concessions to peoples, but was
 669 in fact directed primarily to winning over some of the leaders of
 those peoples, whose ambition was simply to hold offices that had
 been open previously only to Chinese.

4. The recruiting of a new body of Chinese experts and advisers who, like himself, were not tied by common interests to the old regime, and would support his two bold policies of dealing with the Russians and making greater concessions to the non-Chinese nationalities of Sinkiang than their Chinese rulers had ever made to them before.

The first three points have been dealt with earlier in this book, in Chapter III. They are mentioned again here only because of their connection with the fourth point, which concerns the manner in which the characteristics of the Chinese Revolution became, after so long a delay, transplanted to Sinkiang and began to operate there.

Sheng had no difficulty in collecting Chinese, previously strangers to the province, who were far enough to the left to go along with him enthusiastically in his first years of radical innovation. Between the loss of Manchuria in 1931 and the formation of a united front between Communists and Kuomintang at the beginning of 1937, China was a bitter and disillusioned country. Thousands of ardent patriots, who did not want to follow the Communists, were disappointed in the Kuomintang's refusal to make a stand against the Japanese and its insistence, instead, on continuing the civil war against the Communists. Afraid of the Communists as "too revolutionary," but eager for reform, they were ready to rally to a leader like Sheng Shih-ts'ai who was proclaiming internal unity, democratic reforms, and unlimited hostility to imperialism.

Nor were Chinese who felt this way easily frightened by Sheng's friendly association with the Russians. Many Chinese were in favor of good relations with Russia, in view of the clear menace of Japan. To keep one foreign nation balanced against another was an old Chinese tradition; a great many Chinese

At the Crossroads of Inner Asia

217

feared that this technique was being turned against them when they were warned that, because of Russian Communism, they must not seek friendly relations with Russia even in face of the rapidly increasing encroachment of Japan. 175
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In addition to leftists and liberals, Sheng Shih-ts'ai also enlisted Chinese Communists. These were not concealed Communists; Sheng invited them to enter his service, and employed them deliberately for the sake of their techniques of popular organization, and also as economic and financial experts, feeling sure that he could take the upper hand over them whenever he felt it necessary to do so. When, in his opinion, Russia at the time of Stalingrad had become so weak that he thought it prudent to come to terms with the Kuomintang, he arrested both his Communist and his liberal assistants and tortured and killed many of them, including a brother of Mao Tze-tung. Only at the end of the war with Japan were a few of them released from jail and allowed to go to Yen-an.¹⁷

The men of whom Sheng Shih-ts'ai made use brought with them into Sinkiang the thought, the emotion, the methods of organization and some of the factionalism that had been developing in revolutionary China for more than twenty years. Their scope of action, however, did not lie within a Chinese environment. Whether they turned to the problem of strengthening the state or to the problem of reforming society, they found themselves part of a Chinese minority surrounded by peoples of several nationalities, all of them differing from the Chinese, and from each other, in their responses to social and political issues. 175
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In this situation theories of nationalism and the policies based on them became of more and more importance in determining all political alignments. Among the Chinese, at one end of the scale stood those who considered that they must maintain themselves as the ruling people, treating the non-Chinese as subjects. Next to them stood Chinese who, in contrast, considered themselves

¹⁷ For the foregoing information I am indebted to unpublished notes by Miss Anna Louise Strong of her interviews in Yen-an with some of these surviving Communists.

- 175 generous and progressive because they believed that non-Chinese
648 should acquire equal status, as individuals, as fast as they could
563 acquire the Chinese language and assimilate themselves to the
186 Chinese culturally; but this attitude was not accepted as "pro-
gressive" by non-Chinese who had their own loyalties to their
own languages and cultures. At the other end of the scale stood
Chinese who believed in conceding full citizenship to all non-
Chinese, combined with independence — including independence
in education — in the use of non-Chinese languages, and
local self-government based on recognition of the language com-
munity rather than on the territorial unit; but while these Chi-
nese were considered liberal and progressive by the Uighurs,
Kazakhs, and others, they were considered dangerously radical
and disruptive by other Chinese.

Among non-Chinese, the appeal to nationalism also evoked many responses. There were individuals whose hereditary position or political privileges were so closely associated with Chinese rule, that they hesitated to approve any change. There were others who wanted, as individuals, to rise to positions formerly held only by Chinese, but did not want to change the structure of government and administration in any other way. There were Uighurs who considered that the Uighurs, as the most numerous nationality, constituting an absolute majority, should take over the province and should have the same rights over minorities that the Chinese had formerly had over all Sinkiang. There were Kazakhs, Mongols, and others who wanted to be as independent of the Uighurs as of the Chinese. And, finally, there were radical nationalists who wanted to change the social order as well as the political structure: to unseat their own Begs, Sultans, and Princes as well as to govern themselves without the Chinese District Magistrates.

All of these groups and tendencies worked out their relationship to each other in a pattern of constantly changing coalitions. In the politics of reform and revolution, coalitions are the characteristic phenomena. They are formed by groups which have interests in common to defend or to assert and which, in forming

At the Crossroads of Inner Asia

219

the coalition, emphasize convergent interests and avoid emphasis on divergent interests. The coalition breaks up when one of its component groups has secured the interest that it thinks most essential, and is unwilling to risk this gain by pushing ahead in support of interests more essential to other groups. New coalitions then form, grouped on the one hand around those who wish to stabilize the situation and on the other hand around those who still have unsatisfied interests to assert.

Sheng Shih-ts'ai, in the first phase of his rule, achieved considerable success by building around himself a left-of-center coalition of progressive, radical, and Communist Chinese — together with non-Chinese leaders, to whom he granted more freedom of political action than had ever been granted by any previous Chinese Governor. In the second phase of his rule he tried, and eventually failed, to build a new right-of-center coalition by combining representatives of the Kuomintang, freshly sent in from China, with those of his own followers whom he considered personally loyal to himself rather than to political principles.

After the fall of Sheng and the end of the war with Japan, different factions of the Kuomintang, frequently weakened by purely factional quarrels with each other, formed a series of unsteady coalitions in which they enlisted representatives of the most conservative interests among the non-Chinese, especially the Uighurs and Kazakhs. These Chinese-controlled coalitions were opposed by the Kulja coalition in the Ili Valley and western Jungaria, which rested on leftist and pro-Communist groups among the non-Chinese nationalities, but at the same time sought to maintain contact with moderate representatives, such as Chang Chih-chung, within the right-wing coalition which dominated most of the Tarim Basin and eastern Jungaria.

*The Kuomintang, the Chinese Communists,
and the Russian Frontier*

In coalition politics of this kind the shifts of allegiance of Osman Bator, the freebooting Kazakh leader, who has been fre-

175 quently interviewed by American correspondents, were typical.
662 First, as a military leader with an independent following, he sought to take advantage of Chinese military weakness by joining the Ili coalition. Later, failing to dominate the Ili coalition, he went over to the Chinese side, where by this time his price had risen because popular sympathy was turning away from the conservative Uighur and other leaders who had accepted Chinese protection.

During this phase of Sinkiang politics the Ili coalition, holding territory along the Soviet frontier, received aid and comfort from Soviet Kazakhstan. The coalition of Kuomintang officials and generals, conservative Uighur figureheads supported by the Kuomintang, and Kazakh auxiliaries received subsidies and American arms from the American-supported government at Nanking. This phase ended when the advances of the Chinese Communist armies across the Yangtze cut off the Kuomintang outposts in Sinkiang from any hope of support from within China.

175 An entirely new situation was thus created. Ever since the Russian Revolution, the non-Chinese peoples of Sinkiang had stood
563 between a government controlled by Russian Communists on the
648 one side and a government controlled by non-Communist or anti-Communist Chinese on the other side. They now stand between a government controlled by Russian Communists and a government dominated by Chinese Communists.

In this new situation the aims of the Russian Communists and the Chinese Communists, as Marxists, are generally the same; but the domestic interests of the Chinese Republic and the Soviet Union are not necessarily identical. In the Soviet Union the Russians are the dominant people; but there are vast territories inhabited by many millions of people who are not Russians. In the Chinese Republic the Chinese people are the overwhelming majority; they dominate China much more decisively than the Russians dominate the Soviet Union; but in the Chinese Republic also there are vast territories inhabited by peoples who are not Chinese. The geographical center of gravity of the non-Chinese territories of China lies in Sinkiang. The frontiers of Sinkiang

At the Crossroads of Inner Asia

221

touch the Inner Asian Soviet Republics, the most important block of territory in the Soviet Union inhabited by peoples who are not Russians and not Slavs.

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This situation gives a new aspect to old problems and creates new problems of its own. There is the question whether, in the Soviet Union, the interests of the Russians are to override the interests of the other peoples, and the question whether, in the Chinese Republic, the interests of the Chinese are to override those of all others. These are old problems, the development of which has long been watched warily by the neighbors of Russia and China. In addition, there is now the new problem of the relationship between the Soviet Union and China: are the interests of the Soviet Union, as a state, to be made paramount over those of China, as a state?

If statesmen were efficiency engineers, and no more than that, a very good case could be made for annexing parts of Sinkiang to the Mongolian People's Republic and to the Kazakh, Kirghiz, and Tajik Republics of the Soviet Union, and for setting up most of the Tarim Basin as an Uighur Republic, also to be annexed to the Soviet Union. In terms of the affinities of peoples, languages, and cultures, geographical accessibility, the most economical laying-out of modern communications, and the rapid promotion of material progress, the natural orientation of Sinkiang is toward Mongolia and the Soviet Union, rather than toward China. On the other hand, however, the material and sentimental interests of China in Sinkiang, though they have been much abused, are real; and so are the interests of Sinkiang in its connection with China, if this connection is wisely handled.

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The probability is that the Chinese Communists will, as Chinese, renounce no sovereignty in lands long claimed as Chinese. At the same time, it is to be expected that they will attempt to apply new policies — not only to Sinkiang, but to Inner Mongolia, to the districts in which Chinese Moslems predominate in Ninghsia and Kansu, and to such parts of Tibet as they can penetrate. It is to be expected that, as Marxists, they will model these policies on those of the Russians in Soviet Asia. The Sinkiang of

III

SHENG SHIH-TS'AI AND THE "NEW
NEW DOMINION"

185 WHEN SHENG SHIH-TS'AI was offered direction of Sinkiang destinies, history began to record a courageous new chapter—for long a secret and maligned one—in the annals of human emancipation. For Sheng urged that the province discard the old-style dependency tradition and, by adopting a great new six-point charter, cast in her lot with progress. By his Six Great Policies he aimed at reviving long-submerged cultural aspirations of Sinkiang native races and at bringing about revolutionary Sinkiang reconstruction. This he tried to do within the limits of nominal control of the Chinese Republic, at the price of favoring "radical" Soviet ideas, and at the cost of offending other less far-sighted Chinese, as well as many assertedly "foreign imperialist" interests. He has, in brief, made the province into a New Sinkiang (*Hsin Hsin-chiang*), a remarkable "New New Dominion."

175 Sheng, a moderate-sized, handsome man, with an exceptionally full crop of dark hair and a thick, descending mustache, started out for the region late in the 1920's. Yang Tseng-hsin, warlord master of the province since abdication of the Manchu Dynasty, had been assassinated in July, 1928, and his place taken by the weak, avaricious Chin Shu-jen. Provincial General Secretary Lu Hsüeh-tsu had gone from Sinkiang to Nanking on business, and had been requested by Chin to look around while there for a man of military background possibly suited to build up the army of the frontier province. Sheng Shih-ts'ai was the man Lu selected.

643 Born in K'ai-yüan county of Liaoning, Manchuria, in 1893, Sheng Shih-ts'ai had been reared "in a small family" and amid conditions of "poverty" and "cold." How he managed an education with such meager resources is not clear, but he attended primary and middle schools, and even had some university training in Nanking. There he studied European history under Chang Chi-luan, the late editor of China's most famous newspaper, *Ta Kung Pao*. Sheng never seems to have forgot-

ten his old teacher, and that is probably one of the reasons that the *Ta Kung Pao* has often been able to reveal more information concerning the New Sinkiang than other Chinese journals. 643

Though Sheng started out to be a student of the arts, the trend of events in China led him, midway in his career, to study military science also. It was after a period of attendance at a university in Japan—where he and his biographer, Tu Chung-yüan, became friends—that Sheng returned to China and entered the then famous military academy at Shaokwan (Ch'ü-chiang) in Kwangtung Province. Li Ken-yüan, an old-time Yunnan militarist-revolutionary, was in charge and guided the young student through the academic ropes. On graduation, Sheng was given an introduction to Kuo Sung-ling, one of the prominent war lords of his native Northeast China.

General Kuo made Sheng a *Hsiao P'ai Chang* (Second Lieutenant) and rapidly promoted him until he became a *Ying Chang* (Battalion Commander). Then he was permitted another period of study, this time in a Japanese military academy. He had not been in Japan long, however, when he was called back to China to join in a military *Putsch*. It failed, and as a consequence General Kuo was killed. Sheng, having lost his benefactor and himself become involved in difficulties, returned to Japan "to read books." While there he received financial backing from none other than Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. As a consequence, it is said, he has since referred to himself as "The Student" when signing telegraph messages addressed to the Chinese national leader.

Soon after his Japanese military training had been completed, Sheng Shih-ts'ai joined the Generalissimo in the northward march against the war lords of Pei-p'ing or Peking as it was then called. He was shortly given a post in the office of the Chinese General Staff but was not happy there and decided to try his luck on the Chinese frontier. On first thought, probably due to his past tutelage under a Yunnanese schoolmaster at Ch'ü-chiang, he considered going to Yunnan. The attractions of the vaster and richer territory of Sinkiang, however, ultimately won him.

Not the most pleasant introduction to Sinkiang awaited Sheng. He 643
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643 had met Lu Hsüeh-tsu in Nanking through the offices of a mutual
 175 friend, and Lu was persuaded to recommend him to the Sinkiang
 Military Governor. But when Chin Shu-jen learned of Sheng's back-
 ground he seemed to fear to take him on; Chin wanted a subordinate,
 not a possible rival. It was only through third party pressure that Chin
 agreed to give Sheng his chance. Then, just as the young appointee was
 about to leave Eastern China, Sino-Russian hostilities over the Chinese
 Eastern Railway broke out and interrupted normal air transport through
 Soviet Russia via Vladivostok. Since it was by that route that Sheng
 had planned to travel, he was forced to spend eight months in Pei-p'ing
 "reading" again until communications were restored. When the line
 was at last reopened, he flew through Siberia to his destination; there
 he was temporarily lodged as a guest of Lu Hsüeh-tsu, who had been
 his traveling companion. But Sheng did not get to see Chin Shu-jen
 until over a week had passed; for Lu and the military governor had
 had a quarrel almost as soon as Lu arrived.

At last Sheng was assigned a position with the General Staff in the
 Office of the Border Defense Commander of Sinkiang. Not a particu-
 larly attractive "boost" for one with Sheng's background, the assign-
 ment found him nevertheless immediately setting to his tasks. By 1930
 he had worked himself up to the position of Chief of the General Staff
 in the Office; then, when revolt broke out in Ha-mi, he was made
 Commander-in-Chief at the Front.

175 Chin Shu-jen, a man weaker than those before him and yet covetously
 669 retaining the old exploitation methods, had attempted to monopolize
 taxes on Sinkiang foreign trade and had given his sons extensive re-
 gional authority. This combination had caused such resentment that,
 apparently with some Japanese instigation filtering in through Mon-
 golia, it surged up in a swelling tide and flung the waves of civil war
 over the province. The incident which finally precipitated his downfall
 came with the death of the Mohammedan Prince of Qomul in 1930.

Qomul, the Moslem city known to Chinese as Ha-mi, as late as 1930
 had been still under only nominal Chinese suzerainty. But when its
 prince died his son was "received" into Chinese protective custody; then
 the ancient principality of Qomul was legally abolished and the region

broken down into three Chinese counties, Ha-mi, I-ho, and I-wu. From those, according to the existing Chinese law, certain taxes were automatically due to the provincial government and to other Chinese government authority. This alone might have been enough to rouse the Moslems of the old principality, for up to then they had not been accustomed to pay such taxes. But to make matters worse a party of eighty Kansu refugees had been brought by Chin Shu-jeu to Sinkiang and allotted some of the Moslem land in the "new" I-ho county. Finally, one of the "infidel" tax collectors tried to marry a pretty Moslem girl. In their fury the Moslems killed the tax collector and the eighty Kansu refugees. The small nucleus of Mohammedan rioters gradually accumulated "thousands" more, and open revolt against the Sinkiang administration began.

The whole affair was an expensive demonstration of Chin Shu-jeu's ineptitude for the office of Sinkiang Provincial Chairman. The old Prince of Qomul had been thoroughly hated by his own people, and his demise need not have created such an outbreak. Yet, once the revolt had been started, it assumed devastating proportions.

Two of the rebels went to Kansu and solicited help from Ma Chung-ying. With some four hundred Moslem comrades from Kansu to help him, Ma marched forward into Sinkiang. This was one of the far-famed Ma's of the Tung-kan (Tungan) clan. Born at the town of Hsichow in Southern Kansu, he had entered the Ch'inghai army of one of his namesakes, Ma Pu-fang, at the age of seventeen. After a time he had gathered his own Moslem Chinese army about him and swiftly brought his name to notice in Kansu military affairs. So prominent had he become by the spring of 1930 that Chiang Kai-shek had permitted him to enroll in the Nationalist military academy at Nanking for a three months' indoctrination course. When he returned to the Northwest, however, his ambitions brought him rapidly into difficulty with other prominent leaders of the region. He had just suffered a military defeat at the hands of Ma Pu-fang when the call came from Ha-mi.

Ma Chung-ying entered Sinkiang as a liberator, and at first recruits came by the throng to his army, the official 36th Division which

- 175 Nanking had authorized him to command. He attacked Chen-hsi
669 (Barkol) successfully, and then Ha-mi and Ch'i-chio-ching. Though partly victorious in these latter encounters, he was wounded and temporarily retired to refuge in Kansu. He returned to the fray in May, 1932, chiefly assisted by another Moslem, Ma Shih-ming. Chin Shu-jen then directed Sheng Shih-ts'ai, already promoted to the post of Commander-in-Chief at the Front, to march against the rebels. Sheng was so successful that two of the Moslem leaders, Yulbaz and Khoja Niaz by name, fled from the province. Ma Shih-ming, however, had marched to Shan-shan and launched a counter-attack in the winter of 1932. His forces soon were approaching the outskirts of Tihwa, the provincial capital.

At this time over a thousand of the refugee troops of the Northeast Resist Japan Army from Manchuria—then continuing a journey back into China via Sinkiang—began to march down from T'a Ch'eng (Chuguchak) to defend Tihwa. Ma Shih-ming, noting this, withdrew his Moslem forces to San-tao Pa, which commanded access to the rice-producing areas on which Tihwa was dependent. Chin Shu-jen therefore ordered Sheng Shih-ts'ai to take the new forces with him in an attack on San-tao Pa and later Fou-k'ang, another Moslem stronghold. Sheng had just chased the Tung-kans out of San-tao Pa when there came a new turn of events.

A heavy slaughter of Han Chinese had been going on in many centers elsewhere in the province, and within the provincial capital there was a great rice shortage. Chinese military and civilian leaders alike, therefore, had by this time begun to resent the continued fighting; Tihwa had even come to feel that if Chin Shu-jen were ousted from his post as Provincial Chairman the warfare might subside. White Russian troops, constituting a sizable portion of the soldiers upon whom Chin counted for protection, were at the same time restless about poor treatment they had been receiving. This unhealthy state of affairs came to a climax on April 12, 1933, the occasion of the "Four-Twelve" Affair, when these same White Russians announced that Moslems were attacking the city. A mob, entering the gates of Tihwa, rushed forward in a direct attack on the provincial government headquarters. In the midst

of this pandemonium Chin Shu-¹⁷⁵jen fled out of the city. Provincial military responsibility thus fell directly on Sheng Shih-ts'ai's shoulders. 669

Tu Chung-yüan, whose account in Chinese of the New Sinkiang has been exceptionally revealing, continues with the story in this way:

After Chin Shu-¹⁷⁵jen had fled, the White Russian Army captured both Chin Shu-hsin, his son, and Commander Ts'ui Chao-chi. Ultimately Chin Shu-hsin was killed because he tried to flee during his trial.

It was evening in the city when the White Russian Army opened the meeting. Liu Wen-lung, Provincial Commissioner of Education, was chosen Provisional Chairman of the Provincial Government. Cheng Jun-ch'eng, leader of the Manchurian Northeast National Salvation Army, was named Provisional Chairman of the Military Affairs Commission, and twenty-four men, including Ch'en Chung, Tao Ming-yüeh and others, were selected as members of a Sinkiang Provincial Government Maintenance Committee. Liu Wen-lung posited three principles for the meeting: Protection of Chin Shu-¹⁷⁵jen's life and property; Protection of the Consulate; and Maintenance of order.

At the time Cheng Jun-ch'eng was outside the city and did not know what had taken place, so Yang Hsüeh-yüan was sent to get him. Cheng, after declining his appointment three times, finally consented to accept it temporarily. But it was known Chin's appointment of Sheng Shih-ts'ai indicated the latter had considerable power, and some feared that Sheng might help Chin Shu-¹⁷⁵jen. Pai Yü-hsiu was appointed to see Sheng about taking over Chin's office . . . but was wounded. At the time both Sheng Shih-ts'ai and Yang Hsüeh-yüan were at Cheng Jun-ch'eng's headquarters, and all three of them entered the city together. Cheng continually argued that he and his troops were guests of Sinkiang, and that he could not accept appointment in the province. The people therefore selected Sheng as Provisional Border Defense Commander . . .

Young Sheng Shih-ts'ai, rich in military background, recognized this opportunity for what it was; his military successes had already won him acclaim and the Sinkiang capital was looking for a new military leader. Though Cheng Jun-ch'eng, leader of the Manchurian contingent passing through Sinkiang, might have been first choice, he did not feel free to accept provincial military command. Perhaps Sheng helped persuade him to decline. Sheng was the most eligible leader left and, accordingly, was selected.

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669 Sheng Shih-ts'ai had been placed in a difficult position, and at first there seemed little that he could do. The Tung-k'an armies of Ma Chung-ying had cut him off and were bleeding the countryside of Eastern Sinkiang of its sustenance. Everywhere along the road from Ha-mi to Tihwa there was "misery, debris, devastation!" At Ha-mi the shops were closed, their fronts barred with sinister wood shutters. The village of T'ou-p'u had become merely "heaps of clay." At Ch'i-chio-ching the streets were littered and stinking with the bodies of dead horses shot in battle. Movement on the thoroughfares of Turfan had ceased, its commerce was paralyzed and there, too, the shops were shuttered and bolted. Ma Chung-ying had become the "autocrat of Eastern Sinkiang" from Ha-mi to Korla and west as far as Kashgar; by June, 1933, he had entered even Ch'i-t'ai (Ku Ch'eng-tzu) "unhindered" and had begun to push from there towards Tihwa. Behind him, though, he had left a wake of pillaging and poverty. The ruthlessness with which he and his men plundered the countryside and the people earned him hatred even from countless fellow Moslems as well as from the Han Chinese.

Sheng directed the Northeast Resist Japan Army to continue the march against Ma, who was as a consequence forced temporarily into a retreat; but he recovered enough to reform his men into ranks and to capture Turfan. From there, where the North and South Roads of Sinkiang come closest to juncture, he controlled access to both East and South Sinkiang. This news came as a severe jolt to the capital, for revolt had also broken out further north at I-li (Sui-ting), under General Chang Pei-yüan. Representatives of the Chinese National Government took this opportunity to attempt negotiation of a peace between Sheng and Ma. Nanking sent first General Huang Mu-sung, then the late Lo Wen-kan. But both were unsuccessful. Sheng was amenable, yet requested that Ma make Ha-mi his headquarters and take orders from the provincial government; to this Ma would not consent. Instead, at the turn of 1934, he once more marched his armies toward the capital which had just sent its main force in the direction of T'a Ch'eng to put down the Altai uprising of Chang Pei-yüan.

At this point Sheng Shih-ts'ai arranged with Soviet Russia to import

large amounts of war materials—trucks, armored cars, machine-guns, ammunition, and even airplanes. With these and the help of Russian troops from the Altai area, the government forces captured Hsi-hu, on the Altai road, and compelled General Chang to flee ultimately toward an ignominious suicide. Then Sheng turned once more to press home his attack on Ma Chung-ying. Had the Russian matériel not been obtained, Ma might have won the battle of Tihwa. As it was, the Tung-kans were forced to flee back all the way to Toqsun; and Sheng's armies began to block their enemies off, both outside Turfan and in the vicinity of Karashahr (Yen-ch'i). Ma's position quickly became so desperate that he began a long retreat to the southwest in the direction of Kashgar. Sheng's airplanes harried the retreating forces with bombs at Turfan and again at Korla, and it was only by the narrowest margin that the Tungkan leader squeezed past those towns to Kucha. From there he fled to the comparative security of Kashgar in April, 1934. Yet he was forced to leave even that refuge, for troops of the Northeast Resist Japan Army marched in within four months. Ma is said to have been escorted over the Chinese frontier into Russia, and his whereabouts have since then seemingly been swallowed up in mystery.

Sinkiang was not, however, sorry to see him depart, after the four years of warfare. The desperate people were instead only too ready to heed proclamations which were dropped from Sheng Shih-ts'ai's airplanes urging the populace to make "genuine submission" in return for "rehabilitation" and "safety." An army of Kirgizes, Turkis, Torguts, Taranchis, and White Russians, according to words ascribed to one of the tribesmen himself, had at last been formed "to drive Ma and the Tungkans out of Sinkiang." All who followed Sheng Shih-ts'ai had been promised, too, that "a new era" had begun for the province; that General Sheng was going to reorganize Sinkiang administration and bring "order, peace, and security."

On first coming to power in 1933, Sheng Shih-ts'ai concerned himself principally with the handling of dissident factions; soon, however, he issued declarations of radical administrative policy, and then introduced a first, and in due course a second, three-year plan of provincial reconstruction. His program was not at first so effective in South Sin-

it only been these. China has had great difficulty in defending this frontier during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, yet she herself probably began imperialism in Sinkiang some two thousand years ago. And she had to compete even then with the nomads of Siberia, Mongolia, and Turkestan. It is through "Anti-imperialism" that the New Sinkiang has attempted to arm herself against all this. 648

Chinese Imperialism in the Western Regions

The "Anti-imperialism" of the New Sinkiang may well have been, in the first place, a reproach for Chinese imperialist frontier policies of the past. For Sinkiang Province was not always Chinese territory. The area appears to have been inhabited in ancient times by a number of separate independent clans, principalities, and states which Chinese gradually came to know collectively as the *Hsi Yü*, or "Western Regions." By conquest, and often by repression, of the natives of these Western Regions, Chinese were among the first to acquaint them with imperialism. A related, but slightly different, approach to this point is made by Owen Lattimore in his study, *Inner Asian Frontiers of China*. 648 175

The history of the Chinese in Central Asia . . . is a history of imperialism, of conquest. The Chinese could not here expand, adding contiguous region to contiguous region as they did in their advance toward the Yangtze and beyond, but had to subjugate and dominate from afar. They had, moreover, to compete with the imperialism of the steppe, which also attempted to assert its control over the oasis world. The record of the Chinese in Central Asia is therefore by no means continuous; in fact, their effective control has been estimated at only about 425 out of about 2,000 years, divided into a number of periods, of which the present Chinese rule in the province of Sinkiang is the fifth major period.

China seems to have had earliest contact with the Western Regions during the Han Dynasty (B.C. 206-220 A.D.). The Hsiung-nu (Hun?) nomads of Mongolia had been raiding the Chinese frontier, and the Chinese Emperor, Han Wu Ti, wanted to outflank them with bases in the Western Regions. He didn't get those bases at first; but through an emissary, Chang Ch'ien, he did initiate Chinese frontier activity

648 in Central Asia. By the end of the first century A.D. a Han general
175 Pan Ch'ao had expanded that activity so successfully in a military sense
that "more than fifty kingdoms" of the Western Regions had "sent
hostages," and countries as far away as Persia were regularly sending
"tributary" missions to the Chinese throne.

China did not retain this position permanently. Some three to four
hundred years later, Chinese of the Sui and T'ang Dynasties had to
play off "western Turks" (apparently a people of the Western Regions)
against the "northern Turks" (probably a people then in present-day
Mongolia) to regain mastery of Turkestan. In the period, during the
reign of the Emperor Hsüan Tsung of the T'ang Dynasty (713-756)
Chinese power extended as far as the sites of Kashmir and Gogit (in
present-day Northwest India).

But this was the limit to which Chinese westward expansion was
then to go, and later it even met with severe reverses. When the Sons
of Han did carry their authority back to Turkestan, it was centuries
later and then they were mainly henchmen to their own "barbarian"
overlords: the Mongols in the thirteenth, and the Manchus in the
seventeenth century. What memories must have been left the people
of Sinkiang by plundering Mongol hordes of Genghis Khan! And by
the Manchus! In 1750 during the reign of Emperor Ch'ien Lung, their
armies laid waste the Altai region and annihilated 600,000 inhabitants.
A century later they slaughtered numberless Moslems in the "pacifi-
cation" of such Asiatic revolts as that of Yakub Beg of Kashgar.

Nor, for almost a quarter century after Chinese revolt from Manchu
rule in 1911 and 1912, did Sinkiang have an opportunity to dissociate
the idea of Chinese rule from that of stern military conquest. The ad-
ministration of the first Republican governor of the province, Yang
Tseng-hsin, aroused so much resentment that he was assassinated on
July 7, 1928. Once his firm hand was withdrawn unrest again stirred;
and it was thus that the Sinkiang civil war which brought Sheng
Shih-ts'ai to power broke out in the 1930's.

Tsarist Imperialism

In the later days of the Manchu Dynasty, meanwhile, a new imperialism had come to Sinkiang. The expanding Russian Empire had not been slow to profit from her proximity to China, and in the Treaty of Kuldja of 1851 she gained her first sizable foothold in the Sinkiang economic door. The treaty, kept secret for a time, was made public in 1861. It gave Russia the right to send agents into the region, permitted Russian commercial dealings with Kuldja (Sui-ting or I-li) and Chuguchak (T'a Ch'eng), and foresaw the opening of a Russian consulate at Kuldja. In the Treaty of Peking, November 14, 1860, this beginning was enlarged to permit the opening of another consulate, at Kashgar.

Then came the Yakub Beg revolt of the 1860's and an upset in the Central Asian balance of power. The Turkestan frontier was so "disturbed" that in 1871 Russia occupied points on the Chinese side, promising that her forces would be evacuated as soon as China had restored order. There was doubt at the time as to Russia's true intentions, and all might not have gone so well subsequently had China's army under Tso Tsung-t'ang not been successful in its bitter campaign to "pacify" the Moslem uprising. Russia, unable in 1881 to challenge the victorious Chinese, reluctantly signed new conventions with China. By these the Tsar, in return for a monetary payment, ultimately gave back part of the Chinese territory he had occupied. A *modus operandi* was achieved by which China, among other matters, recognized the Russian right to open consulates at Kuldja, Chuguchak, Kashgar, and Turfan, and assented to creation of other Russian consulates at Ha-mi, Tihwa, and Ch'i-t'ai (Ku Ch'eng-tzu) should commercial relations warrant.

British Imperialism

Russian ambitions in Chinese Turkestan in the time of the Tsars had, however, additional reactions farther south. It is not too surprising that, once Russian troops had moved across the Sinkiang frontier in 1871, authorities of the British Empire tendered political "recognition" to the "government" which the rebel Yakub Beg had

648 then organized at Kashgar. The British felt their "preserve" in nearby
 175 India was being "threatened" and as a consequence "countered" Russian action both by recognizing the Beg and by taking a more active interest in "trade" with South Sinkiang.

Sinkiang-Indian trade had been under way for some time, but the British Government became officially committed to its furtherance in 1876. This policy, they found, could not be pursued satisfactorily without dispatch of an armed force to pacify the Northwest Frontier of India. In taking this step, they trespassed on what Chinese feel was and is their ground. Thereupon, say Chinese, when in 1884 a British force marched into "Kanjut" (*K'an-chü-t'i* or *Kan-chu-t'e*)—the site of the Gilgit Agency and Hunza Valley of modern Northwest India—outright English "aggression" against Sinkiang began. Subsequently a British agent and a British consul were established at Kashgar. This South Sinkiang metropolis became a focus for British activity which, under the aegis of the Indian trade agent, the British consul, and native *aqsaqals* (headmen), was carried on mainly as an intra-Mohammedan affair. It became, consequently, subject to a persistent suspicion on the part of Chinese non-Moslems.

Manchu Commercial Efforts

439 That the Russians and British were attempting to dominate Sinkiang trade became apparent to China by the closing years of Manchu rule. In a limited and tardy way the Manchus attempted to strengthen administration in the province, therefore, and to foster new development of intra-Chinese trade. New colonizing blood was poured into the veins of Sinkiang. At the same time went manufacturers and ideas; and from the province came jade, gold, furs, skins, and a number of other items. The avidity with which foreigners in Tientsin and Shanghai sought the furs, skins, and wool especially helped, and by the beginning of the twentieth century Chinese traders were bringing these goods out of Sinkiang in such amounts that she was beginning to experience a new prosperity. But the process of itself could not develop to satisfactory proportions, due to the then current weakness of the

563 lo), "Kuerhliq," those of Ha-mi (Qomul), "Qomuliq," and on and on. There has also, however, been a countertendency to associate these exceptionally localized Turkic and "Alpine" ethnic types as a whole with the Uighur race that flourished anciently in the Sinkiang area. Since Sheng Shih-ts'ai came to power in Sinkiang, these *Ch'an Hui* (or Chanto) have been given the name of *Wei-wu-erh*, a Chinese transliteration of "Uighur."

144 It is not clear precisely what the earliest racial stock inhabiting the Western Regions, or present-day Sinkiang, was. Investigation has disclosed the existence of relatively ancient independent peoples in the Altai region, perhaps as early as the third century B.C., and one pioneer student of the subject has described their history as being "mysteriously wrapped up" in that of the Uighurs "from the far south of Mongolia. . . ." The Uighurs are supposed to have been a light-haired and blue-eyed people and in them, it is insisted, is to be found the "origin of the Turkish race who, later on, overflowed all Central Asia and made an Empire on the shore of the Bosphorus."

771
175 Some of these Uighur peoples of Sinkiang seem at one time to have believed in Manichaeism—the doctrines of the Persian, Manes—but they were willing to try their religious luck elsewhere. They became in turn Nestorian Christians, Buddhists, and finally and most permanently, Moslems. In the eighth century—when almost simultaneous Tibetan and Arab attacks had forced the Chinese armies of Kao Hsien-chih to fall back in retreat from Turkestan and when the Arab forces were advancing successfully under Qutaiba to the edge of the Pamirs—the Uighurs gradually turned to Islam. As the T'ang Dynasty's military standing declined in Turkestan, its nominal subjects—the Uighurs—began to carry on for it the burden of colonial rule. The Uighur prestige grew so swiftly that, before the tenth century was well under way, they wielded the balance of power in Turkestan from their capital at Bishbalik, near the site of the present Sinkiang capital, Tihwa. During this period they served almost as an overland bridge for the introduction of Mohammedan culture into China. The Uighurs themselves derived considerable cultural benefit from their newly gained strategic position; and their language, Turki, was established permanently in

Sinkiang from this time on. Under their kindly patronage a cosmopolitan scholarship developed in the Western Regions, and to it Arab, Khitan, Mongol, Persian, and Tibetan, as well as Chinese, contributed. The vestiges of learned tomes, once impressive shrines, and even whole cities that are buried in the sands of the Takla Makan are evidences even now of this once flourishing native culture.

Authorities of the New Sinkiang have been re-awakening the pride of the Wei-wu-erh people of today on the basis of this ancient kingdom's grandeur, and these Wei-wu-erh may indeed be the modern heirs of the Uighur traditions. Tu Chung-yüan, who is one of those who openly calls the Wei-wu-erh the original settlers of the province, says that they are distributed throughout the south and in much of the north, being especially strong around Ha-mi, Kucha, Kashgar, and Khotan.

One of their principal centers is Kashgar. Perhaps these people are not as strict as some other Mohammedans in their observance of the principles of the Koran, but they do have great reverence for many Islamic rites and observances. They are of the Sunni sect, one of the two great branches into which Islam was split in 645 when the Caliphate was assumed by Ali, the Prophet's son-in-law, in the midst of a dispute over the succession which has remained heated ever since. Whereas the Kanjutis across the border in Northwest India are Shias and follow a leader who traces his lineage to Caliph Ali, the Wei-wu-erh of Kashgar are among the most loyal Sunni Moslems in Chinese Turkestan.

The Wei-wu-erh have deep-set eyes and high noses, and Chinese are inclined to group them racially with the Turks. The girls are often exceptionally beautiful, with eyelashes inclined upwards and with jet hair topped by cheery pompons and quaint petite caps. Maturity comes early in Turkestan, and often these girls marry before they are fifteen. Betrothal is pledged by a girl's father and mother, and the ceremony is performed by the local *A-hung*, or priest. There is understandable gaiety on the occasion, and considerable piping and drumming. The bride finally is borne on a donkey to the house of her future husband for completion of the ritual. If the husband and wife do not prove

563 to a rare imported brandy. The rough, unkempt Kalmuck Mongols of the Tekes Valley of North Sinkiang are especially devil-may-care fellows; but they have, at times, got amazingly rich from their countless horses and sheep.

● 175 A vast sweep of nomad devastation, which won them the throne of China and carried their warfare as far west as the Danube, brought the Mongols to Chinese Turkestan. What is now both Chinese and Russian Turkestan, once those areas were subjugated, came under Jagatai, second son of Genghis Khan, and he and his successors remained in power for almost two centuries. But in 1368 the Yüan (Mongol) Dynasty in China was overthrown by the House of Ming and soon afterwards Turkestan also seceded from Mongol rule. Thus temporarily the Mongol star seemed to have set, and differences between the peoples of Mongolia proper and those in the Altai area (the Western Mongols) set in.

563 One of the subordinate leagues of the Western Mongols, the Ölöts (Eleuths), soon came into military prominence in Turkestan under a [103] Khan by the name of Galdan. Galdan's nephew, Rabdan, gave the name of his branch of the Ölöts—the Jön Gar (Jungars, sometimes written Dzungars, Zungars)—to the kingdom when he succeeded to the Mongol possessions. The name has since stuck in geographies as Jungaria (Dzungaria or Zungaria), and it has reference to the part of Sinkiang which lies between the T'ien Shan and the Altai, i.e., North Sinkiang. These same Ölöts took advantage of political differences to the south of them and came to dominate South Sinkiang, Ch'inghai, and Tibet for a brief historical period; this epoch has even been viewed by one Chinese historian as a "Golden Age" for the Western Regions. Yet the fount of Ölöt power, for the Ölöts as for others of the Western Mongols, was Jungaria and the steppes, not the oases of South Sinkiang, where Uighur (present Wei-wu-erh) civilization appears to have persisted. For Mongol life has been the phenomenon of nomadism, and life in South Sinkiang has been that of the isolated, petty agriculture of the oasis. The power of the nomad is his mobility, and he requires extensive pasturage for his cattle; yet the life of oasis agriculture is essentially fixed and in South Sinkiang it seems to have continued with

VII

CLEAN GOVERNMENT

642 SINKIANG as a Chinese province has existed for less than three-quarters of a century, and even during that period it has been not so much a province as a Chinese outpost and dependency. The changes in Sinkiang since Sheng Shih-ts'ai came to power have brought a new administrative pattern, one which has been summed up in the Six Great Policies as "Clean Government." This new political structure came partially as the result of close ties to Sovietism; but it has never meant surrender of Sinkiang autonomy to Soviet Russia. "Clean Government" has been, instead, an effort to improve upon old Chinese institutions and upon the treatment formerly allotted to the Sinkiang natives.

Han Relations with Ancient Sinkiang (Western Regions)

675 The degree and type of influence which China has exerted in Sinkiang has in a sense varied with the good or bad fortune of effective Chinese control over that dependency. For the purposes of this study the Han (B.C. 206-220 A.D.), T'ang (618-907), Ta Ch'ing or Manchu (1644-1912), and Republican (1912-present) epochs have been selected as periods which modern Chinese themselves view as outstanding for effective Chinese influence in Sinkiang. Though there has been considerable difference in particulars, up to the inception of Sheng Shih-ts'ai's administration there ran through them all a like—though in many ways maturing—thread of colonial policy.

In Han times when Chinese first began to assert their colonial influence in Central Asia they sent gift-bearing, sometimes militarily escorted, diplomatic missions to the numerous petty states of the Western Regions. Once they had opened cordial relations in this manner, they followed with intermarriage between Chinese and members of a particular ruling family or principality of the outlying area. Then came exchange of hostages between the Han and the outlying state. When the Han had thus become established in the Western Regions, they entered more seriously into local politics and began where possible

to enthrone puppet or at least "loyal" princes. Political manipulation was followed, or accompanied, by military demonstration where it was needed and where it was possible. The policy of letting "barbarians rule barbarians" early became a cardinal feature of Han-Turkestan relations and, in many ways, it has remained so. This was important in an area so distant as the Western Regions, and in ancient days was practiced to the extent of utilizing one colonial principality in military campaigns against another and to the extreme of "permitting" native personnel to administer localities—though this often seems to have been "allowed" in cases where it could not have been prevented. In instances of severe difficulties whole populations were shifted to distant areas or, where deemed necessary, depopulated by the sword. 175 642

The pinnacle of Han administrative achievement on this frontier was the creation of the office of the *Tu-tu*. His job, Chinese history states, was to "watch" a particular outpost. He was, it is evident, an all-around colonial executive and the ancient Chinese counterpart of the Occidental Military Governor of a dependency in the pre-Pearl Harbor epoch.

T'ang Improvements

Where T'ang Chinese considerably improved upon the Han was in their attempt to convert much of the Western Regions into the administrative units used in China Proper—the *chou* and *hsien* (department and county). This meant application of customary Chinese law to the Central Asian frontier, but it did not mean abolition of the office of the *Tu-tu*. He still administered outlying areas. His duties, however, became in some cases more closely allied with the regional and local government machinery of China Proper than previously. By the new arrangement, also, executive machinery in the Western Regions became exceedingly complicated and broad. At one time this machinery was centered in the *Tu-tu* prefecture (*Tu-tu Fu*) at An-hsi (in present-day Kansu), with power said to extend from Khotan to Persia, and the following units under its direction: sixteen "states," eighty departments, one hundred eleven counties, and one hundred twenty-six military departments (*chün-fu*, also called *chi-mi chou* or "restrained" departments). [631]

Ta Ch'ing (Manchu) policy

175 The situation that faced the Ch'ing Dynasty was, however, consid-
 642 erably different. By the Ta Ch'ing period the Khitans and the Mongols—in particular the Ölöt Mongols—had accustomed the North Road of the Western Regions to a system of widely effective overlordship. Moslem influence, on the other hand, had consolidated itself in the south. Chinese, therefore, spoke of "Four Ölöt Leagues" on the North Road and of a "Moslem League" on the South Road. These regional distinctions were complicated further by the fact that the Ölöts were exceptionally ambitious and had been expanding from the Altai southeastwards across Turfan and Kokonor as far as Lhasa.

In tackling this problem the Ch'ing first attacked Ölöt power on the southern flank, in Tibet; after ousting the Ölöt party from power there, they devastated the Road North of the Heavenly Mountains (*T'ien-shan-pei-lu*) and wiped out that Mongol stronghold. They then turned to subjugation of the weaker Moslem League in the south.

To ensure that order could be maintained, more than twenty thousand Manchu soldiers were imported into the Western Regions and stationed at I-li (Sui-ting), Yangi Hissar, and Kashgar. I-li became the central military headquarters, and a complicated new system of control was set up. It included at least a hundred special emissaries for handling tribute relations, military affairs, and rationing of food, besides a special office for Moslem affairs. All in all, the early Ch'ing emphasized military, more than political, activities in the Western Regions. The innumerable ramparts and petty military stations (*ch'eng-pao*) constructed are concrete evidence to that effect. Not only had the Ch'ing rulers resented Mongol strength in the Western Regions; they had begun to view with alarm the rise of Islam in Chinese Central Asia and to sense danger from Europe.

Tso Tsung-t'ang, who was drawn out to the Western Regions by Moslem rebellions of the late nineteenth century, made many new administrative changes there. It was he who stressed the importance of, first, Urumchi (Tihwa) and Aqsu and, second, I-li (Sui-ting) and T'a Ch'eng for control and defense of the area. He also suggested

irrigation projects, more extensive colonization, and a land survey. But most important, Tso recommended that the Western Regions be consolidated into one province, *Hsin-chiang* ("The New Dominion") or Sinkiang. By this he at last crystallized the Sinkiang frontier, on the one hand for China and on the other hand against the empires of the modern Occident. Actually the regional lines—that is to say, China's more rigid northwest national boundary and the framework for the province of Sinkiang—cut across the natural grain of traditional Central Asian life and jarred the nomad, the farmer, and the merchant there. The strategem, with local squabbles within Europe indirectly assisting, did help to counter the threats of imperialism, primarily that of Tsarist Russia. 175 642

But for at least three reasons Tso Tsung-t'ang's recommendations did not suffice. First, his major emphasis was upon the old-style Ch'ing military control which could not stand up in the face of the weapons Europe was even then beginning to fabricate. Second, his constructive measures do not seem to have been far-reaching enough in scope or in execution or to have provided suitable means of binding Sinkiang to China Proper through economic ties. Finally, the ebb of Ch'ing power which brought Republican revolt and the fall of the Dynasty in China by 1912 was bound to be felt keenly on the far-flung Sinkiang frontier.

Under the Early Republic

Tu Chung-yüan speaks of administration in Sinkiang during the early years of the Chinese Republic in this manner: 661

. . . The Yang [Tseng-hsin]-Chin [Shu-jen] period was lengthy and greedy. The politician did not believe in working but only in officiating; even when he was officiating he aimed only at making money. This arose from the fact that Yang and Chin were basically that type. In general if a person were to come to Sinkiang from the interior it was not asked whether he had qualifications or not, whether he was talented or not. All that was necessary instead was that he be of an "experienced" temperament or perhaps that he had served in an office of a military governor or of a provincial government for eight to ten years so that it could be seen he had been reared in the atmosphere of slavery. . . . Or, again, if he were appointed, say as a county magis-

185 of soldiers and workers have been working day and night on part of the public works scheduled to be completed by the end of this year. This includes the building of four asphalt roads of over 1000 meters, several macadamized roads of 1500 meters and the modernization of buildings. . . . Over 1,000 old and dilapidated houses are to be torn down and rebuilt, and some 1,800 new houses put up in the new civic center."

735 The Sinkiang representative on China's National Political Council, Sheng Shih-chi, pointed out during the fall of 1942 that there are no beggars in Sinkiang; I heard the same thing from Chinese Moslems when I was in Kansu Province in 1940. At that time one Moslem, a Lan-chou vendor of Sinkiang raisins and Soviet lump sugar, made pointed examples of one of the city's numerous ragged and grimy child indigents and of a nearby beggar cripple, both whining with hands outstretched. "*Tsai Hsin-chiang mei-yu-liao*" ("That doesn't happen in Sinkiang"), he commented with a shake of the head. Tales that filtered through to Lan-chou in 1939 and 1940 painted Sinkiang in a favorable light indeed. The shortage of labor, the abundance of land and resources, the crying reconstruction needs, and the progressive point of view of the administration in Sinkiang all tend to corroborate Sheng Shih-chi's assertion.

175 Sinkiang's transformation in the past decade may not appear miraculous in terms of superficial material measurements. The task of domestic reconstruction is not nearly complete; and at least partial credit for what has been accomplished is due to outside aid. Yet, with all this, unswerving and successful application of her Six Great Policies has put the New Sinkiang and the interfusion of frontier races inhabiting the region among the major phenomena of this age. In the years between 1937 and 1943 the province cast aside five centuries of decadence and began to play a unique and vigorous part in modern living. Now, in the midst of a magnificently intermingled old and new—the Sinkiang newspaper hawked in a native bazaar, the phone call to Chungking from a picturesque yamen, an airplane flight over the old Silk Road—the Sinkiang people have shown their eagerness to join in the fashioning of a better world life.

[134] and it will grow into a full-sized tree ; the other is its tendency to vertical rather than horizontal cleavage. The result of the first is that wherever water can be brought (the climate of the plains is almost rainless, but water from the encircling mountains is plentiful for irrigation) the land is closely cultivated, willows and poplars line every water-channel and the farmsteads are buried in foliage. The second peculiarity results in the landscape being broken up most picturesquely in the neighbourhood of the many rivers by perpendicular cliffs or river-bluffs, seldom more than thirty or forty feet high, but bold of outline and of a rich yellowish hue, with farmsteads perched on top of them and mills nestling below, trees and crops growing to their very edge and greenery in every cranny.

312
241

The whole aspect of the better-watered parts of the oases is one of immemorial peace and contentment and of a civilization, such as it is, that has persisted unchanged for centuries. Nowhere could be found a more striking illustration of the strength and permanence of a rural population with its roots deep in the soil, especially when that soil can only be made productive by means of an elaborate system of irrigation. Politically, Kashgaria has had as stormy a history as any country in the world. During the last 2,000 years or a little more the Chinese have conquered it five times, and four times they have been evicted from it. The total period of their occupations up to date only amounts to about 425 years ; during the remainder of the time Kashgaria has been the prey of one conquering people after another. Huns, Yüehchih or Indo-Scythians, Hephthalites or White Huns, Tibetans, Uigur Turks, Qara Khitai,¹ Mongols under Chingiz Khan, Dzungar Mongols and Turkis from the Transcaspian Khanates have all won and lost it in turn. Apart from these more cataclysmic changes, civil war has at various periods raged between the larger towns, Kashgar, Yarkand, Khotan and Aqsu. Yet down through the ages generation after generation of peasants have yearly tapped the summer floods from the mountains and have raised their crops of wheat and barley, rice and millet, cotton and maize and melons, while wave after wave of conquest has rolled over their head. Whenever any conqueror or tyrant has interfered overmuch with the cultivator, his greed has been his downfall. A striking recent example of this

175

[241]

¹ The twelfth-century conquerors who gave their name to "Cathay." Stein, "Journal of the Royal Geographical Society," June, 1923, p. 495.

KASHGAR

59

was in the case of Yakub Beg, the Khokandi adventurer who led a successful revolt against the Chinese in 1865 and ruled the country after the traditional manner of the Oriental despot for the next twelve years. Under his tyranny, according to Stein,¹ the population of some of the oases sank to one-half of what it had once been, and the cultivated area everywhere shrank greatly. The result was that when in 1877 the Chinese came back in force, they were welcomed with open arms by the people and the power of the self-styled "Amir" collapsed like a house of cards. 175 •

Nothing is more impressive than the persistence with which through the ages China has enforced her claim to Eastern Turkistan. Whether to safeguard the transcontinental "Silk Road," which in the palmy days of Imperial Rome carried the produce of her looms to the Atlantic shore, or whether because she must extend her effective occupation to the westernmost mountain barriers of her empire on pain of losing their protection, China has always returned to the charge, even after a thousand years. Despite the gigantic distances involved—for even now, with several hundred miles of railway to help, the journey from Peking to Kashgar takes five months—her armies have time after time pushed westward; the might of the Emperors of Cathay has leant up against the flimsy structures of one Central Asian power after another and has flattened them out as though they had never been. [489]

Since their last re-conquest in 1877 the Chinese have governed Sinkiang, the "New Dominion," from Urumchi fifty marches north-east of Kashgar. Standing on the site of Bishbaligh, one of the chief centres of the Uigur civilization in the Middle Ages, Urumchi commands the vital Kansu-Shensi corridor leading from Central Asia into the heart of Inner China. Cut off from the rest of China, except for this one long trail, by the vast extent of the Mongolian Desert, where a man may travel for fifty days without meeting a single human being, the New Dominion has recked little of the civil wars which during the last twelve years have rent the mother-country from end to end. The only effect on Sinkiang of the Revolution of 1911 and the consequent weakening of the Central Government has been to permit a Governor of outstanding ability to establish himself as the virtually independent ruler of Chinese Central Asia. The result of Yang Tseng-hsin's twelve years' rule has been that the military and other 636

¹ "Journal of the Royal Geographical Society," June, 1925, p. 498.

144 and southern fringe of the Takla Makan Desert is the same as that still found among the valleys of the Italian Alps and the Caucasus—found, too, by Stein in the third-century graves of Loulan at the eastern end of the Tarim Basin.

I have already referred in Chapter V to the illustration afforded by Kashgaria of the racial continuity and persistence of a population firmly rooted in the soil, especially when the extreme fertility of that soil depends entirely upon an elaborate system of irrigation. This permanence is in striking contrast with the state of perpetual change and flux which has through the ages characterized the history of Central Asia as a whole. Throughout the vast spaces of Mongolia, Dzungaria and Turkistan the winds of migration and conquest have swept to and fro; from the Gobi Desert to the Euxine, from Châlons to the Yellow Sea, the great nomad peoples, Hun and Turk and Mongol, have ransacked the world in the lust of dominion and the search for new grazings. Over the Tarim Basin, too, they have passed time after time, but they have left little impress upon it. The reason is not far to seek. With a rainfall of but two or three inches per annum, the grass that pastoral peoples need scarcely exists.

"Nature" (says Stein) "by denying grazing-grounds to the vast basin between Kunlun and Tien Shan, has protected it against ever becoming the scene of great migratory movements and of such upheavals as are bound to accompany them."¹

177 It is the aridity of its climate, then, as well as the seclusion afforded by some of the greatest mountain ranges of the planet, that has preserved the population of the Tarim Basin relatively intact since the dawn of its history in the second century before Christ. But it is not this continuity alone that lends such exceptional interest to the history of the region. There are people with as high a lineage in other secluded parts of Asia and Europe. The peculiar feature of the history of the Tarim Basin is the fact that throughout a vast period of historical time it served as the channel through which the ancient civilizations of China on the one side and of Persia and India on the other maintained contact and to an appreciable extent reacted upon each other.

176 From the second century before Christ to the eighth century of our era there flourished in these oases a civilization in which, though it was predominantly Indo-Scythian, cultural

¹ "Geographical Journal," May, 1925, p. 403.

ART, LEGENDS AND SUPERSTITIONS 169

influences from the China of the Han and Tang Emperors mingled with those transmitted through Iran and North-West India from the great world of Hellenism in the West. It was through the channel of the Tarim Basin and the medium of its settled populations that the fame of the "silk-weaving Seres" and the fine products of Chinese looms reached the Mediterranean and became known throughout the Roman Empire. It was by this same route that the elements of Indian as well as of Græco-Roman art and culture reached China's western borders. More important still, it was along the Khoian road that Buddhism, in Stein's words "India's greatest contribution to the spiritual development of mankind," found its roundabout way in the first century of our era to China through the Central Asian kingdoms. 175

It would be presumption for me to attempt even the briefest survey of the immense field covered by the archæological discoveries of Sir Aurel Stein among the sands of the Takla Makan and elsewhere in Chinese Turkistan and Kansu. I can but refer the art-loving reader to those monuments of fascinating if recondite erudition, "Ruins of Desert Cathay," "Serindia," and the rest. Here will be brought vividly before his eyes the splendour of Khotan's Græco-Buddhist civilization, in the days when that ancient kingdom was culturally an Indian colony.¹ He will discover for himself how exquisitely that civilization was tinged by the classic art of China; he will see, on the other hand, how in the east of the province and along the great Silk Road the powerful influences of Græco-Buddhist and even of purely Persian art modified the work of Chinese masters. The frescoes of Miran, the classical seals of Yotkan, the relieves of Khadaliq, the wood-carvings of Niya, the amazing painted silks, brocades, tapestries and embroideries of the Cave of the Thousand Buddhas—these and many other beautiful things appeal to the lover of art, and not to him alone. They appeal even more strongly to the Western student of *les vieilles civilisations qualitatives*, as Ferrero calls them, which aimed at perfection rather than progress or power—the old civilizations which we have so ruthlessly destroyed in our pursuit of wealth and our conquest of the earth, and which now, too late, we find to be our lost Paradise. 114

My few excursions into this field of research may be dismissed briefly. In the course of long tours on Consular duty, when our programme had to be thought out carefully beforehand 172

¹ "Ruins of Desert Cathay," Vol. I, p. 290-91.

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311 The newest development, found in the Northwest, especially in Sinkiang, is the partial industrialization of those areas which are the sources of coal, oil, gold, iron, alum, quartz, gypsum, nitrates, salt, and as recently reported, uranium.

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563 The non-Chinese peoples of the Northwest are not only outnumbered but also outweighed in economic and political respects. For more than two thousand years, the Chinese have been ruling those areas (with short interruptions as far as Sinkiang and Chinghai are concerned), even though they never had more than a few garrisons stationed in frontier areas. Those garrisons made it possible for a thin stratum of Chinese officials to rule the areas on the top level. On the lower level, the indigenous peoples and tribes governed themselves - under the supervision of the Chinese viceroys or governors and their bureaucracy.

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631 The general policy of the Chinese government in Peking was to make use of the existing form of governmental institutions of frontier areas like Sinkiang, Chinghai, and Inner-Mongolia. In Sinkiang (prior to 1884 it was called "Hui-chiang," i. e., Muslimic Dominion), two types of local government had existed: the Muslimic type and the Mongolian type. The

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171 Northern and Northeastern part of Sinkiang, where the Mongols were the dominant inhabitants, had the same governmental institutions as Outer and Inner-Mongolia, namely, banners ruled by dzasaks, who were appointees of the Emperor in Peking. The Republic of China tacitly recognized their ranks and interfered very little with their functions. Only Communist China deprived the nomad aristocracy of their titles and rights.

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569 The Muslimic communities were ruled by Bkks with various ranks: the Ak'im Bkk, "local governor"; the Ishkhan Bkk, "assistant governor"; the Shang Bkk, "collector of revenue"; the Qazi, "judge"; the Kukbashi or Mirabu Bkk, "superintendent of agriculture"; Yulzbashi, "hundred-men-leader"; Onbashi, "ten-men-leader"; etc. All the local Bkks were appointed by the emperor or later on by the president of the Republic upon the recommendation of the Imperial or Republican governor, although it must be stated that some governors of Sinkiang, Chin Shu-jen and Sheng Shih-ts'ai, ruled and governed the province without asking Peking for the consent of appointments.

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202 Besides the Chinese civil service there existed Chinese military staffs and detachments, centered in Ili, Urumchi, Kulja, Chuguchak, Kashghar, Sining, Su-chou, Lan-chou, etc. Relay stations provided communication between the government in Peking and the frontier areas. Maintaining the effectiveness of the means of communications was an important duty of Chinese officials. Only since 1930 have some automobile highways been built, and the Communist regime, in cooperation

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Only since 1930 have some automobile highways been built, and the Communist regime, in cooperation with Soviet Russia, are building the first Inner Asiatic railway, linking Alma-Ata with Lan-chou. This railway will, without doubt, speed up the Sinification of the frontier areas, and above all add industrialization to agriculture and pastoral nomadism.

As far as Chinghai was concerned, the Western Mongols (the Oirats) were also locally ruled by dzasaks, the leaders of banners. Unlike the banners of Inner and Outer Mongolia and Sinkiang, however, they did not combine banners to form leagues or to elect one of their tribal leaders as the captain-general of the league. The Chinese governor - with his seat in Sining - functioned as captain-general. In regard to the nomadic Tibetans, the Chinese government appointed chieftains as dzasak-lamas and gave them the rights and the privileges which this office involves. The sedentary Tibetans were ruled by t'u-ssus, also appointees of the Peking government. By and large, this governmental pattern existed until the Communists came into power.

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The form of governing non-Chinese peoples changed in the course of time in various ways, but one thing never changed: the aim of the Peking government to rule, to suppress, to exploit, and to sinify them.

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Unlike the eighteen provinces in China proper, the province of Sinkiang (after 1884) and the Eastern Three Provinces, (after 1907) the areas comprising Mongolia, Tibet, and Chinese Turkestan, although occupying more space than China proper, were administrated by a quite different type of governmental system. Political subdivisions of the Chinese Empire such as Mongolia, Chinese Turkestan and Tibet were usually referred to as dependencies. This is however an inaccurate translation of the Chinese term "fan," which really means "the barbarian west." Since the cultural, ethnic and historical background in these areas was very different from the rest of the Empire, these regions required, and in practice had, a very particular type of governmental control. All these frontier territories were administered by the "Department of Dependencies" in Peking. This department was subdivided into the following bureaus:

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a. Inner Mongolian bureau, that administered frontier boundaries, titles of nobility, appointment of officials, military affairs, league conferences, and finally organization of banner units of Inner Mongolia.

b. "Reception bureau" for Inner Mongolia nobility, that was responsible for the payments and allowances to the Inner Mongolian aristocracy.

c. Eastern Turkestan bureau, that was in charge of Moslem affairs in Eastern Turkestan.

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d. Justice bureau which took care of the civil and criminal cases of the frontier area.

e. Territorial development bureau which took care of the preservation of forests, wild animals and which was in charge of the improvement of live-stock, fur curing and of the Mongolian inhabitants in general.

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The Yüan and Manchu dynasties, which themselves represented minorities, employed a quite different, one might say a positive attitude towards non-Chinese. Generally speaking, the Manchus functioned and acted as the mediators between the minorities and the Chinese. But even the Manchus, after they had become completely sinified, used colonial methods that led to revolts and uprisings in Sinkiang, in Kansu and in Chinghai. The Chinese Muslims in Kansu, e. g., revolted in 1648, 1781-1784, 1820-28, 1862-78, 1895-97, 1918-21, 1928-1929, at which times they tried, with little success, to get rid of the Chinese mastery and to establish their own Muslimic realm. Whenever such uprisings occurred, the Muslimic Turks of Sinkiang sympathized with them or revolted at the same time. In Sinkiang, Yakub Bkh even succeeded in establishing a short-lived Muslimic empire between 1864-1877. The Western Mongols of Sinkiang, Kansu and Chinghai, who revolted and established the Dzungarian Empire between 1673 and 1697, were defeated by a Chinese army in 1697 and again in 1757. In Chinghai, the Tanguts (Tibetans) revolted successfully many times, but like all other minorities who tried and failed, they were eventually brought under Chinese control again. Needless to say, all these unsuccessful petty revolutions, revolts and uprisings of non-Chinese or Chinese Muslims, always upset the economy of the area greatly, increasing thereby the hatred towards the Chinese in general, and the Chinese officials in particular.

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II. Main Patterns of Social Life, Social Organization and Mode of Economy of the Minorities.

Even though the Northwest is occupied by a fantastic conglomeration of heterogeneous societies, it still can be, and always has been, considered by politicians as one area, a political, military, and economic unit, and also as the "land of promise," which it in fact became. When the Communists again set up the unit as an administrative area in 1949, it was only the continuation of an old concept, held by the Chinese rulers because of the geographical location of the Northwest and its commercial traditions (silk road, Mongolia-Tibet road, Chinghai-Tibet road, Sinkiang-India road, Sinkiang-Russia road), which culminated in Sheng Shih-ts'ai's cooperation with Russia, or earlier with Yakub Bkh's policy

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175 towards Russia, Turkey, and England. The cultural cohesion
631 created by Islam that connects Chinese Turkestan with Russian
668 Turkestan and other neighboring Muslim countries, and that
178 created by Buddhism that connects Mongolia with Tibet
619 through Chinghai and small areas of Sinkiang, marked the
648 four provinces of Sinkiang, Chinghai, Kansu, and to a small
degree, Shensi, as one single area which represents one
administrative unit.

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563 The Eastern Turks:
241 The main pattern of social life of the Eastern Turks is
based primarily on "Oasis Agriculture" with its irrigational
complex. All agriculture in this area is made possible through
S the organized use of water. The family organization among the
563 Eastern Turks is therefore an extended one, since a certain
596 level of productivity can only be reached through collective
labor (upkeep of irrigational systems and dikes). One reason
S the Eastern Turks developed the extended family pattern
[312] is that the family receives water in proportion to the amount
[241] of labor its members put into the upkeep of irrigational
systems and canals; the greater the family, the more water
is therefore provided for their land.

S The Internal structure of the family system is not based
upon clan rules. Eastern Turkic communities are governed
[622] by a body of leaders, selected from the community itself
[634] whereas the larger governmental districts are headed by
S Chinese officials or, at present, by Chinese Communists.
563 A secondary aspect of Eastern Turkic social life is formed
[441] by trade and handicrafts. Merchants and craftsmen form
"guilds" which in turn influence the social life of the commun-
ity.

S Kirghiz and Kazakhs:
563 Kirghiz and Kazakh society is clan-based. (The definition
614 of the notion of "clan" is explained in the chapter about the
S Social Structure.) All family relationships are deeply rooted
563 in the clan system. The main pattern of social life among
233 these two tribes is created by their nomadic way of life, whose
36 most essential economic activity is cattle breeding. The trans-
177 ition to a semi-sedentary life is now under way. The Commun-
[668] ists insist that the Kirghiz and Kazakhs occupy a permanent
winter camp site, since this facilitates better political
control over the tribes. The choice of the summer camp site
S still remains more or less in the hands of the tribes. Kirghiz
[622] and Kazakhs are ruled by "baks," or "manaps" (elders)
S responsible to the Chinese officials.

S The Mongols: general remarks.
563 Mongol social life is based on nomadic pastoralism. The
[233] basic unit is the nuclear family. A group of patrilineally
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HISTORICAL SETTING

N 631 I. General History of Relations with China

Northwest China, once a major administrative region of Communist China, is an arbitrary political union of widely dissimilar geographical areas inhabited by a conglomeration of diverse ethnic groups. At the eastern end of this vast wedge-shaped region is Shensi, which has been an integral part of China Proper throughout history and is inhabited almost exclusively by Chinese. Although it is only one-seventeenth of the total area, this single province holds almost half of the population of the Northwest.

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633 Sian, the provincial seat of Shensi, has been in centuries past and still is today China's political and military base for the control of the Northwest and has been the center for the diffusion of Chinese culture to the Northwest in the past and of Communist ideology in the present.

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635 At the western end of the Northwest region of China is the province of Sinkiang or Chinese Turkestan. Its territory occupies half the area of the Northwest but its population is only a seventh of the total. Three-quarters of the inhabitants are Uighurs, a people Turkic in speech and Moslem in religion. The rest is divided among thirteen nationalities.

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635 In the north is the now abolished province of Ninghsia, inhabited largely by Mongols. In the south is Chinghai (also known as Kokonor) with a heterogeneous population of Mongols, Chinese and Tibetans. The Gobi Desert, which pushes south to Ninghsia, and the highlands of Chinghai constricts the habitable area into an hourglass shape, forming a corridor connecting Shensi in the east and Sinkiang in the west. This is the province of Kansu.

* N 175 A. The Role of the Kansu Panhandle 487

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175 All traffic between China Proper and Turkestan has been funnelled through the narrow confines of this corridor. The ancient Silk Road started from its terminus at Sian (known in the past as Ch'ang-an) and wound its way, via the Kansu Corridor, into Chinese Turkestan where it branched into the northern and southern routes to bypass the towering Tien Shan Mountains. The conquering armies of Han, T'ang and Ch'ing had marched out through this narrow passageway to assert the political rule of China over the desert wastes and oasis towns of Turkestan. Hordes of nomads, lured by the lush plains and opulent cities of China, have poured through this funnel to raid and pillage and, when successful, to found militaristic kingdoms. This was the route worn deep by the trudging feet of camel caravans bearing the tea and silk and porcelain of China to bazaars in the Near East and even to the markets of Byzantium and Rome. In the train of these caravans travellers have come into China, from the Buddhist missionary, Kumarajiva,

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*175 to the Venetian merchant, Marco Polo.
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• 175 During the centuries when China faced the land frontier of the
487 Northwest and the Silk Road was the main channel of China's inter-
course with the outside world, the target of China's imperialistic
expansion, when strong, was the domination of the petty states of
Central Asia. The principal strategic pass that must be held to
prevent invading armies from pouring in and ravaging China, in
periods of weakness and division, was Yü-men, the Jade Gate,
in northwestern China.

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17 B. Recurring Cycles of Nomadic Eruptions

As the advance and recession of Chinese power in Turkestan reflected the vigor and the decline of Chinese dynasties, (a feature of Chinese history discussed in the historical section of the General Handbook), so were the outbursts and withdrawals of the nomads the manifestations of their activity and passivity. The juxtaposition and interaction of the Chinese scheme of advance and withdrawal with the nomadic scheme shaped the dynamics and course of history of Northwest China. Together with Inner Mongolia, Sinkiang forms a broad semicircular belt, which marks the marginal zone between China and the steppes and is the amphitheater for the vast age-long struggle between the sedentary and nomadic peoples.

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*175 1. Earliest Invasions
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175 The alternate thrust of the nomads into this marginal zone,
648 at times even penetrating into the heartland of China, and their retraction into the steppes, have been a recurring phenomenon in the history of Central Asia. With tidal regularity, the nomads have surged forth when China was weak and divided, only to ebb when China was strong and united. As far back as the eighth century B. C., when China was beginning to disintegrate into warring states, there were invasions of China by the north and northwestern peoples called Ti and Jung. In Central Asia there was the expansion of the Scythians. From the third to the first century B. C., the confederacy of nomads led by the Hsiung-nu or Huns were active in China's Northwest. During this same period Central Asia was overrun first by the Greeks of Alexander's army, then by the Yüeh-chih and, further east, by the Sakas and Wu-sun. The defense measures of the Ch'in dynasty and the military advance of the Chinese during the Han dynasty in the first century B. C. and the first century A. D., held the Huns in check and finally succeeded in splitting up the Hun confederation.

2. Turkic incursions

From the fourth to the seventh centuries, with China weak and divided, the border peoples from China's northern and northwestern frontiers breached China's defenses. First in dribbles and then in raging torrents they occupied the northwest and poured

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+195 into China to establish militaristic states in North China. The
648 aggregation of invaders included the Huns, the Hsien-pi, the Juan-
S Juan, the Toba, and the Tibetans. But the dominant group to
195 emerge was the Turks, who eventually ruled an extensive terri-
648 tory stretching from Mongolia to the Urals. Once more China,
reunited under the Sui dynasty, was able to hold off the nomads.
Under the T'ang dynasty the Chinese were able to advance into the
domain of the nomads and to destroy the Turkish federation.

By the ninth century, as China declined in power, the nomadic peoples on the northern rim of the Chinese empire came into their own again. The situation appeared to be a repetition of what had happened at least twice before. The decline of the Chou had been followed by the disintegration of China into warring states (cycle one); the collapse of Han had ushered in the Three Kingdoms and the North and South Dynasties (cycle two). Now, with the fall of T'ang, there came the chaotic Five Dynasties and the division of China again into the north and south (cycle three). In each successive stage, the extent of nomadic power was greater than in the previous one. In the first period of division, both northern and southern states were primarily Chinese; in the second stage of division, the northern states were non-Chinese while the southern states were Chinese; but in the third stage, at first the northern states were alien and the southern state (Sung) Chinese, but later the northern invaders (Mongols) succeeded in conquering all of China.

3. Mongol expansion

In the period following the fall of Tang, peoples from Manchuria, Khitans and Juchens, as well as peoples from Turkestan, such as the Sha-t'o (or Ch'ü) Turks, poured into China. In the Northwest, the Western Turks and their offshoots, the Qarluqs and the Uighurs, were active. Later, some of the Khitans, ousted from North China, also established themselves in Turkestan. Here too, the Arabs, who had penetrated Central Asia in the 7th and 8th centuries, were influential. But the most powerful were the Mongols who, having united the tribes of Mongolia into a vast confederation of nomadic people in a series of sanguinary wars, in the 13th century embarked on a career of conquest that was to include all of Asia and part of Europe.

The Chinese, in their resurgence under the Ming dynasty, did not recover Turkestan. Central Asia remained in the grip of the later Mongols, from the Timurid dynasty in Persia, through the descendants of the Chagatai princes in Turkestan, to the Oirats in Northwestern China, the last of whom by the mid fifteenth century, were bold enough to make forays into China. The 17th century saw the rise to power of the Oirats who dominated vast areas of Mongolia and Turkestan. Not until the middle of the eighteenth century was the power of the Oirat confederacy broken and China,

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*175 under the Ch'ing emperors, reasserted its sway in Turkestan.
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4. Pattern of nomadic expansion and contraction

Wave after wave of nomadic peoples have made their appearances and then faded away, leaving the imprint of their stay on the palimpsest of Turkestan. The pattern of their entry, their ascendancy, and their exit have been similar. Each outburst and withdrawal of the nomads showed but variations on the major theme. The Huns, the Turks, and the Mongols, to mention a few of the more powerful of the plethora of nomadic peoples, all had their geneses in the same region, an area of Mongolia south of Lake Baikal. The process of their rise to power followed parallel lines. First, there was a bitter internecine struggle from which one group emerged triumphant. Second, the nomadic tribes were unified into a strong coalition under the leadership of the dominant group. Third, they expanded outward from the steppes into neighboring regions, especially into the marginal zone of modern Sinkiang and Inner Mongolia. Then they consolidated these areas into bases of operation for the fourth stage, the invasion and, when successful, the conquest of the opulent agrarian lands. At the peak of their strength, these nomadic invaders would establish a strong, militant empire, under an absolutist government, to control the motley subject peoples under their domination.

But once they reached the peak of their power, the downgrade began. The paucity of their numerical strength made it difficult for them to hold large territories. The tradition of intertribal contest instilled the spirit of independence in the minds of the satraps appointed to rule portions of the far-flung empires. The failure to resolve the incompatibility between pastoral and agrarian economy, and the resentment and rebellious tendency of the subject peoples whom the conquerors were only able to overawe by military strength, were all factors which brought about the disintegration and decline of the empires of the nomads.

5. Theories concerning nomadic eruptions

What accounted for the sudden irresistible ferocity of nomadic eruptions and what accounted for the docility of their withdrawal? A number of very ingenious theories have been advanced, as answers to this intriguing question, but so far these are still in the realm of assumptions.

Many scholars have regarded the influence of climate as a possible cause of the high tide and ebb of nomadic activities. Superimposed on the progressive dessication of Central Asia resulting from the withdrawal of glaciers, were the minor cyclic fluctuations of alternating dry and moist spells. A climatologist (C. E. P. Brooks) spoke of the "classical rainfall period of 640 years," and a geographer (Raymond Wheeler) believed in a major alternation of dry and cold every 510 years. Ellsworth Huntington,

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• a proponent of the theory of climatic alternations, called the phenomenon "the pulse of Asia."

The most important of the multiple influences is believed to be that of the economic effects of climatic changes. When the climate is warm and moist, the land of the nomads is fertile enough to support the nomads and their herds, but when the climate becomes drier and colder, the rivers and lakes shrink and the pasturage is reduced. This cuts down the food supply and forces the nomads to rampage into the land of their neighbors. Speaking of the thirteenth century, Arnold Toynbee declared that the "paroxysm of aridity coincided in date with the demoniac eruption of the Mongols, and it will be seen that the physiographical recoil towards humidity likewise corresponds in date with the rapid ebb of the Mongols." (A Study of History, vol. III, p. 439).

Although the outbursts and recessions of the nomads were periodic, the rigid periodization was too mechanical and many scholars have discredited climate as the sole factor. Huntington suggests that four factors may have impelled the huge migration of the nomadic peoples, namely: climate, the inherent quality of the people especially as manifested by the leaders, the pull exerted by the wealth and the opportunities of the agricultural lands, and the push exerted by over-population. (Mainsprings of Civilization, p. 568).

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A period of peace and prosperity would allow the population of the nomads to increase. However, in the desolate steppes, food was dependent upon flocks of sheep and herds of cattle and horses, and the people, unlike their sedentary neighbors, did not have the tradition nor the facilities for food storage. Any sudden change in climate which caused a reduction of pasturage and water supply would create a "time of troubles" and compel the nomadic people to migrate in search of food and pasturage.

When the nomads were experiencing a "time of troubles," the lush riches and the military weakness of the settled peoples would tempt border tribes to encroach upon the agrarian regions. Distress and discontent at home and the lure of wealth abroad furnish the push and the pull of Toynbee's theories. When the leavening of bold leadership and ideas were added, the nomads often were induced to burst out from the steppes of Asia and to set the world in commotion.

Other scholars entirely discount the influence of climate and seek the explanation for the advance and withdrawal of the nomads in social and political conditions. Owen Lattimore, who has given much thought to this question, (cf. Inner Asian Frontiers, *passim*), lists a number of reasons other than climate, for the eruption of the nomads. There were, for example, technological factors like the invention of the powerful compound bow and the technique of mounted archery which gave the nomads an edge over their enemies.

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The Chinese had to adopt the nomad bow and the technique of mounted archery before they could meet the nomads on equal terms.

Another factor, according to Lattimore, was the pastoral economy of the nomads which led to migration. Horses and cattle cannot graze on fields that have been cropped by sheep and goats.

Therefore, the nomads whose livelihood depended upon their herds and flocks, must continually seek new pastures. The claims to pasturelands and the right of movement led to wars. The continuous wars stimulated the rise of leaders, hard-headed men who survived the hurly-burly of warfare and politics of the steppes and deserts. Finally, a supreme leader emerged who would then weld the various groups into a grand confederation strong enough to encroach upon the neighboring regions for land, for the profits of trade, and for revenue and tribute from the conquered peoples.

According to Lattimore, the nomads who invaded the marginal zone between the steppes and the settled lands, were not pure nomads but were semi-settled. Their wars of conquest were not only for pastures for their herds and flocks but for land, for the riches of the cities, and for the proceeds of commerce. Moreover, the cycles of their invasion and retreat began only a few centuries before the Christian era when they split from the settled peoples on China's northwestern frontier and when they acquired the technology of nomadic warfare. The true nomads on the steppes evolved from the mixed nomads, not vice versa.

The migrations which led to conquest over a wide area, such as those carried out by the Huns, the Turks and the Mongols, normally did not begin with the true nomads but with the mixed nomads, and were caused by (1) a group breaking away from the mixed nomads in order to become true nomads; or (2) a group breaking away from the true nomads in order to revert back to mixed nomadism. The Huns, Turks, and Mongols had fixed bases of operation and their conquests were for land.

Under these circumstances, according to Lattimore, the cycles of nomadic expansion and withdrawal each went through the following process:

1. The maintenance of large armies of mounted warriors to conquer land for the profit of trade and revenue from subject peoples;
2. A dichotomy of nomad society. The nomadic warriors who went forth to conquer and who were left to garrison conquered territories had control of the sources of wealth but declined militarily. The warriors who stayed in the steppes as the military reserve continued to be warlike but gradually became impoverished;
3. A split within the nomad state between those in the conquered areas and those in the steppes, leading to decline and withdrawal.

6. Summary

In summary, the workings of the historical process represented,

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in these tides of nomadic eruptions can hardly be explained by one set of factors, useful as it may be as a contribution to our understanding of this process. Moreover, each set in turn led into a rather involved pattern. Geography and the highly specialized economies of the nomads, particularly when they had reached the stage of pure nomadism, induced them to seek a more stable base for their evolving power urge than could be found in the steppe lands of Mongolia, from which most of the nomadic conquests emerged. It induced them to push first into the oasis situation of Turkestan with its mixed, richer, more stable but, geographically speaking, more fragmented economy. This aspect helped form the pattern of relationships of the group, which was on its way to conquest of other nomadic or semi-nomadic peoples in Central Asia. However, only from the foundation of this economic basis could an effort at conquest of neighboring civilizations be sustained.

The social pattern of development leading a warrior leader to integrate his clan, his tribe, his people, and finally, a confederation of peoples, into a conquest force is interlinked with the previous one. This expansion led to a relative shrinkage of the group that had been carrier of the power urge and more and more force had to be substituted for the self-consciousness of the participants and their community of purpose. In the course of the social development towards conquest and empire building, the initial group gained a feeling of mission but lost its surroundings geographically, economically, and socially. As a rule this change also led to a change in the pattern of emerging leadership: the warrior leader chosen by his own people had to make room for the heir of a diversified empire.

This development again was linked with the development of a relationship to neighboring agricultural societies, particularly China, a relationship that has been understood under the concept of marginality by Krader (The Cultural and Historical Position of the Mongols, Asia Major 3, 1952, 169-183). Economically speaking, this relationship is always one of interdependence. From the Chinese side the natural and necessary exchange of produce was conceived under an evolving series of patterns. In periods of Chinese power ascendancy the nomadic raid pattern was transformed into trade, then into tribute, and then, if necessary, into conquest. However, in periods when a nomadic empire building situation coincided with a decline of Chinese power, the nomads would shake off conquest, resort to raids and to conquest in their turn.

Whatever may have been the causes of the periodic eruption of the nomads, whether they were due to climatic changes or due to concentration and the disintegration of nomadic society, the pattern remained. With clockwork regularity different groups of

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nomads have descended on the marginal zones, such as Turkestan and Inner Mongolia, conquering and absorbing some peoples and pushing others, in a sort of chain reaction, until the reverberations were felt from China Proper in the east to Russia in the west. The history of China's great Northwest cannot be clearly delineated without tracing in broad sweep the see-saw of power between China and the nomadic peoples.

C. Early History to 1644

1. Chou Dynasty

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In antiquity the Northwest region of China was known as the province of Yung, one of the nine provinces of ancient China. For a long time, it was a region inhabited by peoples whom the Chinese called "barbarians," the Ti in the north and the Jung in the west. The founder of the Chou Dynasty, King Wen (circa 12th century B.C.) was himself a "western barbarian." His fief in the Wei River Valley in Shensi, an area which in the early years of Chinese civilization was fertile and fruitful, provided his son, King Wu, with the men and resources for the campaign to gain control over China. Later, as the barbarians of the Northwest became strong, they forced the Chou court to transfer its capital from the Wei River Valley to Honan.

2. Ch'in Dynasty

The region of Shensi, centering around the Wei River Valley, became the fief of the Marquis (later Duke) of Ch'in. The bountiful resources of the region, enhanced further by the development of irrigation, the militant nature of the people who were part Hun, and the administrative and social reforms initiated by Legalist ministers enabled Ch'in to rise to power, to triumph over the other feudal states in 221 B.C., to conquer the empire and establish the first centralized government over China. Ch'ang-an (now Sian), the erstwhile capital of the Chou kings, became the national capital of a mighty empire from this time on, down through the Han, Sui and T'ang Dynasties.

Under the Ch'in state and later the Ch'in empire, the Chinese began to extend their power up the Kansu Corridor and into the regions of the modern provinces of Ninghsia and Chinghai. In the north, they completed the Great Wall to fend off the northern barbarians and to protect their flanks as they advanced westward. The advances made during the Ch'in Dynasty, which fell in 209 B.C., prepared the way for the great expansion of the Chinese into Turkestan during the Han period.

3. Han Dynasty

With the consolidation of Chinese unity a new power arose among the barbarians of the Northwest. This was the confederation of nomadic tribes formed under the leadership of the Hsiung-nu or Huns. During the civil war which overthrew the Ch'in

● 175 As soon as he had subjugated the Dzungars in 1756, the Ch'ing commander, Chao-hui, sent a part of his army into the Tarim Basin. There they freed the scions of a princely family, the Little Khoja of Yarkand and his brother Burkhan al-Din, the Big Khoja of Kashgar, who had been imprisoned by the Dzungars. However, the Uighurs did not take readily to the exchange of overlords. Rallying the Moslem population south of the Tien-shan, they revolted and set up the Khojas as their rulers. The Moslems were unable to present a united front, split as they were by factional disputes and by quarrels between the Old and the New Sects (see section Religion). They were easily subdued by a Chinese army under Chao-hui in 1759. The cities in the Tarim Basin fell one by one to the forces of Chao-hui who pursued the fleeing Khojas to Badakshan and the Pamirs. Among the prisoners was the beautiful wife of one of the chiefs. Taken back to Peking she became the "fragrant concubine" of the Ch'ien-lung Emperor and the source of many romantic stories.

The wars against the Oirats and the Moslems were commemorated in engravings done by French artists in Paris in 1774. Although they glorified the military deeds of the K'ang-hsi and Ch'ien-lung Emperors, the seventy years of warfare left Turkestan in a state of devastation and had been a heavy drain on the resources of China.

The killing of the Khojas, regarded as descendants of the Prophet, aroused the people of Turkestan and there was general talk of revenge. The people refused to cooperate with the Ch'ing officials and carried out both passive and active resistance against them. Among the members of the households of the Khojas who had fled to Khokhand was Jehangir, the grandson of Burkhan al-Din, the Big Khoja. Raising a force of several hundred Burut (Khirghiz) tribesmen, he crossed the frontier in 1820 with the avowed aim of retaking Kashgar, Yinglis-shar, Yarkand and Khotan. The Ch'ing government sent Ch'ang-ling with forces from Aksu to quell the rebellion. After defeating the Khokand army, Ch'ang-ling recaptured Kashgar in 1827. Jehangir, who was lured into a trap, was captured and taken as prisoner to Peking where a big victory celebration was held.

But the Moslems still resisted. Jehangir's brother, Yussuf, collected another army from Khokand and attacked Kashgar and Yarkand. By this time, the Ch'ing government was too weak to take positive action and, in a treaty signed in 1830, it tried to buy off the rebels by granting them special commercial privileges. The raids carried on by the Moslem rebels with the assistance of Khokand did not cease. As the Ch'ing government declined in power, the rule of its frontier officials became more oppressive and the opposition of the native people became more widespread and more determined. In 1848, a fresh force from Khokand invaded the Tarim Basin. It was led by Wali Khan, the nephew of Jehangir, and by six others. Known collectively as the Seven Khojas, they plunged Turkestan into

195 another sanguinary and desolating war.

The suppression of the "Rebellion of the Seven Khojas" was achieved only after the massacre of thousands of the resident population, Chinese, Chinese Moslems, and Uighurs. Thereafter, nothing was done to ameliorate the situation. The officials sent by Peking treated the local residents as a conquered people and levied heavy taxes as a means of self-enrichment. The local functionaries whom they appointed to assist them in the administration emulated them in tyranny and rapacity. Consequently, as soon as China was prostrated by domestic insurrections, the Taiping Rebellion in South China and the Nien Rebellion in North China, the Moslem peoples in the entire region of the Northwest, from Shensi province all the way to Kashgaria, rose in revolt.

The first to rebel were the Chinese Moslems in Shensi in 1862. A raid on the province by a small Taiping force precipitated the uprising. In the confusion that ensued, the Chinese Moslems, led by Pai Yen-hu, seized a number of Shensi towns, spread fire and rapine throughout the Wei River Valley, and at one time even reached the gates of Sian. When the rebellion in Shensi was finally put down in 1863, it spread to Kansu where it was led by Ma Hualung. To-ming, a Chinese Moslem from the Shensi-Kansu region, marched west to occupy the area around Turfan, Qomul (Hami) and Urumchi (Tihua). The steppe-land of Ili was occupied by another rebel band. The strongest of the insurgent groups was led by Yakub Beg, who had control of the territory around Kashgar.

When the Moslems of Eastern Turkestan joined in the general insurrection against Ch'ing rule, they had sought the assistance of Khokand, which was then having trouble with the Russians' steady advance into Central Asia. Unable to provide direct assistance, it sent Buzurg, the son of Jehangir, and Yakub, an adventurer with a checkered career including that of a dancing-boy and a bandit. There were stories that they were supplied with arms by the Russians in a sub rosa attempt to use them as vanguard of Russians advance, but these stories may have been apocryphal. They arrived at Kashgar in 1865, and thousands of rebels flocked to enlist in their forces.

After Buzurg was made king of Kashgaria, Yakub Beg, as commander-in-chief, set out to eliminate the other rebel leaders and to expand and consolidate the territory under his control. Some of the rebel leaders lost their lives in the bloody struggle for power. Others, such as To-ming, who held the Qumul-Urumchi region, were murdered by their own people, leaving Yakub Beg master of the whole of Eastern Turkestan. Later, in a coup d'etat, Yakub deposed Buzurg and made himself king. Pai Yen-hu, expelled from Kansu by Chinese forces, threw in his lot with Yakub so that the latter controlled an empire extending from the Pamirs to Lop Nor. The British in India afforded him diplomatic recogni-

195 tion by sending two missions to negotiate a trade treaty with him. The Sultan of Turkey made him the Amir of Kashgaria and bestowed upon him the title of Commander of the Faithful, supplying him with arms and sending officers to train his army. His relations with the Russians, who had annexed Khokand, were strained. He feared their designs on his empire and they refused to give him military assistance.

Meanwhile, the suppression of the Taiping Rebellion (in 1864) and of the Nien Rebellion (in 1868) enabled the Ch'ing court to take more energetic action in the Northwest than before. Tso Tsung-t'ang, a Chinese officer who had distinguished himself in the wars against the Taiping and the Nien rebels, was given the responsibility of rooting out the Moslem rebels in Kansu. By 1869, having cleared Shensi of all insurgent forces, he besieged Ma Hua-lung, the leader of the New Sect, in Chin-chi-pao, the rebel stronghold in Kansu. With the capture of Chin-chi-pao and the execution of Ma Hua-lung in 1871, the resistance of the Chinese Moslems in Kansu collapsed.

The next step, to press on westward beyond the Kansu Corridor and to recover Turkestan, was harder. The Peking court complained that it had no funds for an extended campaign. Many of the high officials believed that peace could be obtained by a renunciation of China's claims on the Far West and the recognition of Yakub Beg as an independent monarch. The British minister at Peking suggested that Yakub's domains be made into a buffer state. All this opposition and the suggestions were brushed aside and Tso Tsung-t'ang's views finally prevailed. Funds were obtained from many parts of China as well as in loans from foreign banks. Veterans of the wars against the Taiping and Nien rebels were sent to bolster Tso's command. Having reconquered the northern areas of the Tien Shan in 1876, a column of his troops led by his lieutenant, Liu Chin-t'ang, pushed into the Tarim Basin. In 1877, Chinese troops recaptured Turfan and the kingdom of Kashgaria came to an end. Yakub Beg committed suicide and Pai Yen-hu, who had joined forces with him, fled to Russia.

Tso Tsung-t'ang's pacification of Turkestan brought Chinese forces face to face with Russian troops. By the Treaty of Peking in 1860, China ceded to Russia all the land east of Lake Balkash and west of the Tien Shan, a region that Russian troops had occupied after their conquest of Central Asia. In 1871, when Yakub Beg was at the height of his power, the Russian government sent troops to occupy the city of Kulja and the territory of Ili on the pretext of safeguarding the region and preserving peace and order. They promised to withdraw when the Chinese had recovered the area. However, the Russian move also was designed to counter the extension of British influence in Chinese Turkestan and the steady advance of Chinese forces under Tso Tsung-t'ang.

In 1877, when the Chinese finally reconquered Turkestan, the

- 175 Russians were reluctant to withdraw. The Treaty of Livadia, signed in 1878 after negotiations held in St. Petersburg, was unfavorable to China. China was constrained to pay for the expenses of Russian occupation. Moreover, China also had to agree to Russian retention of the region of the Tekes River and the strategic passes between Ili and Kashgaria and to the establishment of Russian consulates as far interior as Kansu. All China received was the city of Kulja. The Ch'ing court refused to ratify the treaty. The Chinese envoy, who had exceeded his instructions by agreeing to the terms of the settlement, was condemned to death. At Qomul (Hami), where Tso Tsung-t'ang had his headquarters, Chinese troops made threatening moves, and Russia sent reinforcements into Ili. For a time a full-scale war between China and Russia seemed imminent. Finally, cooler heads prevailed, both sides yielded ground and in 1881 at St. Petersburg a treaty was successfully concluded in which China regained the Tekes Valley and the mountain passes between Ili and Kashgaria. Instead of the five million rubles for the cost of occupation, China agreed to pay nine million rubles. In addition, China permitted the opening of Russian consulates not only at Kulja (Ining), Tarbagatai, Kashgar, Urga, but also at Su-chou and Turfan.

B. Sinkiang as a Chinese province

In view of Russia's covetousness and Britain's hints of alienation of the region, Tso Tsung-t'ang proposed that Turkestan be made into an administrative province of China. His suggestion encountered strong opposition at court. Many high officials favored the construction and consolidation of the southeastern coastal provinces for defense against the Western powers, rather than the diversion of China's attention to the northwestern territories. But the recommendation of Tso Tsung-t'ang was finally adopted. The entire region north and south of the Tianshan range was made into a province in 1884 and renamed Sinkiang, the New Dominion, with Liu Chin-t'ang as the first governor. The provincial seat was located at Urumchi (Tihwa) and the headquarters of the military governor established at Kulja. The Chinese system of administration was organized in all the cities and counties of the New Dominion.

This was the first time that the region of Chinese Turkestan formally became a Chinese province, although the way was prepared in the Han and Tang Periods. However, in the past, Chinese troops only held the main cities. The administration of the region was largely relegated to the native princes, and the civil government was quite different from an actually Chinese-administered province. Again, during the Mongol period, an ambulatory government was set up in Turkestan, but it was only a nominal government. The real power was in the hands of the Chagatai princes. The occupation of Turkestan during the reign of the Ch'ien-lung Emperor was largely military, and the civil administration consisted of Ch'ing officials working through the native chieftains, and it was their excesses and exactions that provoked large-scale uprisings.

• 175 Under the energetic administration of the first governor of Sinkiang, Liu Chin-t'ang, and, to a lesser extent, under the administration of the second governor, Yüan Ta-hua, there was a genuine attempt to reform the government and to work for the welfare of the native peoples. Some of the abuses were eliminated, the tax burden was equalized, more schools were established, and wastelands were opened for agriculture. However, the good intentions of the governors were not enough. Repayment of the three million taels borrowed from abroad for the military campaign and of the nine million rubles for Russia's occupation of Ili drained the province. With a large percentage of its revenue siphoned off little funds were left for internal development.

In the train of the Chinese army there came hordes of Chinese migrants, many of whom were merchants and craftsmen from Hunan, Tso Tsung-t'ang's native province. Gradually, they entered into the business life of the cities and operated farms in the countryside. Soon their encroachments led to clashes with the native peoples.

There is little evidence that the Mongols were influenced by the Moslem rebellions of the early 19th century. These disturbances were confined almost entirely to the oases south of the Tien Shan range. In the sixties of that century, however, the revolt spread to Dzungaria and the Ili valley and to some degree involved all the nationalities of the province. Many Mongol groups abandoned their ranges, particularly in the Tien Shan mountains and the Ili region, and fled to more remote and possibly less desirable areas. Some may have returned to their former pastures after hostilities ceased, but it is probable that these wars effected a redistribution of Mongol tribes.

The Chinese rebellions of the early 20th century - the Boxer uprising in 1900 and the revolution of 1911-1913 - caused no mass disturbance in Sinkiang. However, apparently these years saw the growth of a spirit of independence throughout Mongolia, especially in the western regions most remote from Chinese authority. In this developing spirit the provincial government saw a threat to the ruling Chinese minority. It was feared that the Mongol tribes of Sinkiang might join with the clans of Outer Mongolia in a bid for autonomy.

C. Sinkiang during the Republic

Toward the end of the Ch'ing dynasty, there had been a slackening of the administration in Sinkiang. The officials sent out from Peking were not men of high caliber. Their failure to understand local conditions and their maltreatment of the natives had aroused much resentment and hostility. Yüan Ta-hua, the governor, was virtually an independent ruler of Sinkiang while the rest of China was engulfed in the civil war that resulted in the overthrow of the Ch'ing dynasty and in the formation of the republic. In 1911, when

- 175 the revolution reached Sinkiang and the revolutionists occupied Urumchi, it was YÜan who defeated them. The revolutionists, led by a man from Hunan, one of the many who had migrated to Sinkiang, withdrew to northern Sinkiang where they proclaimed the independence of Ili. One of YÜan's officers, Yang Tseng-hsin, recruited a Moslem corps, marched north and succeeded in suppressing the revolt. With the military power in his hands and with the backing of YÜan Ta-hua, Yang assumed the governorship of Sinkiang. The Republican government formally confirmed the office in 1912.

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669 1. Governor Yang Tseng-hsin

The first phase of Yang's administration was military. Oppression of the local officials and crushing taxes drove the Chinese Moslems in Qomul (Hami) to revolt; but Yang soon quashed the insurrection. In Ili, Chinese and Manchurian revolutionists continued their resistance. Yang dulled the edge of their power by negotiations. He recognized their republic as a part of Sinkiang and their officials as legitimate officials. Later, when the Ili revolutionists agreed to accept a loan from Russia without the knowledge of the provincial or central authorities, Yang wired Peking and received orders to seize and execute the leaders. Yang acted promptly in taking over control of that region.

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669 Another source of trouble for Yang Tseng-hsin was the activities of a secret society known as Ko-lao Hui, introduced into Sinkiang by the troops of Tso Tsung-t'ang and Liu Chin-t'ang. In later years it gained many adherents among the Chinese Moslems. A member who later rose to prominence was Ma Hung-pin, who under the Communists became a vice chairman of Kansu province. During the disorders following the fall of the dynasty, the headquarters of the secret society moved to Kashgar and its influence spread to Kharashar, Kucha, Aksu, Yarkand and Khotan. It took Yang Tseng-hsin two years to suppress the organization.

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669 On the northern borders of Sinkiang, Yang's troops fought a number of skirmishes with the Outer Mongolian forces who invaded Sinkiang in 1912 and seized control of Kobdo. Hostilities finally ended with the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between Yang and the government at Urga.

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669 Internally, Yang undertook administrative and financial reforms. By severe punishment of corrupt officials he sought to check graft, and by the issuance of a new currency he tried to halt inflation. Under him, a million mou (about 135,000 acres) of new land was opened to cultivation. To win the support of the natives, he gave power at the lower administrative level to the begs - Uighur headmen. Since their tenure of office was thirty years to life, they had an advantage over Chinese-appointed magistrates who were periodically changed. In official proclamations, he permitted the use of the native languages. This policy was effective until the collapse of the Imperial Russian government.

000 Imperial Russian government.

159 The revolution in Russia presented fresh problems to Yang's
635 administration. In 1917, hordes of Kazakhs who were residents of
175 Russian Turkestan, fled from conscription and poured into Sinkiang.
648 At one time, it was estimated that there were 200,000 Kazakh
167 refugees in the province, of whom about 100,000 were in the vicinity of Ili and 70,000 in Tarbagatai. Yang used his good offices to persuade the Soviet Government to pardon them and to permit these Kazakhs to return home. Following the Kazakhs, large numbers of White Russian emigres entered Sinkiang between the years 1918 and 1921. Yang drove out the more truculent ones, disarmed the others and gave them asylum in Sinkiang. Many of them enlisted in his forces.

159 The Soviet domination of Outer Mongolia resulted in the complete
635 repudiation of Chinese authority by all the Mongols except those in
175 the inner regions of the border provinces who were more accessible
648 to Chinese influence.

These new developments impelled Yang Tseng-hsin to adopt a campaign to promote dissension among his nomadic subjects. To accomplish this first he withdrew from the Mongols their rights to all the nomad lands granted them under the Manchu dynasty. Under these rights the Kazakhs had been required to pay grazing fees to the Mongols for use of the land. Then he withheld arms from the Mongols and supplied them to the Kazakhs, thus insuring the continuation of hostilities between the two peoples. These measures, coupled perhaps with the enmity which often exists between peoples of different faith and tradition, were sufficient to prevent the Sinkiang Mongols from joining with their kinsmen beyond the Altai. Under the pressure of Kazakh raids that penetrated even to the north of the Altai range, the Mongols of Sinkiang retreated farther into the province. Communication between them and Outer Mongolia came to an end.

175 The revival of a spirit of independence among the Mongols was
648 characterized generally by a lack of native leaders or of outstanding personalities of any sort. Nevertheless, there was one individual whose ambitions were associated with this spirit and who enjoyed a brief success as a Mongol leader. This was Dambijantsin or Ja Lama. Ja Lama, a Russian Kalmuck by birth, appeared in Western Mongolia in the early twentieth century. With his propaganda for the revival of the Mongol federation, he succeeded in attracting a following. As early as the late nineteenth century, travelers in Outer Mongolia had heard reports of Ja Lama. He claimed to be the grandson of Amursana, the last great Oirat chieftain, and he foretold the liberation of the Mongols from the Chinese by the action of forces that would gather in Siberia. Some such legend seems to have been current among the Oirats at that time. The Russian traveler, Roborovski, heard rumors that Amursana himself would return to unite the Western Mongols. Whether he created the legend or merely

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648 took advantage of it, Ja Lama assumed the role of liberator. He was influential in swinging Western Mongol support from the Sinkiang government to Outer Mongolia. His apparent objectives were the conquest of Sinkiang and part of Tibet, and a union of all the Western Mongols to form a new Western Mongolian state. In 1912 he led a successful attack on the town of Kobdo. He assumed religious and princely titles and served briefly as military governor of the region. In 1914 he was arrested and deported by the Russians, whose negotiations for a Chinese-Mongolian treaty were being disturbed by his aggressive activities. Eventually he returned to eastern Sinkiang. There he again rallied a group of Mongol adherents and built a fortification. He was hunted down and killed by assassins from the Uрга(Outer Mongolian) government, which apparently feared the consequences of a new Western Mongolian union.

The destruction of Ja Lama and his "organization", and the policy of the Sinkiang government in dealing with the Mongols, both contributed to the permanent detachment of the Kobdo district from Western Mongolia. The actual separation dates from the latter half of the eighteenth century and the Manchu conquest of the Northwest. In 1754 the Imperial government set up the Kobdo region as an administrative district under the administration of Outer Mongolia. When Ja Lama attacked and captured the city of Kobdo and established himself as governor of the district, it was Russian power that expelled him and forced the return of Kobdo to Outer Mongolia. Finally when Ja Lama established himself in eastern Sinkiang and attracted a new following of Western Mongols, he again threatened the detachment of Kobdo. It was the Uрга government that sent men to kill him and thereby insure Outer Mongolia's retention of Kobdo. The Mongols of the Kobdo district were, and probably still are, descendants of Oirats whose attachment to Outer Mongolia was merely a military and political convenience for the Manchu administration. Ja Lama's temporary success and the actions taken against him by the Russian and Outer Mongolian governments probably reflected a real feeling of "Oiratism" among the Mongols of Kobdo.

175 Before the Chinese Revolution in 1911, Western Mongol tribal territories were administered by princes who enjoyed virtual autonomy under the provincial government. This arrangement was continued with some modification under the Republic. The government extended its control over the princes and consequently over the Mongols themselves. The league and banner system probably remained in effect until the establishment of regional autonomy in Sinkiang, although the administrative units did not correspond strictly to tribal divisions and, in some cases, even included groups of unrelated peoples. There were three leagues and two special groups which were constituted as follows:

The Unen Susuktu League consisted of ten banners of Torguts,

195 widely distributed and separated from each other by non-Mongol peoples. These Torguts were located in the Tienshan Range above the oasis of Karashahr, on the northern slopes of the Tienshan, and on the southern slopes of the Altai.

The Bato Setkhiltu League was composed of three banners of Khoshuts who lived on the Yulduz plateau in the heart of the central Tien Shan.

The Ching Setkhiltu League, which included three banners of Khoshuts and seven of Urianghai, was located in the Chuguchak-Altai area in northern Sinkiang.

The Chahars in the Borotala Valley, and the Oirat in the valleys of the Tekes and Kash rivers in the Ili region were not included in the leagues.

However, the Chahars and Urianghai are not true Western Mongols. The former were transplanted from Chahar by the Manchus after the conquest of Dzungaria in the eighteenth century; the latter are descendants of tribes who originally lived in what is now Tannu Tuva.

175 Through Yang Tseng-hsin's efforts, Sinkiang remained neutral
159 in the civil war that raged in China in 1926-27. His troops kept out
635 the forces of the "Christian General" Feng YU-hsiang. On his own
648 initiative, he negotiated a new treaty with the Soviet government permitting Soviet consulates to operate in Sinkiang even after the National Government broke off relations with Soviet Russia in 1927. With the establishment of the National Government at Nanking, Yang wired his acknowledgement of, and allegiance to, the new government, which confirmed his position as governor.

2. Governor Chin Shu-jen

175 Yang Tseng-hsin came from the southwestern province of Yunnan
159 and during his rule many men from Yunnan had followed him to Sinkiang. In 1928, a fellow Yunnan official, allegedly with the connivance of the Chinese Communists and the Russians, murdered Yang at a banquet in his honor. The military commander Chin Shu-jen, who was believed to be implicated in the assassination plot, immediately suppressed the revolt and put the ringleaders to death. He then maneuvered himself into the position of governor.

Under Chin, the government of Sinkiang virtually disintegrated. Corruption was rife. Chin himself set the example for rapacity. He ruled in open defiance of the National Government at Nanking to the extent of concluding, on his own initiative and without the cognizance of Nanking, a new agreement with Soviet Russia in 1931. The agreement permitted Soviet authorities to establish eight commercial agencies in Sinkiang and to have complete control over telegraph and radio communications, thus increasing Soviet influence in the province. [48] The deterioration of economic conditions, heightened by spiralling inflation and the exploitation by Chin's minions, oppression, and inequities, led to widespread discontent. The situation was ripe for

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rebellion.

The rebellion began at Qomul (Hami), where at the death of the old prince, the Chinese had taken over the region and divided it into three administrative districts under the rule of Chinese magistrates. Then, with the influx of refugees from Kansu, Chin ousted the Uighurs from one of the three districts to provide land for the refugees. To make things worse, the Uighurs had to pay taxes while the Chinese refugees were exempted for three years. Finally, when a tax-collector forced a pretty Uighur girl to marry him against her will, the Uighurs rose in anger and killed the tax collectors and the refugees.

When Chin sent troops to put down the rebellion, the Uighur rebels sought the aid of Ma Chung-ying, a young Chinese Moslem (Dungan) officer from Kansu. Entering Sinkiang in 1932 with 400 men, his [648] force was soon swelled by local recruits. The Japanese, seeking an opportunity to intervene in Sinkiang, were believed to have given him guidance and moral support, if not actually funds and military equipment. Barkol (Chen-hsi) and Qomul (Hami), as well as large areas of eastern Sinkiang, fell to the arms of the young conqueror. However, his attack on Urumchi was beaten back by a young Manchurian officer, Sheng Shih-ts'ai, whom Chin Shu-jen had brought to Sinkiang to take command of the army.

[648] Sheng's defenders were later reinforced by Manchurian troops, who had been interned in Soviet Siberia and who were repatriated and sent to Sinkiang. They were called the Northeast Anti-Japanese Army.

With the arming and augmenting of both the provincial government army and the rebel forces, the civil war increased in ferocity and intensity. There was a heavy slaughter of the Han Chinese, the Chinese Moslems, and the Uighurs. Meanwhile, the Russian mercenaries stationed at Urumchi, whose pay had been in arrears, also revolted. In the pandemonium, Chin fled the city and found refuge in Russia. Sheng Shih-ts'ai came to the fore to take control over the army and the civil government.

3. Governor Sheng Shih-ts'ai

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Although frustrated in his assaults on Urumchi in 1932 and again in 1934, Ma Chung-ying was able to expand his power from Qomul (Hami) westward to Kashgar, hemming in Urumchi from all sides. In his marches back and forth across Sinkiang he left wide swaths of pillage and rapine, death and desolation in his wake. His far-ranging depredations were the signal for other bands of insurgents to rise. The Chinese military commander of Ili raised the banner of independence. In the Tarim Basin, the local Han Chinese and Chinese Moslem residents had banded together into an Eastern Turkestan Army to defend themselves against the ravages of Ma Chung-ying. In November, 1933, a group of Burut chiefs, assisted by returned-students from Turkey, seized control of the Eastern Turkestan Army and established an Eastern Turkestan Republic at Kashgar. In their newly-drafted constitution, they stated that the structure of their government would be based on the Koran, and all decrees and laws

195 also would be based on the Koran. Emissaries were sent to seek
159 aid and support from Moslems in Afghanistan and India where the
635 Pan-Islamic Movement was then in full swing. Telegrams were
669 sent to the Nationalist Government of China and to the League of
Nations requesting recognition of their state. Not only did they
fail to obtain support and recognition from abroad, but they were
also repudiated by their own people. Once in power, they embarked
on a terroristic program of persecuting the Han Chinese and the Chi-
nese Moslems who were the mainstays of the Eastern Turkestan
Army. Then, too, they were weakened by internal dissensions and
by the struggles of the leaders for power, until one by one they were
killed. The Eastern Turkestan Republic was finally dissolved when
Ma Chung-ying attacked Kashgar in June, 1934.

(648) Meantime, Sheng Shih-ts'ai reached an agreement with the
Soviet authorities whereby he received planes, trucks, armored
cars, machine-guns and ammunition. While Soviet troops operated
in the region of the Altai Mountains, Sheng's forces marched north
and succeeded in routing the insurgents at Ili. Again he led his army
south against Ma Chung-ying. His possession of superior armaments
turned the scales in the battle of Urumchi. Ma Chung-ying fled,
(506) harried by Sheng's warplanes, which bombed and strafed the rebel
columns at Turfan and Korla. He went to Kashgar in April, 1934.
Four months later, again forced to evacuate Kashgar, he crossed
the border into Russian Turkestan and was never heard of again.

The civil war in Sinkiang had lasted for four years of wholesale
destruction and bloodshed. Weary of strife and disorder, the people
were ready to accept Sheng Shih-ts'ai's proclamation of a new and
stable government and his promises for a new era in Sinkiang. When
he first came to power in 1933, he announced an eight-point policy
that had gained him considerable support. The eight points were:
1. racial equality, 2. religious freedom, 3. immediate and equitable
distribution of farm relief, 4. financial reform, 5. administrative
reform to clean the government, 6. extension of education, 7. pro-
motion of self-government, and 8. judicial reform.

Under the administration of Sheng Shih-ts'ai, Uighurs and Kazakhs
were appointed to high posts in their own district governments. The
non-Chinese nationalities were encouraged to use their own languages
and to organize their own schools. The number of students in schools
increased from 3,000 in 1933 to 150,000 in 1936, and many non-Chi-
nese students were sent abroad to study in Soviet Russia. The Sin-
kiang Daily was published in seven languages, and cultural associations
were established for the Uighurs, Kazakhs, Dungans (Chinese Mos-
lems), Tartars, Russians, and Chinese.

When he finally had suppressed the rebellions and firmly estab-
lished the authority of his government, Sheng Shih-ts'ai announced
his Six Great Policies for New Sinkiang: 1. anti-imperialism, 2.
kinship with Soviet Russia, 3. racial equality, 4. honest government,

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• 175 5. peace, and 6. reconstruction. After the years of tyranny and
159 misrule, the government which Sheng created in Sinkiang in com-
635 parison was enlightened and progressive, although, because of the
669 characteristics and background of the region, it was autocratic.

N IV. The Rise of the Communists

* 175 While Sheng Shih-ts'ai was consolidating his power in Sinkiang,
* 159 events were taking a dramatic turn at the other end of the vast
* 668 territory which comprises China's Northwest. The nucleus of the
669 first Communist guerilla bands appeared at Paoan in northern Shensi
in 1931. By the following year, when they came under the overall
direction of the Political Department of the Chinese Communist
Party headquarters at Yulin, they controlled eleven counties. The
poverty of the region made the people receptive to Communist pro-
paganda. In 1935, the Red Army, which had been driven out of
Kiangsi, reached northern Shensi after a long and circuitous trek
through southwestern China. Here they were under attack by gov-
ernment troops until December, 1936, when Chiang Kai-shek, who
was visiting Sian, was detained by Manchurian troops stationed in
the area. Under the terms that the Nationalist Government accepted
to secure the release of Chiang, the policy shifted from fighting the
Communists to outright opposition to Japan. With the pressure on
them removed, the Chinese Communists immediately began to ex-
pand in all directions. In the months that followed they occupied 24
counties (18 in northern Shensi, 5 in Kansu and one in Ninghsia).
They controlled a population of two million in what was known as the
Shen-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Region.

Their headquarters at Yen-an, in northern Shensi became the
Mecca of the Chinese Communists and fellow-travellers. From here
tentacles of Communist strength stretched out to North China, Inner
Mongolia, and to Sinkiang where some of the Communist agents
found service in the administration of Sheng Shih-ts'ai. During
World War II, the Communists were unable to penetrate southern
Shensi, where the government had stationed an army. The Com-
munists also made little headway in Ninghsia, in the regions held by
the Chinese Moslem general, Ma Hung-k'uei, and in Chinghai, held
by another Chinese Moslem general, Ma Pu-fang. In both these
provinces, the Moslem population repudiated Communism and
resisted Communist forces.

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175 The Nationalist Government's preoccupation with the war
159 against Japan permitted Sheng Shih-ts'ai to govern Sinkiang as a
148 virtually independent ruler. For seven years, until 1940, he main-
[635] tained his policy of kinship and orientation to the Soviet Union rather
than to China and his nominal superior, the Nationalist Government.

After 1941, when German armies overran and occupied eastern
Russia, and the Soviet government, engaged in a violent struggle for
survival, could not continue to send him supplies, he broke his ties

- 175 with Russia and sought to return to the fold of China. The National
159 Government had been waiting for this opportunity. Immediately it
648 dispatched officials to Sinkiang to take over the administration from
[669] Sheng's underlings; Nationalist troops under Chu Shao-liang and
Ma Pu-fang were sent to overawe Sheng's army; and another tide of
Chinese colonists invaded Sinkiang and were settled in the vicinity of
Urumchi.

Under these circumstances, Sheng Shih-ts'ai tried to shift back to Soviet Russia. Moreover, by this time, Russian forces had rolled the German invaders back from Leningrad and Stalingrad and were steadily advancing. In 1944, Sheng ordered the arrest of Chinese Nationalist officials and also of students and teachers from China Proper. His coup failed and the National Government removed Sheng from the governorship of Sinkiang and transferred him to Chungking to the sinecure position of Minister of Agriculture. This was the end of the colorful career of Sheng Shih-ts'ai. A trusted Nationalist official, Wu Chung-hsin, was appointed as governor of Sinkiang.

- 175 One of the many problems that Wu Chung-hsin inherited from
159 Sheng Shih-ts'ai was that of the Kazakhs in Ili. In 1940 Sheng had
669 arrested 70 Kazakh delegates from the Altai region who had come to
[563] protest his high-handed treatment of their people. When news of the
arrest reached the Kazakhs, they revolted en masse, led by one of
their chieftains, Osman Batur. After sporadic fighting between the
rebels and provincial troops, Sheng agreed to negotiate and to release
the prisoners. However, before they were released, a number of
them were executed. Incensed by this act of treachery, the Kazakhs
in the Altai region revolted again. They put up a strong resistance
but were finally overwhelmed by Sheng's forces. Osman Batur fled.

When Sheng turned against the Russians and attempted a rapprochement with China, Osman Batur organized the Altai-Kazakh Restoration Society. With arms from Outer Mongolia and the tacit support of Soviet Russia, he attacked and captured Ching-ho, Ta-cheng (Chuguchak) and A-shan (Altai). He was besieging Wu-su in 1944 when the new governor, Wu Chung-hsin, decided to negotiate. In the settlement of this uprising, which has been called the "Ining (Kulja) Incident", the Chinese agreed to withdraw their troops from Kulja and to grant the Kazakhs semi-autonomy in the territory they held which included Kuldja, Ta-cheng and A-shan. The new Eastern Turkestan Republic was established at Kulja. It had a government headed by a council of three, a Kazakh, a Uighur, and a White Russian. One of the leaders, Akhmejan Kasimi, was placed in charge of administration and finance; another of the leaders, Osman Batur, headed the army, which at one time was reported to number 40,000 men.

- 175 By November, 1945, the Ili rebellion had spread to the Tarim
669 Basin and insurgent forces surrounded Yarkand, Khargalik, and Kho-
[648] tan. At that time it was denied that Soviet Russia gave any military

175 assistance to the Ili rebels. Later, however, when the Chinese
668 Communists came to power, there were profuse statements thank-
648 ing the Soviet Government for its unstinted aid and support. Soviet
support to the Ili rebels was more apparent on the diplomatic plane.
The Soviet consul-general at Urumchi was openly friendly to the
rebels. He gave them every encouragement, while he played his
game as intermediary between Kazakh insurgents and the Chinese
authorities.

175 The negotiations between the Ili regime and the Chinese govern-
669 ment delegates headed by Chang Chih-chung lasted from October,
1945, to June, '46. The insurgents were willing to abandon their
independence if the Chinese government would grant them autonomy.
The Chinese negotiators were willing to permit the Ili regime to
retain its armed forces as a peace preservation corps if the Chinese
could have top military command and full authority in Sinkiang's
diplomatic affairs.

Finally a settlement was reached in the summer of 1946. An
agreement was signed providing for a reconciliation between the
Chinese authorities and the rebel leaders. Attached to the agree-
ment were two codicils concerning the reform of the provincial
government and reorganization of the armed forces. The terms of
the settlement also contained provisions for the election of district
officials by adult suffrage and for the formation of a provincial gov-
ernment composed of men, some of whom were appointed by the
Chinese government and some nominated by the provincial delegates.
The use of the Uighur and Kazakh languages was permitted in schools
and in the army. To implement the agreement, Chang Chih-chung
succeeded Wu Chung-hsin as governor. Burkhan Shahidi, a Uighur,
and Akhmejan Kasimi, a Kazakh, were appointed vice-chairmen of
the provincial administration. A determined effort was made to
improve the government and to give the local people a greater voice
in political affairs.

175 However, realization of these agreements, which would have
668 given the non-Chinese residents of Sinkiang a large measure of self-
669 government, was delayed and hamstrung by distrust and hostility on
578 both sides. The military commanders and the diehard Kuomintang
563 party members were unwilling to relinquish their prerogatives to
the native leaders; the extremist native leaders were impatient and
uncompromising. In February, 1947, the more contentious elements,
led by Akhmejan Kasimi, issued a statement, known as the Kulja
Declaration. It denounced the supremacy of one nationality (the
Chinese) over the other nationalities of Sinkiang, and called for the
unification of all the races of Sinkiang under a native government.
Adopting a moderate attitude, Chang Chih-chung issued a statement
declaring that, while Sinkiang should have an autonomous and demo-
cratic government, the pattern of the government should be based on
the ideas of Sun Yat-sen rather than on Soviet ideas.

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[635] The pressure on Chang Chih-chung from both sides became so intense that in May, 1947, he resigned and was succeeded by a Uighur, Maksud(Masud) Sabri. Maksud's appointment accentuated the clash of interest between rival factions in Sinkiang. The Uighur people generally supported him since he was one of them although he had spent many years of his life abroad. However, some of the more articulate popular groups denounced him vociferously and a majority of the members in the provincial assembly adopted a resolution opposing his nomination. In July, shortly after confirmation of his appointment, the Kulja delegation, headed by vice-chairman Akmejan Kasimi, withdrew. However, in a statement from Kulja (released in November) they denied that they had any intention of seceding from China and declared that they would return if their demands, including the removal of Maksud, were met. Since to dismiss Maksud so soon after his appointment in order to please the Kazakhs, would alienate the Uighurs, the National Government procrastinated and a deadlock resulted.

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648 Meanwhile the Kulja faction itself was split by dissensions. Osman Batur defected. He and his men were incorporated into the Nationalist Army and stationed at Pei-ta-shan (Baitik Bogdo) close to the border of Outer Mongolia. Outer Mongolia, claiming this region as its own, invaded in 1948 and penetrated a hundred miles into Chinese territory until they were checked by Osman Batur who was acclaimed as a hero throughout China. The dispute finally reached the United Nations without a satisfactory settlement.

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[635] By December, 1948, matters in Sinkiang had reached such an impasse that Maksud Sabri was removed and the governorship of Sinkiang was given to Burkhan Shahidi, another Uighur, who was vice-chairman of the provincial government and a middle-of-the-roader. During the first part of 1949 the Communist advance in China itself turned the attention of the National Government away from Sinkiang. In September, Saifuddin Azizi, a leader of the Kulja coalition, went to the Communist capital as a delegate to the first Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference and he brought word of the submission of the Ili faction to the Chinese Communists. Chang Chih-chung, whom the National Government sent to Peiping to negotiate with the Communists, also surrendered and exerted his influence to persuade the officials in Sinkiang to join the Communist bandwagon. By the end of September, when Communist troops under Wang Chen pushed through the Kansu Corridor, the governor of Sinkiang, Burkhan, and the military commander, T'ao Chih-yueh, in separate telegrams, offered their allegiance to the Chinese Communist Government. A few days later, Communist troops reached and occupied Urumchi.

1. Washington S-4 (no date) 1956 AF13 Northwest China AF13 Sinkiang A11 Iran MA1 China AF1

100 -

Pan ch'ao reaches
Caspian Sea 92

Pan Ch'ao regains Turkestan 74-94; returns to
China 102

Huns retake Turkestan 107-31.
Invasion of Kushan 127

200 -

Sassanid Dynasty in
Persia 226-651

300 - Mani; Manichaeism

Hephthalites (White Huns), Juan-juan,
Kao-chü (Tolües)

400 - Wars with Rome

Appearance of Turks; Expansion
Turks destroy Juan-juan and the Hephthalites
552 Division of Turks into East and West 582

THREE KINGDOMS (221-265)

CHIN 265-419

Barbarian Invasions
Foreign States in North
China

Minor Chinese state in
South China

500 -

554 - subjugate the Heph-
thalites in region of Oxus

600 - Arabs invade Persia
Expansion to Mediterranean;
Last Sassanid King
flees to China, 674

Travels of Hsuan-tsang
Chinese defeat E. Turks 636; Tibetans 639;
W. Turks 659; Chinese control of Turkestan
Arabs and Tibetans effect junction 741

SUI (capital: Sian) 589-618
T'ANG (capital: Sian) 618-906
invasion of E. Turks 629
Rebellion of An-lu-shan 755
Uighurs sack Loyang 762

700 - ARABS -

Qutaiba conquers
Central Asia 707-713

Expedition of Kao Hsien-chih over the
Pamirs 747

Battle of Athlach 751, Chinese defeat.
Uighur Empire on the Orkhon 744-821

Tibetans sack Ch'ang-an 763

800 -

Defeat of East Turks, 745
Tibetan Wars 763-821

Barbarian Invasions

900 -

Kirghiz destroy Uighur Empire 840
Uighurs migrate to (1) Irtish (2) Urumchi-
Turfan

FIVE DYNASTIES (North) and
TEN STATES (South)

Qarluks, Uighurs, Sha-t'o (Chöi) Turks

DIVISION

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civilization. The former provinces of Ninghsia, Chinghai, and Sinkiang are China's frontier dependencies. While Ninghsia was part of Inner Mongolia and Sinkiang is the homeland of the Turkic peoples, Chinghai forms a transitional area between the Tibetans and Mongols on the southwest and northeast as well as between the Chinese and Uighurs in the southeast and northwest respectively. Although these borderlands were first brought under China's political control during the Han Dynasty at the beginning of the Christian Era, their political ties to China were not consolidated until recently.

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In order to check Tsarist Russia's aggression towards Chinese Turkestan (Sinkiang) after her occupation of the Ili valley, China sent an expedition under General Tso Tsung-t'ang in 1871 to reconquer the region and to make it a province under the name of Sinkiang (literally "New Dominion") in 1881.

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In view of Russia's continued southward encroachment from Siberia upon Outer Mongolia and Britain's from India northward to Tibet during the Chinese Revolution at the end of the Manchu Dynasty in 1910-1912, China carved Ninghsia out of Inner Mongolia and Chinghai out of greater Tibet, thereby creating two special districts with Yin-chuan and Hsi-ning as their centers under the provincial administration of Kansu in 1913. By 1928, they were made into two separate provinces. However, quite unexpectedly, following the formation of the Inner Mongolian Autonomy, the province of Ninghsia was abolished and has been added to Kansu province in 1955. (In May 1956 the Alashan and Edsingol regions have been detached from Kansu province and incorporated into the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region. Precise boundary demarcations are not yet known.) Although the political control over these frontier dependencies of Sinkiang, Chinghai, and Ninghsia has been strengthened gradually by the subsequent changes of their administrative status in relation to China, they still remain as "pale" areas in the distribution of Chinese population and culture. That is, the inhabitants of these borderlands are essentially ethnic minority peoples such as Mongols, Tibetans, Uighurs, Monguors, Khirgiz, Kazakhs, etc. They are non-han Chinese peoples with an increasing touch of Chinese cultural influence and an increasing number of Chinese elements among the various native groups.

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The annexation of these frontier territories to China has brought about an artificial connection between the Chinese and the non-Han Chinese minority peoples, both nomads and settlers. Until now, the natives do not seem to have been influenced much by administrative unity. Not much sympathy is exchanged between the Chinese and Lamaist Tibetan or Mongol; even less

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B. Population Problems

1. Traditional Antagonism Between the Moslems and the Chinese

Of the many problems in regard to the population of North-west China, the traditional antagonism between the Moslems and the Chinese, together with its international complications, is by far the most serious. Moslem uprisings have been frequent and often caused great massacres on both sides. In most cases the Moslem disturbances are supported and made use of by ambitious neighboring powers, particularly Russia - both Tsarist and Soviet. In 1871 Tsarist Russia used the 1861-1874 Moslem disturbance as a pretext to occupy the Ili Valley and then force China to cede the lower part of the Valley, west of Khargos to Russia. Time and again Russia took advantage of Moslem troubles in Sinkiang to make some special territorial, political and economic demands in the provinces, i. e., free trade in Sinkiang by the Ili Commercial Treaty of 1851 and the cession of the territory west of Tarbagatai by the treaty of Chuguchak (Ta-cheng) in 1864.

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648 Sinkiang had always been a center of international intrigue between Russia and Britain for the spoils of Central Asia, as well as the barometer of power relations between Russia and China. (See Foreign Relations).

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2. The Uighur Autonomy

Under the Chinese Communist Regime, Sinkiang became the Uighur Autonomous Area in September, 1955. A National Autonomy for Sinkiang was first recommended by General Chang Chih-chung, a liberal Nationalist Government high official in 1946-49. He was "influenced by views of American politicians who insisted that the principle of self-government should be applied to Sinkiang also - an illusory wish for a people which stood between Russia and China, like a mouse between two cats." (CNA. No. 103, October 7, 1955).

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A continuous great influx of Chinese to Sinkiang has occurred, which is particularly marked by the present-day Army Construction Corps and the presence of the Corrective Labor Force. The soldiers are sent to meet the urgent demand of labor to undertake the gigantic construction program and the latter, estimated at several hundred thousands, are condemned to forced labor in the thinly populated border areas. (See: Labor).

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"Since the Chinese Communist troops entered Sinkiang, the rulers have always been Chinese, and at present, with the introduction of autonomy, this Chinese domination is the more emphasized." (CNA. No. 103, October 7, 1955). Furthermore, Government officials are transferred from Peking to Sinkiang in large numbers. On August 21, 1955, seventy-nine officials from the "First Grade Offices" of the Central Government left Peking for Sinkiang; at the same time

II. The Turkic People of the Northwest

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A. The New Uighurs (or Eastern Turks)

[668] The Turks of Sinkiang call themselves after the cities where they live, e.g. Kashgarlik, Turfanlik, Kuchalik, etc.... After the Communist Revolution the Communists introduced the term Uighurs for the Eastern Turks, living in the Ili District. The term later was adopted by the Chinese.

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1. Physical characteristics

[167] In one sense the Eastern Turks are the descendants of the old Uighurs who migrated to present day Sinkiang during the ninth century A.D., Later they had mixed with Indo-european tribes and other Turkish tribes of the Chagatai Ulus (empire) and to a small degree also with the Mongols. Thus, in the terminology employed by E. Frhr. von Eickstedt, "Rassenkunde und Rassengeschichte der Menschheit, Stuttgart, 1934, the Eastern Turks show many europid and some turanid racial characteristics, and only a slight degree of mongoloid traits.

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A more detailed description of the average physical type of Eastern Turkestan is as follows: dark hair and eyes, (sometimes lighter occasionally blue eyes), white or yellowish skin with sometimes a slight inclination to brown, middle or tall stature, on the average 1680-1700 mm., with a tendency toward obesity. The head is definitely brachycephalic with a length-width index of 85-87, a longish-oval face, with wide cheek-bones, a straight and rather prominent nose, eyes lacking the mongoloid fold, and everted lips.

2. Economy

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The main occupations of the Eastern Turks are horticulture, agriculture and animal husbandry. The Eastern Turks breed camels, horses, sheep, and goats. They are famous for their fertile fruit-orchards, which are mostly artificially irrigated. Handicraft is fairly developed, but has no economic significance.

3. Religion

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The Eastern Turks are Moslems, adherents of the Sun sect. However, they display an attitude towards religion. This does not refer to the leading religious clergy who form a kind of a gen-try together with the nobility of the rich landowners.

4. Social organization

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In contrast to the Kirghiz, Kazakhs, and Uzbeks, the Eastern Turks have lost their clan system and tribal organization completely. There is no antagonism between the Eastern Turks and the remaining Turkic tribes, although the nomadic Turkic tribes exhibit some contempt of the Eastern Turks. However, there is an old and remarkable hatred between the Turks and the Chinese, due partly to the greater efficiency and industriousness of the Chinese.

212 5. Literature

563 a. literacy

The Eastern Turks still use the Arabic script. Until recently there was at least 95 per cent illiteracy. The Communist regime apparently has successfully attempted to fight illiteracy.

b. literature and folklore

538 Since Chagatai times the Eastern Turks have been the bearers
178 of an amazing literature and folklore. For over a hundred years,
563 this intellectual life has been declining. Now nothing remains but
primitive samples of that literature which was so famous and influential upon various Turkic peoples.

101 B. The Taranchis

563 The Taranchis are ethnically, linguistically, culturally and
175 genetically the same as the Eastern Turks. Those New-Uighurs
who were defeated by the Chinese at the middle of the 18th century
and fled to the Russian part of the Ili Area, the Russians called
Taranchi, a name that has remained ever since.

C. The Kazakhs

1. Origin and physical characteristics

Prior to the Russian Revolution the Kazakhs were called Kirghiz. Many times they are referred to as Kazakh-Kirghiz, or Kirghiz-Kazakhs or Kirghiz-Kaisaks. The original homeland of the Kazakhs was southern Siberia between the Yenisei River and the Ob River. According to Abulgazi and Rashideddin the Kazakhs were a very small tribe which expanded after the Mongolian conquest and after frequent mergings with Mongolian clans. This explains why the Kazakhs resemble the Mongols so much. In fact 80 per cent of the anthropological features of the Kazakhs are mongoloid, i. e. a strong and square-built trunk with relatively short legs, wide and round heads; in profile only a slight curvature of the occiput (back part of the head) can be seen; the face is wide and flat, high cheek-bones, and typical mongolian eyelid, the nose is flat, hair and eyes are black or brown, the lower jaw is wide and strongly built.

2. Social organization

a. the khanate

563 The Kazakh hordes first belonged to the Chagatai Empire and
175 later to the Golden Horde. During the sixteenth century they formed
619 their own Kazakh Khanate.

b. the tribes

563 The Kazakhs living in Sinkiang belong mostly to the Orta Dzhuz
619 (middle horde), consisting of the following five main tribes: (1) A-
tagni, (2) Naiman, (3) Argin, (4) Uvak-Girei and (5) Kipchak.

c. the clans

[614] The clan organization among the Kazakhs is very well preserved.

563 Known clan names of the Middle Horde are the following: Chakchat,
619 Chardzhid, Turtul, Karaul, Karakisak, Kandzhagali, Achai, Tarakli,
614 Kulchan-Argin, Kundelen, Usun, Tanabuga, Karabalik-Kipchak.

3. Economy

563 The Kazakhs are still nomads. The rear camels, horses,
233 sheep and goats. In contrast to the Eastern Turks who live in
433 brick and mud houses, they live in felt tents. The Kazakhs are
[342] famous horse and camel breeders. Sheep play the most important
role as sources of wool and meat. Like the Kirghiz and the Mongols,
the Kazakhs have carefully explored, selected and defended summer
pastures and protected valleys for the winter time.

563 The Kazakhs are very proud and independent. They dislike
181 any political supervision and are known to have avoided tax collec-
tors by crossing the borders to Mongolia or Soviet Russia.

4. Literature

563 The Kazakhs have a huge folklore which is being handed down
538 from generation to generation. They still use the Arabic script,
[173] but only a small percentage of noblemen and clergy are literate.
[212]

5. Religion

563 The Kazakhs are Moslems, belonging to the Sunna sect, but
771 they are in no way passionate and ardent believers like, for instance,
the Turks of Persia. Their nomadic life obviously does not permit
strict observance of the Islamic regulations.

D. The Kirghiz

1. History

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• 175 Prior to the Communist Revolution the Kirghiz were called
563 Kara-Kirghiz or Burut. When the Kirghiz were driven out of Mon-
golia by the Kara Khitai (shortly before 924 A.D.), some moved
southwest into the areas where they now live.

563 The Kirghiz are subdivided into two wings: Ong-the right one,
619 and Sol-the left one. Like the Kazakhs, the Kirghiz have a very
614 well preserved clan system. They are believed to represent the
[44] oldest Turkish tribe. As far as their physical characteristics are
concerned, what has been said about the Kazakhs is also true for
the Kirghiz; i.e., the Kirghiz also had mixed with Mongol clans
at a very early period.

2. Their regulation

[147] The Kirghiz have a reputation for being extremely resistant
to rigorous climate, hunger and diseases. They are well known
[181] for their wit and sense of humor. Although most are illiterate,
[212] their vivid folklore is handed down in every single tent and many
[538] Kirghiz tribesmen are able to quote thousands of rhymes from
their epic songs.

3. Economy

563 Their weather-beatend faces show that they live in the moun-
361 tains. They breed horses, camels, sheep, goats and yaks. When
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[131] Huang-ho and in the surrounding villages. They are also found on one section of the road from Hsi-ning to Ho-chou. They differ considerably from the average type of Chinese Moslems. They
[142] are tall and lank. They have large and not flat noses, black and level eyes, cheekbones not prominent, long face, thick eyebrows, full black beard, retreating forehead, flattened occiput, brown but never yellow skin. Thus they are similar to the Turks of Chinese Turkestan.

2. Language and religion

[197] The most remarkable characteristic is their language which might be called a corrupt Turkish. In religion they are strict
[771] Hanafis and show great respect to their clergy. However, for the most part they are rather given to the drinking of spirits. Even
[213] the lowest classes sometimes are acquainted with the Arabic alphabet. They are said to have received their present form of religion
[212] from a reformer named Maming-hsin (Muhammad Amin) who taught
[175] about 1750.

3. Social organization

[173] The Salars are believed to have settled in their present habitat during the Yuan or Ming dynasty. They claim to have migrated from the Samarkand area. According to Schramm, who quotes
[614] General Ma Fu-hsiang, the Salars are subdivided into the "inner five clans" and into the "outer eight clans" (Chinese: kung). The
[197] latter lost their original Turkic language and now speak Tibetan.

The Salars are said to preserve clan traditions very well and
[614] they do not marry anyone who does not belong to one of the Salar clans. They also have a reputation for being very fanatical Moslems, and have participated in all the Moslem uprisings of the
[771] 17th, 18th, 19th and 20th centuries.

G. The Sarigh Uighur (Chinese: Huang-fan)

[175] When Mannerheim visited the Sarigh-Uighur in 1907, there were only 100 families to be found. This small tribe lives in three villages on the northern slopes of the Nanshan Mountains, in the area of Tun-huang, Su-chou and Kan-chou. They have preserved their
[361] tribal name and their Buddhist religion but they gave up their Uighur script during the eighteenth century and adopted the Tibetan script.

1. Physical characteristics

[178] Mannerheim describes them as generally having excessively
[212] prominent cheek bones. But he also saw several people with oval
[771] shaped faces and not strikingly prominent cheekbones. However, in general the type of face is short and somewhat broad. Some of the women have thick noses. The mouth shows neither thin nor thick lips. The eyes are small and the distance between them is also normal. (Mannerheim obviously employs European standards when he talks about "normal" or "average.") The corners of the eyes were closed and there was no inner epicanthic fold. Their hair

1: Washington S-4 (no date) 1956 AF13 Northwest China AF13
Sinkiang A11
Monguor AE9

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563 body skin is brownish or yellowish and brachycephalism is found
141 in more than 92%. They have high cheek bones, the nose is flat
142 and the eyes show the typical Mongoloid eyefold. The eyes are
either black or brown, sometimes even light brown. The hair is
also black or dark brown, coarse and straight. Hair growth is
sparse. The average height is about 1670 mm. The trunk is
strongly built and the legs are rather short in comparison to those
of the Uzbeks or Tajiks.

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563 3. Relations with non-Mongols

There is no animosity between the various Mongol tribes, but
there is a definite antagonism between the Mongols and the Kazakhs
and between the Mongols and the Chinese.

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563 4. History

The Western Mongols are direct descendants from the Oirats
of the great Mongolian conquest. At least, since 600 A.D. they
have lived in this area. Some of the Torguts are recent immi-
grants or, more accurately, returnees. They left Russia in 1771
and returned to their homeland, Dzungaria.

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563 As far as social organization is concerned, the Oirats are
said to represent the old Mongolian pattern. Tribal leaders inherit
their political positions, and property is considered in terms of
pastures and cattle.

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563 5. The leagues

631 The Mongols of Sinkiang were organized into three leagues:

- (1) the Unen Susuqtu League, consisting of ten banners of Torguts
- (2) the Batu Setkhiltu League, consisting of three banners of Khoshuts
- (3) the Ching Setkhiltu League, consisting of three banners of Kho-
shuts and seven banners of Uriangkhai.

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*563 B. The Mongols of Kansu

101 1. The Mongours

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[101] a. history

The Mongours are the most important Mongolian tribe living
in Kansu. They are known under various names. Potanin called
them Shirongols, the Chinese call them Tu-jen, the Olots and Tor-
guts call them Dalda or Doldo, the Tanguts call them Cha-hor, but
the Mongours themselves use only the latter term. The Mongours
have been studied by Father Schram who states that the Mongours
came to Kansu in the course of the Mongol conquests in the thir-
teenth century and that furthermore the Mongours were already
settled in the Hsi-ning area when the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644)
was founded. The Ch'ing dynasty (1644-1911) "benefitting by the
experience of the Ming succeeded in organizing the country, pri-
marily by subduing the neighbouring tribes of Kokonor, assigning
definite territories to each of them and placing them under the
jurisdiction of an Amban in 1732; having thus removed the danger
of forays by nomadic tribes they were able to develop the country

563 or Oirat. The Kalmucks proper are, or rather were, only a
[001] group of the Oirats (Western Mongols). As a people they have
[619] ceased to exist. The Western Mongols are divided into the
Torgut, Khoshut, Ölot and Dörbet (also called Dzungar) tribes.
• 175 As the pressure of the Chinese government became too strong
563 in the early 17th century some Khoshuts migrated into the Koko-
nor area. The Torguts moved into the steppes (1618) between the
Urals and the Volga and submitted to the Russians. In 1673 the
Dorbets, and in 1675 the Khoshuts, who had not migrated to the
Kokonor area, followed their lead. However by 1771 Russian
domination had become so oppressive that the Oirats decided on
a return migration. Only a small part of the 400,000 people and
their animals that wandered back arrived in their new home,
which was now called Dzungaria (Mongolian: zūn gar "right
wing"). One group settled in the eastern part of Tien-shan,
[13] another small group at the southern edges of the Gobi, at the
Kokonor and another in the Chinese province, Kansu.

19 Linguistically speaking, the following changes have occurred:
1) The Kalmuck language has contracted the groups *aju, *egū,
etc. to long vowels:

Common Mongolian	Mongolian	Kalmuck
*caɣayan "white"	ɣayan	tsayān
*qaɣayar "bridle"	qaɣayar	ɣazār
*qabalya "gate"	qabalya	χālγ
*čigiray < *tiγiray "massive"	čigiray	tširoG "solid"
*dayuda- "to call"	dayuda-	dūn "voice"
*toɣari- "to turn"	toɣori-	tör- "to go around"

2) I-breaking has occurred:

Mongolian	Kalmuck
birayγu "calf"	bürū
miqan "meat"	maχγ
sira "yellow"	šar
milaya "lash"	malā

3) I-breaking did not occur in some instances; rather *i has
assimilated the vowel in the following syllable:

Mongolian: jida "spear"	Kalmuck: džido < *jide
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4) The Common Mongolian affricatives *č and *j became in
Kalmuck *ts and *z respectively. Only before *i did they remain
as *tš and *dž:

Mongolian	Kalmuck
čayan "white"	tsayān
časun "snow"	tsasn
čisun "blood"	tsusn
jekegün "cold"	zekūn
jelkei "thief"	zelkē

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- 3) Predominance of nasalized vowels, -ã, and ẽ
- 4) A group of words like cha, ch'a, sha, etc. have ts-, tsh-, s-, respectively.
- 5) These dialects show a different treatment of words like chu, ch'u, shu, ju, etc. While in some dialects they have ts-, tsh-, s-, z-, (or rarely ts-, tsh-, ʃ-, ʒ-) plus -y, in other dialects they have pf-, phf-, f-, v- respectively plus -u.
- 6) The following contrasts are observed only in some of these dialects:

- a) Contrast between n- and l-
- b) Contrast between v- and u-
- c) Contrast between s- and ʃ- before -i
- d) Contrast between -ẽ and -ɛ

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Areas with Chinese minorities are found in Sinkiang and the U.S.S.R. The Mandarin-speaking officials, merchants, soldiers, and criminals who went to the larger cities of Sinkiang (i. e. Urunchi, etc.) in frequent waves of migration, resulted in the predominance of the Mandarin dialect in these cities. Descendants of the Chinese Moslems, under the name of Dungans, migrated from the provinces of Kansu and Shensi in the second half of the 19th century. They still preserve their native Chinese language with minor changes. The center of the Kansu dialect is the Alexandrowka settlement, in Kirghizstan, in the vicinity of Frunse (former Pischpek). The center of the Shensi dialect is Karakunuz, in Kazakstan, which lies not far from the city of Tokmak.

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The phonological structure of the ancient northwestern dialects of the 8th and 9th centuries is demonstrated in some Chinese texts which were discovered in Tibetan transcription at Tun-huang. These ancient dialects, presumable of Kansu, do not seem to be directly ancestral to the modern dialects described above. The striking features of the ancient dialect, as revealed by the Tibetan spellings in the thousand character classic are the different development in -i and -u; the distinction between m-: 'b-; n-: 'd-; (ʒ): 'g; and the partial loss of the final -ŋ.

V. Concluding Remarks

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Most of the Western Mongols of the Northwest region speak Chinese as a second language. The percentage of those who are bilingual is rather high (about two thirds). The Monguors, however, rarely speak a second language. Very few individuals know Chinese or Tibetan. Among the Turks the percentage of New Uighurs who speak Chinese is very high, due to the fact that they live side by side with the Chinese. The same is true for the Tatars, Uzbeks and Tajiks, whose employment in trade forces them to learn the main language of the country. Those Turks who live in the moun-

B. The Western (Oirat) Mongols (See also IMAR, Social Structure)

563 After the decline of the Mongolian Empire in the 14th century,
175 the Western Mongols (the tribes Choros, Khoit, Khoshut and Torgut) of Dzungaria established the so-called Oirat Federation. Its social structure is best summarized in the Oirat codex [671] Chaghajachi yin bichik "Book of the Judges", based on the Jassa of Chingis Khan.

563 Life within the extended family is absolutely patriarchal.
596 Although polygyny is not mentioned in the codex it is an accepted
595 part of the society. The children of concubines are legitimate.
[671] The order of precedence among the children depends on the
[851] social status of their mothers.

563 After the father's death, the eldest son inherits everything,
428 including the father's wives and concubines with the exception of his own mother. Inheritance as well as descent follows the male line.

563 Among the Western Mongols clan exogamy is strictly observed,
614 especially among the Torguts and Khoshuts of Sinkiang. Marriage
583 entails the payment of a bride-price of at least two horses, two cows and twelve sheep. The bride-price for an aristocratic girl is considerably higher and consists of several dozen camels, 563 horses and sheep. If a wife is divorced she is not permitted to 586 take with her anything which has been given to her by her husband.

563 According to the Chaghajachi-yin bichik the Oirats were organ-
631 ized into ail, khoshun (banners) and aimak. In Sinkiang there are two khoshun of Torguts, one khoshun of Khoshuts and seven khoshun of Uriangkhai. The Khoshuts of the Alashan Area and the Torguts of the Edsin Gol Area each constitute one khoshun. Each khoshun lives on land and pastures with well-defined boundaries.

563 The same source details the various strata of Oirat society.
565 It subdivides the entire Oirat population into three groups. The nobility (taiji) belong to the first group, the darkhans (soldiers, warriors, flag-bearers, who are tax-exempt people) belong to the second group, and the kara klümüm (plebians) belong to the third group. Cutting across these other divisions is the highly respected group of monks (Llama, Ho-brog or pandit) who are also tax-exempt.

563 The Oirat princes are subdivided into six different ranks:
565 a) Ch'in-Wang b) Chün-Wang c) Beile c) Beise d) Chen-kuo-kung
554 and f) Hu-kuo-kung. The Oirat taijis have four ranks, e.g., the ruling leader of a khoshun who is called khoshun-u jasak is a taiji of the first rank. Besides these ranks honorary titles exist such as: erdeni "jewel", darkhan "master", tüsiyetü "pillar, support", daiching "hero", dalai "ocean" and batur "hero" etc. The Khoshun-u jasak is the ruler of his banner. Commoners [651] pay him tribute in the form of cattle or agricultural products.

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*563 The clan /The Nomadic Tibetans/
614 as such owns no property. It serves only as a geneological record
[421] of importance in determining who are not legitimate marriage mates.
N The clans are patrilineal, but the clan affiliations of both parents
limit the choice of possible spouses.
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*563 Beyond the larger unit, Ekvall states "... the Tibetans acknow-
648 ledge no law or control beyond that of the tribe. About seventy years
[651] ago some of these tribes paid token-taxes to the Chinese government
as a sort of yearly tribute, but even that has gone out of practice; and,
though in a vague way the Tibetans acknowledge the 'emperor's
household,' i.e., the Chinese government... to all practical pur-
poses Chinese law is completely ineffective in the region. Not only
are the tribes independent of the Chinese government but they are
even more independent of each other...." (1939 p. 50-51.)
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*563 Lhasa has almost as little influence as Peking. It has no poli-
792 tical control over the area, but it still remains the prime ecclesi-
astical authority and the goal of every prospective pilgrim-trader,
i.e., every Tibetan.
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*563 Despite the rigors, the feuds and the dangers of Tibetan nomadic
554 life, it presents a very strong attraction for both the nomadic and
556 the sedentary Tibetan. By attaching himself to a nomadic encamp-
ment a young and poor ex-farmer can become a social, as well as
a literal, climber. Success and prestige are measured in terms of
influence and wealth. The high road to these is the road of the
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[579] nomad, with his herds and his golden opportunities to acquire wealth
rapidly by removing it from its previous owner and by trading.
With his wealth, regardless of how acquired, he can be lavish with
gifts and donations to a monastery. This lavishness combined with
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[574] the ability to entertain guests liberally, adds to the individual's
influence and with influence he has prestige, therefore success.
The sedentary man or woman who succeeds in making himself
valuable to a nomadic tent is well on the way to becoming a self-
made nomad.

II. The Sedentary Peoples

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563 A. The New Uighurs (Eastern Turks)
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• 175 Some socio-historical considerations are necessary for a better
understanding of New Uighur social structure. No clear con-
cepts about the transformation of the New Uighur to a sedentary
population have been advanced to this time. However, the following
hypotheses are presented. Until the eighth century the New Uighurs
(or simply the Uighurs, as they were known at that time), were a
predominantly nomadic people. After the collapse of the middle
Turkic empire in 744 A.D. Chinese influences upon all the Turkic
peoples in Sinkiang became increasingly stronger. This is brought

/The New Uighurs/

563 out clearly by the Orkhon inscriptions in which the Khaqan com-
121 plains bitterly of the Turkic susceptibility to Chinese culture,
175 and the rapid sinification of his people. In this sense, sinification
meant that the Turkic tribes gradually gave up their nomadic life
and settled in more permanent camp sites. These events had
strong repercussions on Turkic social structure, which moved
from kinship to function and territory. After the New Uighurs
had been expelled from their ancestral lands by the Kirghiz in
840 A.D. they settled around the Tarim Basin. They had to
[177] abandon their nomadic way of life and to learn Chinese irriga-
tion practices in order to survive and to maintain a certain level
of productivity.

563 Thus the New Uighurs established what may be called an
175 irrigation civilization. Class lines in New Uighur society became
565 more flexible. Whereas noble status was based on descent in
554 the nomadic era, high social prestige and, therefore, high
status was now attained by wealth gained through efficient
labor and irrigational practices. Nearly all the irrigation
canals were dug by collective effort. However, the actual
water right of each farmer was in proportion to the quantity of
labor he contributed to the digging. Irrigation regulation was
entirely a matter of self-government. The Mirab, or keeper
[624] of the registry and person in charge of water distribution, and
his assistant the Kokbeshi, were chosen by the village. This
meant considerable social mobility, though traces of a more
rigid class structure remain. For example, the Aqsagal is
the successor to the former tribal chieftain, but unlike the
former he is chosen from among the villagers, and his office
[771] is not hereditary as was that of the tribal leader. Class lines
based on racial distinctions do not exist among the New Uighurs,
since the unifying factor in the society is not race but religion.
[582] Should a New Uighur marry a Chinese woman, she becomes a
member of the community by "baptism."

563 The following distinctions may be noted in the New Uighur
565 class system as a whole:

- [423] 1. About two-thirds of the New Uighur population belongs to
the small peasantry, holding title to one to three acres of irri-
gated land. On rare occasions a small peasant may till up to
thirty acres. Politically, this social stratum has little or
no power, unless they participate as a group in a mass move-
ment.
- [423] 2. About one-eighth of the New Uighur population belongs to
the "landed gentry" holding title to fifty or more acres. All
their land usually is rented to tenant farmers, who pay the
landlord up to eighty per cent of the land's produce. Politi-
cally, this segment of the New Uighur class structure is the
strongest, or at least it was, prior to 1949. Usually the com-
munal leaders are elected from this segment of the population.

ARTISTIC AND INTELLECTUAL EXPRESSION

I. The Turkic Peoples of Sinkiang

A. General Introduction

563 The artistic and intellectual expressions of the peoples of
517 Sinkiang vary greatly from those of the people of China proper.
The culture of the Eastern Turkis is influenced greatly by
Islamic civilization, and constitutes a culturally integral part
of Turkestan as a whole.

563 The artistic and intellectual creative achievements are con-
517 tained in the vast written and oral literature of the Turkic
53 people, in their extensive folklore, folk music and dance. The
545 arts of painting and sculpture are a tradition of the past, and
have scarcely been practiced since the conversion of the Turkic
people to Islam. Turkic theatre, with the exception of shadow
theatre, was virtually unknown in Sinkiang prior to the Com-
[177] munist era. The Communists have introduced dramatic art into
[668] Eastern Turkestan, the modern theatrical productions being on
the Soviet model for drama among national minorities.

563 "Unfortunately, contact with Europe and the natural inter-
517 course with the neighboring state of Russia are gradually de-
53 stroying these beautiful arts and crafts which have been pre-
177 served here from earlier times" (Le Coq, Albert von, Buried
Treasures of Eastern Turkestan, p. 41). Most of the various
forms of art and intellectual expression of the people of Sinkiang
are today in a state of decline. The contact with industrialized
Russia and the intellectual atmosphere created by the Commun-
ist regime have produced unfavorable circumstances for the
further development of the Eastern Turki artistic and intellec-
tual expression. The important works of art are to be found in
the already accumulated artistic creations.

B. Turkic Literature and Oral Art

563 The literary heritage of Eastern Turkestan is not limited
538 alone to the works produced in this geographical area, but en-
compasses also much of the Turkic literature produced in other
parts of Inner Asia as well as much of the Islamic literature.
Little of the Eastern Turki literature is completely original and
particular to this area alone; most of it being the common heri-
tage of the Turks as a whole and some of it common to the
other believers in Islam.

• [175] The earliest important literary achievements known to us in
Eastern Turkestan were written in the Uighur language and date
back to pre-Islamic times. These literary documents are re-

/Turkic Peoples of Sinkiang/

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• 175 religious in character and testify to the strength and popularity of Manichaen doctrines among the Uighurs. The most famous of these religious documents is Khoustuanit, noted in particular for its linguistic purity.

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(177) In the eleventh century, two new religious trends made an impression upon the Uighurs—Nestorian Christianity and Buddhism. The existence of both these religions and their influence upon the Uighurs is confirmed by a few religious texts found in the area which date back to that period. These religious texts seem to be mainly translated works rather than original creations.

There were scarcely any secular documents found in Uighur. However, there is one noted secular work which was written toward the end of the eleventh century—the Kudatku Bilik. This work was written by Yusuf from Balasagun, then serving in the court of Boghra Khan. The work is concerned with the secular ruler, the nature of his office and his duties to those governed by him. It gives many historical details about the court life at the time and the political and social life of the Uighurs. Contrary to the religious Uighur documents, which do not show Islamic influence, this work was obviously written under the influence of Islamic and Arabic culture. Greek ideas, which were adopted by the Islamic culture, appear in this work. Thus knowledge and science are put above material gains and glory as the important possessions in life.

(756) Strong remnants of Shamanism are also evident, side by side with the Islamic ideas.

After the eleventh century, we find no more Uighur documents of literary value.

Turkic Chagatai literature is a product mostly of the Timurid age after the Mongol conquest of Turkestan. The main representatives of the Chagatai literature are Mir Ali Shir Nevayi in poetry and the Emperor Babur in prose. Mir Ali Shir Nevayi lived in the fifteenth century and served in the court of Hussein Baikara. He mastered both the Chagatai and Persian languages and wrote in both. He introduced many Persian stylistic devices into the Chagatai verse. Nevayi gained wide recognition for his creativity and leadership in the field of Chagatai poetry. The Emperor Babur, who lived only forty years after Nevayi, wrote:

"Ali Shir Beg was celebrated for the elegance of his manners, and this elegance and polish were ascribed to the conscious pride of high fortune; but this was not the case—they were natural to him, and he had precisely the same manner when he was in misfortune in Samarkand. Indeed, Ali Shir Beg was an incomparable person. From the time that poetry was first written in the Turkish language, no man has written so much and so well. Some of his Persian verses are not bad, but

/Turkic Peoples of Sinkiang/

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175 the greater part are heavy and poor. He has also left excellent pieces of music, excellent both as to the airs themselves and as to the preludes. There is not upon record in history any man who was a greater patron and protector of men of talent than Ali Shir Beg. He had no son, nor daughter, nor wife, nor family. He passed through the world single and unencumbered, and in the end, victim of a sudden stroke, he departed to the mercy of God." (Sir Olaf Caroe, Russian Empire, p. 219.)

The Chagatai language, being mainly the language of the court, was finally replaced by the Persian language, and the use of Chagatai as well as literary production in this language came to an end.

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175 Both the early Uighur and Chagatai literatures were the product of the sedentary population of Turkestan. The bulk of literature, however, is to be found in the oral literature which originated with the nomadic Turks. Proverbs, ballads, epic narratives, legendary tales and songs, form the body of this oral heritage. These proverbs, songs and stories are transmitted orally from generation to generation and are mostly carried by the beggars, wandering minstrels, story-tellers and professional musicians.

The popular proverbs among the Turkic people relate much about the customs prevailing among them, their beliefs and attitudes. Here are some examples of these proverbs:

(539) "The eagle has his wings, the man his horse."

"The cock tells you the time, the donkey tells you where your halting place is."

"The girl whom her father does not want to give in marriage is priced high."

"When the camel's stomach is empty, he stretches down his neck even to the thorn-bush."

"Those who never even rode a donkey's foal, now ride yearling horses; those who never even drank barley gruel now drink tea."

(177) The influence of the Persian culture is strongly evident in the popular proverb, and one finds many proverbs identical in both languages.

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538 The art of story-telling is very popular in Eastern Turkestan. Many of the folk tales belong to the general Turkic and some to the Persian story cycles. An example of such tales is the story of Hamra, recorded by the Russian scholar Radlow, the theme of which is taken from a popular Inner Asian written tale by the same name about the love of two supernatural beings for a young man. Many of the romantic tales of the fifteenth century poet, Ali Shir Nevayi, are in the repertoire of the story-tellers. These folk tales are full of fantastic and supernatural elements, and the Persian influence is easily recognized. These

/Turkic Peoples of Sinkiang/

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(214) produced in Peking. A report from Peking on January 3, 1955, states that "some 200 books in more than 1.64 million copies were put out in 1954 in Peking in the languages of the minority peoples. They were published by the Nationality Publishing House for use among the Mongolian, Tibetan, Uighur, Kazakh and Korean peoples. These books include works on revolutionary theory, novels, and translations of Soviet literature. This total does not include books published by the many printing houses of the various minority areas." (Peking, NCNA, January 5, 1955, 1607 GMT-W.)

D. Artistic Expression

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532 The period prior to the introduction of Islam produced the great works of art in Eastern Turkestan. The Shamanistic, Buddhist and Nestorian civilizations which were dominant in Eastern Turkestan in this period encouraged the religious expression through the mediums of painting and sculpture.

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172 Late in the nineteenth and early in the twentieth century, European scholars went to Eastern Turkestan to explore the ruined cities which had long been buried under the sands, and which contained many of the pre-Islamic artistic treasures. It is through the efforts of these scholars that we have most of our present information on the subject. Among the best known of these explorers, who carried out extensive expeditions in Sinkiang, were Sir Aurel Stein, Professor Albert Grünwedel and Albert von le Coq of the National Ethnological Museum in Berlin and Paul Pelliot.

(648) Although the Chinese Government was quite tolerant at first and allowed these archaeological works and expeditions to take place, it later became concerned with the fact that so many cases full of artistic treasures were being shipped out of the country. From then on, the Chinese Government tried to put as many official difficulties in the way of these explorers as they could, and discouraged further efforts in this direction.

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172 The important artistic discoveries were made at the following sites: near Khotan, the past capital of an ancient kingdom, at the oasis of Dandan Oilik, and at Rawak where a Buddhist shrine was found, and also in the twin oases of Turfan and Karakhoja, which proved to be extremely rich in artistic remains.

Most of the remaining structures which were fully or partially preserved are of an obviously religious character. They are usually shrines, temples, burial monuments, or various parts of monastic establishments. Most of them are products of Buddhist religious expression. Some buildings display the remains of Nestorian Christian and Manichaean murals. Manuscripts were discovered in these sites which confirmed the simultaneous existence of these religions in the area for several centuries.

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/Chinese Moslems/

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The Chinese Moslem community differs from the Turkic Moslem community mainly in the organization of the community around the mosque and in the peculiar position the ahung holds in the community. The ahung holds the central position in both the religious and the social life. In principle, the Islamic community has no professional priests, but in China the ahung has actually taken the place of one. The Imam, whose office is important in Western Asia and Eastern Turkestan, where he has leadership in religious life, has lost his pre-eminent position in China. So has the Muazzin (the one who calls people for prayer) and the Mufti (the teacher of law). At present these positions have been practically abolished. Those who hold the title have no particular importance in the community. These titles are inherited and are not conferred by virtue of any knowledge of Islamic affairs. The ahung is the only real Moslem scholar in the Chinese Moslem community. He is nominated to this position by virtue of his knowledge of the details and philosophy of the religion. He trains students, the Khalifa, to become the future ahungs and to continue to maintain Islamic life in China.

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G. Chinese Moslem Sects

After the pilgrims had established some contact with the rest of the Moslem world, there were attempts, many of them springing in the Northwest, to reform Islam in China. The first well-known attempt of this sort was made by Muhammad Amin, known in China as Ma Ning-hsia, who in 1781 appeared among the Salars and introduced some reforms concerning the rituals of Islam, correcting some of the practices which seemed not to be in accordance with those he had observed in Mecca.

However, of all the most notoriously successful is the sect of Ma Hua-lung, the hsin-chiao or the new doctrine, as contrasted with the traditional religion practiced by the Chinese Moslems, Lao-chiao or the old doctrine.

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The new sect is to be set apart from the rest of Islam in China. In spite of the Islamic Chinese tradition regarding religious leaders, their being chosen by the community to serve it, and known only to their adherents, Ma Hua-lung's name was known far beyond his immediate followers. To some he was a prophet, and others detested him as an impostor.

The nature of Ma Hua-lung's teachings still remains somewhat of a mystery. There is a tendency to regard them as endorsements of Shi'ism, or perhaps as an unusually bold representation of Sufism (mysticism in Islam). However, the notices of D'Ollone show that actually they are genuinely Sunni in character and not a variety of the mystical philosophy widely diffused throughout Central Asia. Ma Hua-lung was regarded as an incarnation of the Spirit—a sheng jen (holy man, prophet)

THE CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM

I. The Historical Background

When the Communists conquered Northwest China, they created a Northwestern administrative area, which included the five provinces of Shensi, Kansu, Ninghsia, Chinghai and Sinkiang. In 1954, the Communist Government abolished Ninghsia Province and put it under the jurisdiction of Kansu. In 1955 it changed Sinkiang Province into the Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region. So now, Northwest China includes three provinces, namely, Shensi, Kansu, Chinghai, and one autonomous region, Sinkiang.

Historically speaking, Shensi and Kansu were under one governor-general during the Manchu Dynasty. For many purposes, such as provincial examinations, the two provinces were handled as a unit. At that time, part of Chinghai and Ninghsia were considered to belong to Kansu. While most of Sinkiang was administered under a special military government system, its eastern strip, from Tihua (Urumchi) to Hami, was under the jurisdiction of the governor-general of Shen-Kan. When Sinkiang later was made a province, it absorbed all the territory west of Hami.

Under the Nationalist Government, the Kokonor area was separated from Kansu. It became the nucleus of the Province of Chinghai, which was established in 1928. During the same year the Nationalist Government also established Ninghsia Province by uniting the northern counties of Kansu along the Yellow River with the two Mongolian Banners, Alashan and Edsin. Thus, when the Communist Government abolished Ninghsia as a province by combining it with Kansu, it merely reestablished part of the old border line.

During most of the Manchu Dynasty, Sinkiang was a special area. The local people retained a high degree of self-government. Even after the area was established as a province, the Chinese government let the local leaders handle most of the business of their own people. Thus, the establishment of an autonomous region in Sinkiang also had a historical basis.

II. The Constitutional Systems

A. Constitution of the Chinese Soviet Republic

In October of 1927, Mao Tse-tung retreated to the border area of Hunan and Kiangsi. There he established the "Hunan-Kiangsi Border Region Worker-Peasant Government". This was the beginning of the Chinese Soviet Government. After the Communists had consolidated their position, they established a "Constitution of the Chinese Soviet Republic". This was a Communist constitution for a Communist government. After suffering severe losses from Nationalist attacks, the Chinese Communists were no longer able

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*668 Ch'en Shih-yü deputy mayors. All were appointed by the central
(633) People's Government. After the abolition of the administrative region in 1954, the Communist Government made these major changes in Northwest China:

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(633)(1) Sian was changed from a municipality under central authority to a municipality under the authority of Shensi province.

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(635)(2) Ninghsia was made part of Kansu on September 27, 1954.

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(635)(3) Sinkiang province was made the Sinkiang Uighur autonomous region on October 1, 1955.

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(635) Thus, in 1955 the administrative units of Northwest China were quite different from those of 1950. The units under Shensi, Kansu, and Chinghai are summarized in Table 7. The units under Sinkiang in early 1955 are shown in Table 8, while those after October 1, 1955, are shown in Table 9.

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*668 After the promulgation of the Chinese Communist constitution
(631) in 1954, elections were held and People's Congresses and People's
666 Councils were organized. There were some personnel changes, but the general structure and control of the government remained about the same.

III. Government of the Autonomous Districts

N *195 A. Earlier Systems

631 In the past, although the Chinese government gave little publicity to them, autonomous governments existed among the minorities in Northwest China. As late as the 1880's, when the proposal to transform Sinkiang into a regular province was presented to the Court, it met with strong opposition on the grounds that the minorities who differed from the Chinese in tradition, language, religion, and customs would be difficult to govern. Before then, the minorities had been governed by their own leaders. Even after the area became a province, the life of the minorities was not greatly disturbed.

N *668 B. The Communist System

*563 The Communists have a definite program for changing the social and economic order. Knowing that cooperation is necessary to attain their aims, the Communists intend to lessen the friction between racial groups under their regime. On the surface, they grant autonomous governments to the minorities; in fact, they control them from within through hand-picked Party members. So far there is no evidence to show that the structure of these autonomous local governments is essentially different from that of the regular local governments. The government of the Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region, as well as of the local governments under it, superficially is the same as under the former Sinkiang province. A complete list of all autonomous districts in Northwest China,

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attempts of the native peoples to throw off the Chinese yoke and to set up their own government, a story of intrigue and bloodshed, set against the backdrop of international rivalry.

In the past thirty years, superimposed on the political and international complex of Sinkiang were the new ideas that have added fuel to the discords and discontent in Sinkiang. Generally, the more important of the new ideologies injected into the political life of Sinkiang were the following:

1. Policy of assimilation, generally denounced by its enemies as the Great Hanism (Ta-Han chu-i), in which the border peoples were regarded as descendants of an ancient Great Chinese race and should be reabsorbed into the Chinese race. This concept was pushed by the Kuomintang extremists.
2. Program of cultural diversity and cultural autonomy. This idea was pushed by men such as Sheng Shih-ts'ai and Chang Chih-chung, as an alternative to the policy of compulsory assimilation.
3. Pan-Turkestanism and Pan-Islamism, promoted by the native people, especially by the Uighurs and their Kazakh allies, stressed the fact that the majority of people of Sinkiang speak Turkic language and belong to the Moslem faith. The exponents of this concept belong to many shades of political opinion, from the moderates such as Maksud Sabri, Burkhan Shahidi, and Mehmet Emin Bughra, to the more radical faction which included Akhmejan Kasimi, Saifuddin Azizi, and the members of the Kulja coalition.
4. Territorial and cultural autonomy under the principle of federalism based on ideas derived from the Soviet policy towards the minority nationalities. This policy was actively propagandized by the Chinese Communists and served to inflame the native peoples as well as to embarrass the Nationalist authorities.

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These divergent views, in substance, were the expressions of nationalism on the part of the Chinese and on the part of the native peoples of Chinese Turkestan, especially among the educated classes. As in many other parts of the Orient, the game of politics was not a popular one. The people, downtrodden and persecuted, desired only to be left alone, and they rose in revolt only when tyranny and injustice became intolerable, and they would then follow the cue of their leaders in wholesale uprisings. In the wars of the Oirats against the Ch'ing government two hundred years ago, the leaders were the tribal chieftains; and in the rebellion of the Khojas and the Dungan rebellion in the last century, the leaders were religious prelates. But in republican times, there were few of the hereditary tribal princes or religious leaders taking a part. Instead, the leaders were drawn from the ranks of the bandits, officers in the Chinese army, or young intellectuals who had studied in China or abroad. On the part of the Chinese, the men in political life in the Northwest were either local civil and military officials, or officials sent out by the central government.

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* 668 Even with the advent of the Chinese Communists, there was
554 little fundamental change in the composition of the panel of men
S in the political arena of the Northwest. The men who acquiesced
668 to the Communists and were retained in office as well as those who
554 opposed the Communists were the same men who had been in the
political limelight in the past. Some of the men sent out by the
Communist Central People's Government were the same men who
had been sent out in the past by the Nationalists. The names of
local Communist officials appeared to be new, but actually many
of them had been in the Northwest for a long time, working in the
underground. The old and the new, the local and the Peking-ap-
pointed, were all worked into the Administrative Council of the
Northwest and the provincial governments. The general election
of 1954 resulted in a reshuffle of the political figures of the North-
west, but not in a basic change in the composition.

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668 The situation in the northwestern provinces was in a state of
175 flux in 1949 prior to the actual occupation by the Chinese Commun-
669 ists who were then in the process of conquering all of mainland
S China. In May, Sian was occupied by Chinese Communist troops,
628 who were posed for their westward advance to gain control of Ning-
669 hsia, Chinghai (both of which soon fell to Communist arms), and
175 Sinkiang.

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669 Out in the west, Sinkiang was divided into two political regimes:
175 the adherents of the provincial government and the insurrectionists
631 in Ili. At Urumchi was the headquarters of the Chinese Nationalist
635 Army, under the command of T'ao Chih-yüeh, and the provincial
554 government headed by Burkhan Shahidi, a Russianized Uighur, who
was then middle-of-the-road in politics and who represented the
large Uighur population. With him was Mehmet Emin Bughra, who
had played a part in the establishment of the East Turkestan Repub-
lic of 1933 (at Kashgar) as well as in the East Turkestan Republic
of 1944 (at Kulja in Ili). Politically, they cooperated with the
Nationalist Government and they sought only a modicum of liberties,
such as the establishment of a government of their own choosing
and the preservation of their languages, culture and traditions.
They were thus a less militantly revolutionary group than the Ili
faction. In September, 1949, with the defeat of the Nationalists on
the mainland, with the Chinese Communist Army preparing to
march into Sinkiang, and with the persuasion of such men as
Chang Chih-shung, the provincial government under Burkhan and
the Nationalist forces under T'ao Chih-yüeh formally submitted to
the Communists.

The revolutionary movement centered around Kulja was, since
1948, quiescent, rendered impotent by internal dissensions and
the defection of some of its leaders, including Osman Batur. To
recoup their fortunes, Akhmejan Kasimi and his lieutenant,
Saifuddin, organized the Sinkiang League for the Defense of Peace

669 and Democracy and began to make overtures to the Chinese Communists. In September, 1949, Akhmejani Kasimi was killed in a plane crash en route to attend the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference convened by the Chinese Communists. 631
635 Saifuddin, who was already friendly to the Communists and who 554
may have been an undercover Communist agent, became the head of the Sinkiang League, bringing it formally into the Communist fold and using it to assist the Communist takeover of northern Sinkiang.

175 Even with the submission of civil and military dignitaries of 631
635 both factions, the situation in Sinkiang was delicate, due to the strong growth of Soviet Russian influence in the political vacuum following the withdrawal of Nationalist power. Actual authority 648
669 rested in the hands of the Soviet consul-general at Urumchi, the Soviet consul at Kulja, and the secretary-general of the Turkestan branch of the Communist Party. The district of Ili was reported to be wholly Russianized, and by April, 1949, according to Urumchi police records, 6,200 natives changed their nationality to become Soviet citizens. (Mehmet Emin Bughra, Doghr Turkestan, (Eastern Turkestan), pp. 83-4, and interview with Isa Yussuf Aliptakin, in NYT, March 23, 1951). The Chinese Communists were obliged to proceed with caution in their advance on and occupation of Sinkiang.

II. United Front Work, 1. Political Leaders and Factions

175 The fact that the provincial leaders of the Northwest peacefully 668
669 submitted to the Chinese Communists, bringing the areas under their control along with them and thus sparing the Communists of the effort and cost of a military campaign, posed for the Communist leaders acute problems of absorption and disposition of the local officials. As a reward for their defection to the Communist cause, even though it was, for some of them, at the eleventh hour, they had to be retained in office. However, it was also necessary to reward the Communist officials, who had been working in the underground, as well as the officers of the Communist army, and at the same time, it was necessary to establish control by the Communists over the local functionaries.

175 The Communists, long anticipating this problem, had a ready-made solution. This was the United Front, when applied to everyone in general, and the "democratic coalition" when applied to different factions working together for the Communist government. 668

"The aims of the Chinese People's Central Government vis-a-vis the Northwest," stated Wang Chen (commander of the Communist forces which entered Sinkiang and concurrently secretary of the Sinkiang Sub-bureau of the CCP), were "first, to establish people's provincial governments made up of democratic coalition of all nationalities; second, to enlist progressive elements of all nation-

- 175^S alities and classes to participate in the governments; and third,
668 to establish people's democratic United Front of democratic
nationalities under the leadership of the people's provincial govern-
ments and various branches of the CCP committees." (JMJP
Oct. 1, 1950).

In response, the people's council of Sinkiang passed a resolu-
tion urging the establishment of a people's democratic dictatorship
based on a union of all democratic classes and all nationalities,
built around the alliance of workers and farmers. This was to be
achieved by the establishment and consolidation of the united front,
by the annihilation of reactionary elements, by the re-education and
reform of former government functionaries and by the absorption
of progressive elements into the government.

The extent to which the Chinese Communists succeeded in im-
plementing their policy of a United Front in Northwest China may
be seen in (1), the alignment of the top ranking officials and the
parties, (2) the mobilization of the people, and (3) the building of
an army of trained men - the cadres - to serve as instruments of
Communist policy.

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* 175 A. Top Echelon Officials
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554 The men in power in the northwestern provinces at the time
635 of the Communist takeover belonged to an assortment of political
S factions and held to a hodge-podge of views and interests. There
175 were the Communists, many of whom had held official positions
668 in the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Region, who were immedi-
554 ately summoned to take charge. There were the members of the
635 Democratic League, which had thrown in their lot with the Com-
munists and which maintained branch offices in Sian and Lanchow.
The Nationalist officials in China Proper who defected formed
themselves into the Kuomintang Revolutionary Committee and they
were joined by the Nationalist officials in the Northwest. Among
the national minorities, there were those who held responsible
positions under the Nationalists and who, as prominent men among
the national minorities, were carefully preserved by the Commun-
ists. Another group of native leaders who rose to power were the
former participants of the Ili revolt.

The administrative structure formed from these varied political
groups was a cunning piece of assembly. The non-Communist
figures had to be given conspicuous display in order to give the
impression of a coalition government, but their line had to be
stiffened by Communist officials so that it would answer to the
dictates of Peking. Each of the top-ranking officials held three
or more concurrent positions in one or more places.
Political: in the Central People's Government, in the regional
Military and Administrative Council (later the Administrative
Council), in the provincial or the municipal governments.

N Military: In the People's Revolutionary Military Council, the
*175 Northwest Military District, or the provincial sub-districts.
*668 Party: In the Central Committee of the CCP, in the Northwest
554 Bureau of the Central Committee and the Sinkiang Sub-bureau, and
635 in the provincial committees.

S Mass organizations: In the national committee and in regional
175 committees.

668 The positions held were either vertical, from Peking down to
554 the provincial level, or horizontal, in more than one collateral
635 agencies. The system of interlocking political positions may be
seen in the cases of the following men, chosen at random as illus-
trations. The positions they held were as of 1952:
Hsi Chung-hsün: In Peking, he was a member of the Government
Administration Council, member of the People's Revolutionary
Military Council, and a member of the Sino-Soviet Friendship
Association. In the Northwest, he was vice-chairman of the Mili-
tary Administrative Council, director of the Commission of Land
Reform, deputy director of the Commission on Culture and Edu-
cation, and political commissar of the Northwest Military District.
In the Party, he was an alternate member of the Central Committee,
and first secretary of the Northwest Bureau.

Ma Wen-jui is primarily concerned with party work. In the North-
west Military and Administrative Council, in which he is a mem-
ber of the council, he was chairman of the People's Supervisory
Commission and member of the Commission on Political and Legal
Affairs. In the party, he was concurrently director of the Organ-
ization Department of the Northwest Bureau of the Central Com-
mittee and director of the Committee on Women's Work.

S Saifuddin Azizi, chairman of the Sinkiang People's Democratic
175 League, was also a member of the Northwest Military and Admin-
668 istrative Council and a member of its Political and Legal Commis-
554 sion and its Nationality Affairs Commission, which have offices in
635 Sian. In Sinkiang he was vice-chairman of the Provincial People's
Government and fourth secretary of the Sinkiang Sub-bureau of the
CCP. In Peking, he was a member of the Central Peoples Gov-
ernment Council, a member of the Political and Legal Commission
and vice-chairman of the Nationality Affairs Commission. He was
also reportedly commander of the 5th Army in Sinkiang.

S Among the non-Communists, the men who had climbed the
175 highest in the Communist hierarchy were the members of the
554 Democratic League. One of these was Han Chao-e who, in Peking,
635 was a member of the Central Committee of the Democratic League,
a member of the Central Committee of the China Farmers' and
Workers' Democratic Party, and a member of the People's Super-
visory Commission in the Central People's Government. In the
Northwest Military and Administrative Council, he was a member
of the Political and Legal Commission and vice-chairman of the
Land Reform Commission.

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*175 Land Reform Commission. In the Shensi Provincial People's
635 Government, he was vice chairman and director of the People's
554 Supervisory Commission.

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*175 In the case of Yang Ming-hsüan, one can see the tie-in between
554 the Democratic League and the Chinese Communists. Before the
635 rise to power of the Chinese Communists on the mainland, he was
*668 a vice chairman of the Communist-controlled Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia
Border Regional Government which had its headquarters at Yen-an.
Later, he became chairman of the Northwest branch of the China
Democratic League, with headquarters at Sian and thus helped to
prepare the way for the take-over by the Communists in 1949. In
the Northwest Military and Administrative Council, in which he
was a member, he was director of the Cultural and Educational
Commission and a member of the Commission on Nationalities
Affairs.

It would be tedious to list the concurrent posts held by other
key figures in the Northwest. Table 1. shows the number of re-
sponsible positions (director, chairman, secretary, member of
councils and committees, military command and head of mass
organization and minority party branches) held by a few of the
members of the Northwest Military and Administrative Council,
in Peking and in the Northwest provinces in 1952.

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• 175 B. Parties
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Having integrated the leaders of non-Communist political
bodies into the government, the next step was to reorganize them
and to utilize them as arms of the Communist Party. The Sinkiang
League for the Defense of Peace and Democracy, headed by Sai-
fuddin, was reorganized into the Sinkiang People's Democratic
League (not to be confused with the China Democratic League).
It brought over 17,000 trained cadres, veterans of the Ili revolt,
to the Communist cause. The official announcement of the
reorganization, in 1950, stated that the Sinkiang League was to
be guided by the CCP and would base its work on the Common
Program of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.
It was to be established in parts of Sinkiang as part of the demo-
cratic United Front.

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*175 In December, 1953, the Northwest branch committee of the
*668 China Democratic League held a conference at Sian, to hear Yang
Ming-hsüan, chairman of the branch committee, and other League
leaders report on the work of organization, propaganda, and edu-
cation. Yang exhorted the members of the league to unite and edu-
cate the intellectual masses to take part in building the economy,
national defense, and culture of the Northwest. Responding to the
resolution of its parent body in the spring of 1953, the Northwest
branch committee called upon its membership to concentrate its
efforts in mobilizing and organizing the students and teachers in

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* 175 the Northwest under the leadership of the Chinese Communist
* 668 Party.

In May, 1953, the Northwest Work Committee of the KMT Revolutionary Committee was organized with Chang Chih-chung as chairman. Its avowed aim was to coordinate all its branch offices and members of the KMT Revolutionary Committee in the Northwest under the leadership of the CCP and to implement so-called United Front work. It was significant that the conference of the KMT Revolutionary Committee at Sian was attended by high-ranking Communist Party and Democratic League officials, who were there apparently in a supervisory capacity, a fact which may indicate that the KMT Revolutionary Committee had not then gained the confidence of the Communists. Ma Ming-fang, secretary of the Northwest Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party, expounded on the role of the "democratic" parties during the stage of New Democracy, which he said was "to educate their members to actively participate in political campaigns." Yang Ming-hsuan, chairman of the Northwest branch committee of the Democratic League, in a speech similar in content with those of the other speakers, declared that it was imperative "to continue the enlargement of the people's democratic united front (and) to get closely united under the CCP and Chairman Mao." (Sian Ch'ün-chung jih-pao, May 26, 1953).

III. United Front Work, 2. The Masses

A. Mobilization of the Masses

The organization of people's governments and the employment of non-Communist political leaders were part of the window-dressing for the organization and mobilization of the masses of the people. As early as January, 1950, the Sinkiang People's Government Council, in a statement of its policies, declared that one of the primary tasks was "to activate and organize the workers, farmers, youth, women, and other popular bodies so that they would become strong and reliable support for the government in all fields of construction." (NCNA January 8, 1950).

The agencies for the mobilization of the people were, as in other parts of China, the mass organizations, which supplement and bolster the work of the political parties, and were either directly controlled or indirectly manipulated by Communists or trusted agents of the Communists. The following are a few of the organizations of mass control.

The United Front Department of the Northwest Bureau of the CCP: This agency has overall supervision over the other mass organizations and also serves as liaison between them. The chairman, Wang Feng, was also director of the Commission on Nationality Affairs in the Northwest Military and Administrative Council.

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*175 Northwest Federation of Trade Unions: The chairman is Chia
*668 T'o-fu, a member of the Financial and Economic Commission in
467 the Central People's Government and vice chairman of the Finan-
554 cial and Economic Commission in the Northwest Military and
Administrative Council. An influential figure is Chao Chan-hui,
director of the Department of Labor in the Northwest Military and
Administrative Council and a member of the All-China Federation
of Trade Unions.

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*175 Federation of Democratic Women: The dominating personality
*668 in the Northwest is Chang Tzu-fang, onetime director of the feder-
554 ation in the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Region and after 1949
a member of the Executive Committee of the All-China Federation.
In the Northwest Military and Administrative Council, she was a
member of three commissions. Ma Wen-jui, chairman of the
People's Supervisory Commission of the Northwest Military and
Administrative Council and director of the Organizational Depart-
ment of the Northwest Bureau of the CCP, was also director of
the Commission of Women's Work. Thus, intimately and inescap-
ably entwined with Communist activities, the Northwest Federation
of Democratic Women saw a tremendous expansion of its member-
ship. In Sinkiang, by the summer of 1951, it had branches in 47
of the 78 counties and in five of the ten administrative districts,
and 190,000 women members took part in the propaganda campaign
to resist America and aid Korea.

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*175 Federation of Literary and Art Workers: By September, 1950,
*668 7,000 literary and art workers in the Northwest were mobilized
[467] to take part in propaganda activities, and 30,000 writers and
artists joined the Reformation Congress of Literary and Artistic
Workers in the Northwest to establish the United Front.

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[175] New Democratic Youth League (renamed the Communist Youth
[668] League in 1955): This is an auxiliary of the Communist Party the
function of which was to mobilize the youth. In the Northwest it was
guided by Lo I, a member of the Standing Committee of the Central
Committee of the New Democratic Youth League and of the China
Democratic Youth Federation, and a member of at least two com-
missions in the Northwest Military and Administrative Council.
An example of the expansion of the New Democratic Youth League
in the Northwest may be seen in Sinkiang, where, by spring of 1953,
there were 1,015 branches with over 20,000 elite youth members.
Half of the labor models in the Urumchi Saw Mill in 1952 were New
Democratic Youth League members, and it was reported that the
New Democratic Youth League members "have become efficient
assistants of the (Communist) Party in carrying out patriotic move-
ments in factories and villages." (NCNA May 4, 1953).

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*175 Sino-Soviet Friendship Association: By the end of 1951, there
*668 were 1,314 branch associations and 417 sub-branch associations
[467] in 157 of the 274 counties in the four Northwest provinces. Over

N 60,000 of its total membership of 336,610 in the Northwest were
*175 from the city of Sian. Hsi Chung-hsin is president of the Sino-
*668 Soviet Friendship Association in the Northwest, and Chang Chih-
648 chung, Chia T'o-fu, Chang Chia-fu, and Burkhan are the vice-
S presidents. Since 1951, the membership of the Sino-Soviet Friend-
• 175 ship Association throughout China has vastly multiplied, as the
668 following figures show: three million in 1950; 17 million in 1951,
648 23 million in 1952; and 58 million at the end of January, 1953.

The membership of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association in the Northwest, therefore, must have increased proportionately.

One of the strongest centers of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association in the Northwest was the Ili Administrative District, where, by fall of 1951, there were 36,814 members in 11 county branches (out of the 12 counties), and in 16 branches of the government. According to Te-li-ha-te, head of the Department of Organization of the Ili branch of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association, the people of Ili, Altai (Ashan) and Chughuchak (Tacheng) had cherished the friendship of the Soviet Union since their revolt of 1944-45, and as their political consciousness was higher than elsewhere in the Northwest, they took the lead in the founding of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association in 1949.

One of the chief responsibilities of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association in the Northwest was the conduct of propaganda. Its propaganda objectives were not only to propagate the gospel of the advance technology in Soviet Russia and the "very great assistance received from the Soviet Cultural Associations for Foreign Countries," but also to combat popular opposition to Soviet Russia. The Sino-Soviet Friendship Association in Sinkiang might have fared better if many of the people were not deterred from joining by a whispering campaign warning them that if they joined the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association they would forfeit their right of worship of their religion. (Sian Ch'un-chung jih-pao, November 7, 1951).

N B. Elevation of Political Consciousness

*175 - Aside from propaganda, the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association
*668 in the Northwest also initiated an ideological remoulding campaign
S in 1951 aimed at 2,500 teachers selected from eleven nationalities.
175 This campaign was one of the many drives, one following or over-
668 lapping another, which were correlated to the work of mobilizing and organizing the people. The more important of the popular drives were the Land Reform, the Resist-America and Aid Korea Movement and the Suppression of Counter-Revolutionaries.

By the summer of 1952, the so called land reform was completed in 97 per cent of all the agricultural hsiang (administrative villages) in the then five provinces of the Northwest. The membership in farmers' associations constituted 30-40 per cent of the

total number of peasant households. "The peasants in the mutual aid teams are politically organized," stated the Sian Ch'un chung jih-pao (January 6, 1954), and the enlargement of the membership in the farmers' association have "strengthened the militia, thereby consolidating the people's democratic dictatorship in the countryside in the Northwest region." (NCNA, May 22, 1952).

Concerning the effects of the agrarian reform on the political organization of the people, Kao Chin-shun, vice-chairman of the Sinkiang People's Government, mentioned the following points: (1) Eradication of the "feudal" landlord class, (2) elevation of the political consciousness of the peasants, (3) consolidation and enlargement of the United Front, and (4) training large number of cadres. (Urumchi, Sinkiang jih-pao, June 19, 1953). He revealed too that in the process of the land reform, large numbers of the people signed pacts pledging to resist America and to aid Korea.

Late in 1950, branches of the China Peace Committee, organized for the purpose of rallying the people to support the war in Korea, was established in the Northwest. The work of these branch committees supplemented the activities of the people's political consultative committees and the people's representative conferences which were then in session preparatory to the formation of the people's governments. In Sinkiang, for example, the Provincial People's Representative Conference, in May, 1951, declared that its aim was to popularize and develop penetratingly the Resist -America and Aid-Korea campaign. Later in the year, in order to strengthen the hate-America campaign, the Sinkiang People's Political Consultative Committee and the Sinkiang branch committee of the China Peace Committee were merged into one joint committee. (Sinkiang jih-pao, June 19, 1953). Henceforth, the activities of the so-called conferences of workers, herdsmen, peasant, youth, women, religious, industrial and commercial circles, which were the components of the people's political consultative conference, were channeled to the work of propaganda. Seven members of the Sinkiang People's Political Consultative Committee who toured the Korean front, returned to spend three months giving speeches to half a million people. By the end of 1951, a total of JMP \$213 billion (about US \$10 million) was raised, sufficient, it was claimed, for the purchase of 142 fighter planes. This came to 4.24 per cent of the amount raised in all of China.

Particular efforts were made to utilize religious institutions. In Chinghai, Buddhist lamas were organized into propaganda teams, monasteries into meeting places for discussion of current events and the signing of pledges, and temple fairs and festivals for the extension of propaganda on government policies to the rural areas. Similarly, in Sinkiang, mosques were used to hold accusation meetings and the Akhuns and mullahs were brought in line to support the land reform as well as the Hate-America campaign. A

175 mass meeting of 3,500 mullahs in 46 mosques in Urumchi was
668 held on May 20, 1951, and again on May 25, 1953, to reaffirm
793 their pledge to support Mao Tse-tung, the CCP, the Central
346 People's Government and the Resist-America and Aid-Korea
[795] campaign. Burkhan, chairman of the Sinkiang People's Govern-
ment, was concurrently head of the China Islamic Association,
which had the responsibility of rallying the Moslems of China
under the banner of the Chinese Communists.

"Through the above-mentioned activities," declared Yu Chan-
lin, vice-chairman of the Sinkiang People's Political Consultative
Conference, "the policies of the (Communist) party and the
people's government ... have been conveyed to the masses of
various nationalities and various circles (i.e., political groups),
so that the misgivings and the hesitant attitude on the part of
certain people were corrected and the masses mobilized... thus
enlarging the anti-feudal United Front." (Sinkiang jih-pao, June
19, 1953). As for the future, Yu urged further propaganda on
"patriotism and internationalism" by means of mass movements,
intensification of the mobilization of all the nationalities and all
the political groups, and further supervision over the masses.

The Sinkiang jih-pao, in an editorial (June 30, 1953), also
expressed gratification with the progress of the mobilization of
the masses. "During the past four years, the people of all
nationalities and all circles have been educated by repeated patri-
otic campaigns and experiences in various political activities,
thereby increasing their organizational ability and their political
consciousness. The general election will further consolidate and
unite the people of all nationalities and the ties between the People's
Government and the masses, thus enabling the state system of our
people's democratic dictatorship to become more perfect."

C. Suppression of Counter-Revolutionaries

668 The efforts of the Communists to herd and regiment the people
669 were not accomplished without considerable resistance. Large
578 segments of the people refused to enter into the Communist fold
175 and their resistance, strong and stubborn, made it necessary for
the Communist authorities to launch campaigns for the suppression
of the opposition, whom the Communists designate as "counter--
revolutionaries."

The "counter-revolutionaries" or "bandits" were, according to
Wang Chen, commander of the Communist forces which entered
Sinkiang and concurrently secretary of the Sinkiang Sub-bureau of
the Chinese Communist Party, composed of the following groups:
(1) Former Nationalist forces; (2) local forces under Osman Batur,
Mehmet Emin Bughra, Jamin Khan and Yolbars Khan; (3) White
Russians; (4) members of secret societies; (5) bandits; and, he
added, "all sorts of subversive espionage organizations (which)

668 make use of reactionary elements of Pan-Turkestanism and Pan-Islamism to establish anti-Communist and anti-Soviet bases of operation." (JMJP October 1, 1950).

175 The extent of opposition to Communist rule may be seen in the news dispatches issued by the Communist authorities on the results of their relentless crack-down of the counter-revolutionaries:

175 Item: September, 1950, liquidation of 58,000 bandit troops who refused to disarm and continued to resist.

668 Item: November, 1950, arrest of 6,249 Kuomintang agents and seizure of 208 special service cells and 275 radio stations.

669 Item: February, 1951, capture of Osman Batur and Jamin Khan and escape of Yolbars Khan to Formosa. April, 1951, Execution of Osman Batur.

578 Item: 1951. Revolt of workers in the Yen-ch'ang Oilfield, Shensi.

Item: December, 1950, Suppression of the Taoist secret society, the I-kuan-tao, which claimed to have 100,000 members in Shensi, Kansu, and Ninghsia. Members of the organization were charged to have infiltrated into farmers' associations and sabotaged the land reform and peasant organization work.

Despite the savagery of the suppression, the Communists were unable to snuff out the opposition. Kan Ssu-ch'i, director of the Department of Public Security of the Northwest Military and Administrative Council, pointed out that in the province of Kansu alone, the counter-revolutionaries killed and wounded 2,117 native cadres resulting in a profound demoralization of the people. "The people blame us," he said, "for having only government and no law. We must...by means of accusation meetings, exhibitions, public trials and forums, mobilize the broad masses to partake in the work of suppressing the counter-revolutionaries." (NCNA, April 7, 1951).

The alibis for the failure to wipe out the opposition in the Northwest was attributed to many causes. T'ao Chih-yüeh, deputy commander of the Sinkiang Military District, charged that "hidden enemies are utilizing old relations, old friendships and all opportunities for winning over and buying over a few backward elements." Ma Hung-pin, vice-chairman of the Kansu provincial people's government, warned the people to renounce their old friendships. "All counter-revolutionaries," he said, "be they your relatives, your friends and your neighbors, or even your family members, must be denounced." (NCNA, April 7, 1951). Burkhan, governor of Sinkiang, charged that "the imperialists" were fanning the fires of "narrow nationalism" by spreading rumors and fostering animosity among the minority peoples and they have seized upon pan-Turkestanism and pan-Islamism as their weapons." (JMJP, October 2, 1951).

The admonition and the threats by the officials had no effect

N in curbing the hostility of segments of the population towards the
*175 Communist regime. Sabotage as well as open rebellion continued
#668 unabated, as the following items, culled from Communist papers,
#669 show:

578 Item: November, 1951, arsonists set fire to the Urumchi Fur
Factory causing a loss of two billion yuan (US \$100,000).

• 175 Item: April to July, 1952. Revolt of Chinese Moslems in Kansu,
668 who killed over 3,000 Communist cadres and many government
669 officials and seized control of three districts.

578 Item: March to June, 1953. 1,380 "bandits" reported annihilated
in southern Kansu.

Item: December, 1953, Suppression of "bandit" forces under Ma
Liang in the Kansu-Chinghai-Szechwan border region.

Item: First half of 1954, 3,420 counter-revolutionary cases
unearthed.

IV. United Front Work, 3. The Cadres

N *175 A. Recruitment of Cadres #668

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(647) The placement of non-Communist and non-Chinese leaders in
the government and the organization of the people, while important,
were but subsidiary tasks. The principal task was the reform of
the old cadres and the recruitment of new cadres to serve as the
work forces of the party and the state. The job, which was a part
of the building of the "democratic United Front" since it concerned
the integration of Communist with non-Communist employees, was
handled by two agencies of the Northwest Bureau of the CCP: the
Department of Organization, headed by Ma Wen-jui, which was
responsible for party expansion, and the Department of United
Front Work, headed by Wang Feng, which was responsible for
recruiting and integrating non-Communists and non-Chinese func-
tionaries in government and party work.

The shortage of trained cadres and the need for more were
felt by the Communist authorities from the beginning of their
rule over the Northwest. In November, 1949, barely a month
after the Communists took over the vast territories of the North-
west and two and a half months before the formation of the North-
west Military and Administrative Council, Ma Wen-jui, who had
already set up his Department of Organization, declared that the
main problem facing the Chinese Communist Party was the train-
ing and employment of new cadres (JMJP, January 4, 1950). The
need was particularly urgent in view of the depletion of trained
men due to the transfer of many of the veteran cadres of the old
Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Region to other parts of the country
and the reluctance of the local youth to become cadres. Hsi
Chung-hsün, secretary of the Northwest Bureau of the Chinese
Communist Party, pointed out that the number of men who had

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*175 served as underground workers in the Northwest came to about
*668 50,000, and with the population of the five northwest provinces about twenty-three million (the 1954 census gave the figure of 35 1/2 million), the number of cadres came to only 0.22 per cent of the population. Even with the addition of the 200,000 party men in the People's Liberation Army, the number of cadres was less than one per cent.

As part of the United Front Work, the Communist authorities, as soon as they took over control of the northwestern provinces, absorbed almost all the former Nationalist government functionaries and students into the rank of the cadres. By providing them with jobs, the authorities expected to remove a potential source of discontent at a time when it was necessary to win over the people. In his speech of November, 1949, Ma Wen-jui revealed that 70 per cent of the new cadres were young intellectuals and former government personnel (JMJP, January 4, 1950).

But both old cadres and those newly converted were unsatisfactory for reasons which will be discussed later, and, not only for the purpose of remedying the shortage but also in the hope of catering to the aspiration of the non-Chinese peoples who make up the bulk of the population in the outlying regions, it was necessary to train large numbers of cadres recruited from the national minorities. The training of cadres was achieved in two ways: one through the schools and special training classes and the other by placing them in low-ranking administrative positions and "coaching them as apprentices."

In June, 1951, the Government Administration Council in Peking approved a resolution entitled "Tentative Measures for the Fostering of Cadres of Minority Nationalities," which in its preamble called for the "universal and large-scale cultivation of cadres of various minority nationalities." Priority was given to the training of military and technical cadres. To implement this policy, a Central Nationalities Institute was established in Peking, to which cadres with ranks above those of section chiefs in the autonomous areas and battalion commanders in the army were sent. Regional nationality schools as well as cadre schools were established for the rank-and-file cadres. In addition, all the institutions of education were used to turn out cadres for the state.

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Primary Schools: In Sinkiang, it was stated that the 112,393 students who graduated from the elementary schools in the years from 1950 to 1955 were assigned to the labor reserve, promoted to be cadres, or permitted to attend secondary schools.

Middle Schools: The 13,140 students who graduated from Middle schools in Sinkiang in 1950-55 were either permitted to attend colleges or were inducted into the ranks of the cadres. (Kuang-ming jih-pao, September 30, 1955).

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(563) Nationality Schools: The seven nationality schools in Sinkiang

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● 195 graduated in four years a total of 11,000 students into the ranks
668 of the cadres. Deserving boys of Mongol descent were also sent
871 to study in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, which was
[563] regarded as the model for the national minorities.
Short-term Training Classes: The first thing the Chinese Commun-
ists did upon entering Sinkiang was to set up twenty-five classes
to train cadres in three-to-six month courses. By summer of
1951, these training classes graduated 3,600 cadres from 13
different nationalities.

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* 195 Colleges: There were by 1955 thirteen institutions of higher
668 education in the Northwest. The most important was the North-
* 871 west Revolutionary University located at Sian. Founded in 1950,
873 it conducted courses on Marxism-Leninism and the writings of
Mao Tse-tung with the aim of "reforming the intellectuals."
(Ch'un-chung jih-pao, July 8, 1953). In 1953, after having gradu-
ated 12,000 cadres, its name was changed to Northwest Cadres

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* [563] School of Political and Legal Science. The Nationality College at
Lanchou was under the direction of Wang Feng, who was head of
the United Front Work Department of the Northwest Bureau of the
CCP. The Sinkiang Nationality College at Urumchi, headed by
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195 provincial governor Burkhan, was distinguished by a faculty of
668 350 Soviet advisors who made up 43% of the teachers. It gradu-
871 ated 1,700 minority cadres in 1953. The Sinkiang People's Gov-
[563] ernment and the Sinkiang Sub-bureau of the Chinese Communist
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195 Party each have a cadre school which, along with the training
668 classes, turned out 10,000 cadres by the end of 1955. By the
871 summer of 1955, these two cadre schools and the Sinkiang Nation-
873 ality College trained a total of 396 teachers and 4,355 educational
cadres.

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* 195 The nationality autonomous areas were also used as nurseries
668 for the incubation and training of nationality cadres. In Chinghai
871 over a third of the native cadres were selected from activists in
* 563 the people's governments.

The purpose of study in the cadre schools was to "enable the
students to shake off the bad influences and to strengthen their
patriotic ideology." The cadres were drawn from the ranks of
the students and from "upper religious circles" and, "on returning
to national minority areas, they were able to conduct propaganda
in a correct manner, do work actively and promote solidarity
among various nationalities in pushing forward political, economic
and cultural enterprises." (Kuang-ming jih-pao, February 24,
1954).

Allowing for the possibility of some duplications in the figures,
the number of national minority cadres trained may be estimated
by adding the numbers mentioned in the Communist press (see
Table 2).

1: Washington S-4 (no date) 1956 AF13 Northwest China AF13
Sinkiang A11

Table 2

NATIONAL MINORITY CADRES TRAINED IN THE
NORTHWEST

Sinkiang			
Veterans of the Ili Revolt			17,000
Graduates of 25 training classes in 1950			3,600
Graduates of the training classes in 1951			1,200
Graduates of the Sinkiang Sub-bureau cadre school in 1951, 1044, 84 per cent were natives			877
Graduates of the Sinkiang Nationality College, 1953			1,700
Educational Cadres, from Sinkiang Cadre School			4,355
Graduates of the training classes in 1954			200
Graduates of the Provincial Government Cadre School			296
Cadres promoted from activists			
In 197 hsiang	308		
In Ili, Kashgar and Yarkand	934		
In Bavenkara NAA	80		
In Qizil Su Kolkhoz NAA	1,100		2,422
Total	2,422		
Total			31,650
Ninghsia, summer 1954,			2,300
Kansu, Graduates of the Lanchou Nationality College, 1950-54			2,500
Chinghai			
Number as of summer, 1954			3,471
Cadres promoted from activists			
Yu-shu Tibetan NAA	250		
Huang-nan Tibetan NAA	258		
Hai-pei Tibetan NAA	302		
Mongol-Tibetan-Kazakh NAA	340		
Shun-hua Salar NAA	190		
Total	1,340	1,340	
Total		4,811	4,811
Shensi, Graduates of the Northwest Nationality College at Sian, 1950-54			2,543
GRAND TOTAL FOR THE NORTHWEST			43,834
This figure, 43,834, is not far from the figure of "over 40,000 cadres of national minorities" cited by Wang Feng, chairman of the Commission of Nationality Affairs of the Northwest Military and Administrative Council and director of the Department of United Front Work of the Northwest Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party in December, 1953 (NCNA, January 6, 1954).			
As to the total number of cadres in the Northwest, it is necessary to deduce from the statistics given in the Communist press to obtain an estimate. In September, 1955, Burkhan, governor of Sinkiang, claimed that there were 36,000 national minority			

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#175 cadres in the province (JMJP September 24, 1955), but this ap-
*668 peared to be an exaggeration, for an article in the Kuang-ming
*563 jih-pao, (by Chang Hung, on September 30, 1955), stated that the
162 number of minority cadres in Sinkiang was 34,400, and that they
162 made up 66.9 per cent of all the cadres in the then province. The
175 total, therefore, comes to 51,543. In Kansu, the total number of
668 cadres up to the end of 1953 was 12,361. In Chinghai, the 3,471
563 national minority cadres made up 40 per cent of the total number
162 of cadres, so that the total number would be about 8,500.

Early in 1950, Hsi Chung-hsün, vice-chairman of the North-
west Military and Administrative Council, stated that there were
50,000 underground cadres plus 200,000 cadres in the People's
Liberation Army, or a total of 250,000. Later in the year, it was
stated that over 10,000 students and former government function-
aries were undergoing reform in the Northwest Cadre Training
School, and that 6,000 of them were from the national minorities.
A large number of these cadres were purged in 1952-53, but their
ranks were filled by graduates from the training schools and col-
leges. The Northwest Cadre School at Sian, graduated 2,200 in
the years 1949-53 and the Northwest Revolutionary University,
also at Sian, graduated a total of 12,000 in the period from 1950
to 1953.

Simultaneous with the process of drawing men from schools
and government offices into the special training classes, nationality
colleges and cadre schools for training non-Chinese cadres were
also assigned jobs in lower levels of the governments so that they
could receive practical experience in the administration and also
to bear the brunt of contact with local inhabitants. By fall of 1950,
there were about 4,400 native cadres employed in local government
agencies, half of whom held offices above the level of hsiang. By
spring of 1951, according to incomplete figures, the number of
national minority cadres in government increased to 22,000, dis-
tributed in the five Northwest provinces as follows, (NCNA, May
13, 1951):

Sinkiang	17,000
Chinghai	2,000
Kansu	1,976
Ningshia	1,050
Sian Municipality	40

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#175 The 17,000 administrative personnel in Sinkiang were the same
*668 veteran cadres who took part in the 1944 Ili Revolt and who were
*563 organized into the Sinkiang People's Democratic League headed by
162 Saifuddin (JMJP, June 6, 1952; also statement of Wang Feng,
631 December 29, 1951). It was also claimed that seventy to eighty
S per cent of the personnel in the magistrates' offices in the 80
175 counties of Sinkiang were native cadres. By the end of 1951, the
668 number of national minority cadres employed in government work
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#175 in the Northwest reached the highwater mark of 27,000 (NCNA
*668 January 8, 1952).
*663 A large number of the cadres were sent out directly from
162 training schools to low-ranking positions in the people's govern-
-631 ments. Up to the summer of 1953 the Northwest Revolutionary
[873] University at Sian placed over 12,000 of its graduates in govern-
[874] ment service, the Northwest Nationality College 2,573, the Lanchou
5 Nationality College 2,500, and the Northwest Cadre School 2,200.
• 175 The areas of concentration in Sinkiang were the Ili and Kashgar
668 Administrative Districts and three counties in Yarkand which had
*663 6,907 native cadres employed as directors of departments, sec-
162 tion chiefs, and heads of counties and ch'u (districts).
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B. Demoralization and Conflict of the Cadres

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*175 A compelling reason for the large-scale induction of cadres,
*668 both Chinese and from the national minorities, was not only because
578 of the small number of veteran cadres, but also because these old
cadres were no longer considered trustworthy and useful by the
authorities. However, the authorities soon found that the new
cadres were not any better and their absorption only heightened
the conflict within the ranks of the cadres. The defects of the
cadres were repeatedly pointed out in the series of conferences
convened by the Department of United Front Work of the Northwest
Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party in the fall of 1951 and in
the spring of 1952. The main shortcomings of the cadres, as
pointed out by the Communist leaders, were:

1. Lack of political consciousness and demoralization of the old party cadres. It was significant, and perhaps paradoxical, that the major criticisms against the cadres were directed against the veteran cadres who had been trained and who had seen service in the Shensi-Kansu-Nghsia Border Region, which since 1935 had been the center of Communist activities and the showcase of Communist administration. As early as January, 1950, Ma Wen-jui, director of the Organization Department of the Northwest Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party, charged in a speech (JMJP January 4, 1950), that the old cadres showed restlessness, they wanted better jobs and were anxious to return home, they suffered from the ideological defects of individualism and jealousy of the new cadres, they were inefficient and careless in their work so that they lost important documents and often divulged state secrets, they lacked initiative and a sense of responsibility, and sought only enjoyment. Cases of graft were quite frequent.

Eighteen months later, at a conference of high-ranking cadres held at Sian in August, 1951, Ma Wen-jui charged that the old party cadres, due to their long stay in the rural villages and due to the demoralizing conditions of the war, lack education. "The degrees of political awakening of some of the party members is

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* 175 of the cadres had a corroding effect on the party and endangered
* 668 the party cause." (NCNA July 21, 1954). But, said the leaders,
578 "the main obstacle to party unity in Sinkiang district at present
[66] is the survival of the tendency of Great Hanism and the sentiment
of local nationalism among a section of the cadres." (NCNA
April 25, 1954).

The demoralization of the government personnel in the North-
west was so widespread that in March, 1954, when the residents
of thirty-two villages in the Hu-chu county in Chinghai were told
that they were free to voice their grievances, they made a total
of 3,800 complaints in the hsiang people's representative assembly
against the "bureaucratic work style of the leadership cadres."
(NCNA March 20, 1954).

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* 175 V. Political Structure and Political Progress
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A. The Northwest Military and Administrative Council and
People's Governments

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[635] Early in 1950, the Northwest Military and Administrative
[632] Council was established at Sian, which also became the location
of the Northwest Bureau of the Communist Party and of the head-
quarters of the Northwest Military District. In the months that
followed, provincial and municipal people's governments were
also established in the five provinces then comprising the North-
west: Shensi, Kansu, Chinghai, Ninghsia, and Sinkiang.

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* 175 While the members of the Military and Administrative Council
* 668 were appointed by the Central People's Government in Peking, the
[635] members of the provincial and municipal people's governments
[632] were, according to Communist pronouncements, elected by con-
[66] ventions of representatives of all circles and all nationalities.

Since no machinery of election was set up and the people were not
instructed, these conventions were actually meetings of Commun-
ists and fellow travellers who were invited to attend, in the manner
non-Communists were invited to attend the Chinese People's Polit-
ical Consultative Conference in Peking in September, 1949.

Since the officials were those on the panels who were approved
by the Communists, there was little for the representatives to do
except to endorse the selection, and then to devote the rest of their
time to other unrelated items of the agenda. The first conference
of the people's representatives of all circles and all nationalities
in Sinkiang, which met April 19 to May 10, 1951, was primarily
devoted to the purpose of propaganda, the discussion of means of
popularizing the Resist-America and Aid-Korea Campaign, the
campaign to suppress counter-revolutionaries and the land reform.
The meeting of representatives in Chinghai, held in October, 1950,
discussed these items on the agenda plus the means of collecting
the grain tax.

Table 3. CHINESE AND NON-CHINESE IN REGIONAL, PROVINCIAL, AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS

Regional: Top level
(in 1952)

NW MAC	total	Han Chinese	From the National Minorities	Unknown
	43	35	8	--

Provincial: Second level
(in 1950)

Shensi People's Government Council	39	37	2	-
Kansu " " "	29	21	8	-
Chinghai " " "	22	12	7	1
Sinkiang " " "	31	13	15	3
Total	121	85	32	4
(Total in 1951)	133	78	55	-)

County Magistrates: Third level
(in 1951)

Shensi:	Chinese, head of all municipalities and counties in the Linhsia Administrative District, 6 counties:
Kansu:	3 Chinese, 3 from the minority nationalities
Chinghai and Ninghsia:	in 35 counties: 13 Chinese, 22 from the minority nationalities
Sinkiang:	80 counties, 13 Chinese, 67 from the minority nationalities.

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 lishment of the Hai-pei Tibetan Autonomous People's Government in Chinghai came only after the "achievement of the Chinese Communist Party and the People's Government at upper level."
 "On entering the Tibetan area in Hai-pei in 1949, the Chinese Communist Party and the cadres of the People's Government exerted great efforts in propaganda, thoroughly carried out policies concerning national equality, unity and the development of production, mediated disputes... and stabilized social order." (NCNA June 18, 1954).

As one after another of the national autonomous areas proved satisfactory, from the point of view of the Communists, more were established. Following the establishment of the T'ien-chu Tibetan Autonomous district in Kansu in May, 1950, eight autonomous districts were established in 1950: five in Kansu, two in Ninghsia, and one in Chinghai. Three were established in the years 1951 and 1952, all in Chinghai. Fifteen were set up in 1953: six in Kansu, two in Ninghsia, and eight in Chinghai. Of the total of 27 autonomous districts set up by the end of 1953, 14 were Tibetan, five Chinese Moslem (Hui), four Mongol, and four others. Including the smaller autonomous areas, there were a total of over forty autonomous people's governments in the three provinces of Kansu, Chinghai, and Ninghsia, by August, 1953. Their size varied. In Chinghai, the Kung-ho Kazakh autonomous hsiang had a total population of 130 and the Huang-nan Tibetan Autonomous district a population of 220,000. These nationality autonomous areas in the three provinces embraced a total of 700,000 people, or one-ninth of the non-Chinese population in the Northwest (NCNA August 29, 1953 and September 9, 1953; but one million according to Ma Ming-fang, Ch'ün-chung jih-pao, January 1, 1954).

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 The people of Sinkiang, who constituted the bulk of the non-Chinese population in the Northwest, were, up to fall of 1953, four years after the Communist conquest, not granted the privilege of self-rule. Some of the reasons for the discrimination of Sinkiang were quite obvious.

1. The propinquity of the provinces of Kansu, Ninghsia and Chinghai and the predominance of the Chinese population made it easier for the Communists to exercise control. Sinkiang, on the other hand, was farther from China and the bulk of the population was non-Chinese with a long tradition of resistance to Chinese rule.

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 2. In Kansu, Ninghsia and Chinghai, Chinese cadres far outnumbered the native cadres, but in Sinkiang, according to one source (Kuang-ming jih-pao, September 30, 1955), 67 per cent of the cadres were native cadres, including 17,000 of them who had taken part in the Ili Revolt in 1944-45. The fact that they still entertained separatist views may be seen in the fact that Saifuddin, their leader, found it necessary to remind them: "From now on, the

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• 175 problem is no longer one concerned with opposition to pan-racial-
668 ism (i.e., Great Hanism), but rather how to cooperate with the...
563 Chinese in struggling for the building of a free big family and in
631 opposing petty nationalism and the saboteurs of national solidarity."
(JMJP October 2, 1951).

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3. Up to the end of 1953, it was reported that there were a total
* 175 of 2,800,000 organized peasant households in the Northwest, or
572 45 per cent of the total number of peasant households (Ch'ün-chung
162 jih-pao, January 1, 1954). The bulk of the number of organized
S peasants were in the interior provinces, while in Sinkiang only
175 33.8 per cent of the peasant households were organized. Not only
592 the percentage in Sinkiang, but also the average percentage of the
162 whole of the Northwest, compared rather unfavorably with the
77.32 per cent in Inner Mongolia.

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[474] The figures on Table 4 are numbers of farming households in
[476] the Northwest, which were organized into farmers associations
and into mutual aid teams up to December, 1953, based on statis-
tics appearing in the Communist press. (Figures in parentheses
are computed from percentages given of the total).

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4. An important factor, too, was the special position of Soviet
175 Russia in Sinkiang. Soviet authorities had succeeded in gaining a
648 foothold in Chinese Turkestan during the administration of Sheng
Shih-ts'ai and later in the political vacuum attendant upon the
withdrawal of Nationalist influence in 1948-49. Soviet troops were
stationed at strategic points and Soviet party and consular officials
actually held the reins of power. Soviet interests were confirmed
in the treaty signed between Peking and Moscow in February, 1950,
to which were attached two codicils providing for the organization
of two joint stock companies for Soviet exploitation of the oil and
mineral resources in Sinkiang (not excluding the possibility of the
mining and shipment of uranium ores to the Soviet Union). To
implement these agreements, large numbers of Soviet experts
arrived to set up machine works, power plants, and to assist the
Chinese in the work of geological survey, veterinary and medical
research, the operation of trucking lines and state farms, cotton
production, insect eradication and sheep-raising (NCNA interview
with Burkhán, Kuang-ming Jih-pao, September 27, 1955). In the
face of Soviet domination of Sinkiang, it was difficult for Communist
China to assert its rule, except nominally, in that remote province.

It was with the death of Stalin that there was, ostensibly, a
reappraisal of Soviet relations with Communist China. During the
visit of Nikita Khrushchev and Nikolai Bulganin to Peking in October,
1954, the pattern of Sino-Soviet partnership was readjusted to make
it more palatable to the ego of the Chinese leaders. In regard to
Sinkiang, one of the five agreements reached as a result of the
Peking talks was for the sale of Soviet shares in the two joint
stock companies to Communist China, transforming them into

(TEXT CONTINUED ON PAGE 513)

Table 4. ORGANIZATION OF THE PEASANTS IN THE NORTHWEST UP TO DECEMBER, 1953
(Based on Communist statistics)

	Total Popu- lation (1953 census)	Organized Farming Households Number Percentage of total farm- ing households	Mutual Aid Teams	Permanent Mutual Aid Teams Number Percentage of Total No. of Teams	Agricultural Producers Cooperatives	State Farms
Northwest						
China	35,358,000	2,800,000	45 %		305	
Shensi	15,881,000	1,424,800	47 %	280,848	34,381	12.2% 234 93
Kansu (including Ninghsia)	12,929,000		45 %	194,400	19,400	10 % 32 50
Ninghsia (721,000)			53 %	13,615	2,535	16 % 19 -
Chinghai	1,677,000	96,000	52.3%	25,106	1,840	7.3% 10 -
Sinkiang	4,874,000	299,000	33.8%	51,600	(2,500)	5 % 10 -

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• 175 Chinese-owned companies. Although Soviet and Eastern European
648 experts were retained as salaried technicians, the move was made
to appear that Soviet Russia was withdrawing from Sinkiang in
favor of Communist China.

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175 In addition to these conditions, there was a whole plethora of
648 other factors which made the Communist authorities reluctant to
642 grant regional autonomy to the people of Sinkiang. However, as
631 they had in repeated pronouncements promised autonomy to the
583 non-Chinese inhabitants of this province, they found that they
could not procrastinate any longer, and in the late summer of
1953 they finally agreed to the establishment of the first autonomous
people's governments in Sinkiang, but on an experimental basis.
The three experimental autonomous governments were: one for
the Sibo on the hsiaing level, one for the Chinese Moslems on the
county level, and one for the Mongols on the district (ch'u) level.
In December, 1953, Saifuddin urged "that a good job must be done
to guarantee that the various national autonomies in the province
may be established." (Ch'un-chung jih-pao, January 6, 1954).

The experiments proved successful and by May, 1954, the
green light was given for the establishment of autonomous people's
governments in Sinkiang for other concentrations of national
minorities in the province. There were thirty-three autonomous
areas below the level of district in Sinkiang in August (NCNA,
August 7, 1954). However, in proportion to its population of non-
Chinese people, Sinkiang was still behind. During the same
period, the number of autonomous areas in Kansu had increased
to 86 (NCNA April 9, 1955).

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* 175 C. The General Election of 1953-54

* 668 In 1953, the people of Northwest China, as elsewhere in China,
666 were for the first time permitted to cast their votes for the elec-
tion of their representatives. In February, the Central People's
[641] Government in Peking passed the Election Law which provided for
suffrage for adults over 18 years of age with the exclusion of all
those whom the Communist authorities had classified as landlords,
counter-revolutionaries, and lunatics and those who were deprived
of the right to vote or to run for election. The certified voters
vote only once, at the lowest or basic levels, and by a show of
hands (art. 55). The system is pyramidal. The representatives
chosen by the people at the basic election elect their representa-
tives to people's congresses of a higher level, and these in turn
elect representatives for peoples of still higher level, and so on
up, through the levels of county and district people's congresses
to municipal and provincial congresses, and through the level of
municipal and provincial congresses to the National People's Con-
gress. Only at high levels was the balloting secret. The candidates
running for election were Communist or men approved by the

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*175 going to the polls, but in Chinghai where it was reported that 95
666 per cent of the people went to the polls, the election was only one-
*668 fourth completed.

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In Sinkiang, the Communist authorities were more cautious.
• 175 The experimental elections began in May, 1953, in 17 basic elec-
666 tion units (hsiang) selected from the ten administrative districts,
668 then in 36 basic election units. In these experimental elections,
80-95 per cent of the electorate turned out. With the successful
conclusion of the experiments, the real basic level elections began
in September in 665 basic level areas in Sinkiang, followed in
December by the second group of 860 basic level area elections.
By April, 1954, the basic level election in Sinkiang was concluded,
S having been held in 2,424 basic units in 83 counties and municipi-
[369] palities. In urban areas, 89 per cent of the voters turned out,
while in southern Sinkiang, the turnout by the Uighur population
was 95 per cent. The elections during 1953 had been supervised
by 1,127 cadres who formed 144 election courts and 98 mobile
investigation teams, which uncovered 204 cases of irregularities
and nonconformity.

The fruit of the efforts of the election cadres was the election
of large numbers of cadres and party members. Sixty-three per
cent of the 619 new party members employed in the Sinkiang pro-
vincial and Urumchi municipal governments were elected as dele-
gates. In 312 hsiang in Sinkiang, out of the 7,088 of the delegates
elected, 5,248 were Communist Party cadres, and the bulk were
Chinese. In Ninghsia, only 25 per cent of the 9,700 deputies elec-
ted in the basic level elections were Chinese Moslems (Hui).

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Moreover, the elections in the Northwest, as in the rest of
*175 China, were by no means universal. Vice-premier Teng Hsiao-
666 p'ing, one of the top officials in charge of the nationwide elections,
*668 revealed that basic level elections were not held in a quarter of
[64] the regions inhabited by national minorities, and the number of
*563 national minority people who were not given a chance to vote came
to 8,708,169. The reason for disfranchising these minority people,
he said, was due to the "lack of requisite conditions," which were
(1) the native cadres were unsatisfactory and (2) the people failed
to appreciate the nationality policy of the government. (NCNA
June 19, 1954).

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In contrast to the publicity given to the basic level elections
*175 in the Northwest, the elections in the higher levels were conducted
*668 quietly and, in many cases, the results were not published. How-
666 ever, from scattered information gleaned from the Communist
633 press, the following picture emerges: in Shensi, Kansu, and
[175] Sinkiang, the incumbent governors were re-elected. Only in
[666] Chinghai, was there a change in the governor. In these four pro-
[668] vinces, three of the governors are Chinese. In the three provinces
[633] of Shensi, Kansu and Chinghai, about half of the thirteen vice -

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governors were holdovers from the past, and of these thirteen, nine were Chinese. The provincial people's congresses also showed a greater proportion of Chinese. In Kansu, 20 of the 25 elected members of the people's congress were Chinese, and in Chinghai, 12 of the 23 were Chinese.

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A word must be said about the representation of national minorities in the National People's Congress in Peking in the fall of 1954. The number of national minorities in China, according to the 1953 census, was 35,320,360, and they elected a total of 150 delegates. This comes to one delegate for every 235,470 persons, which compares unfavorably with the residents of municipalities and industrial centers where the ratio was one to 800,000. In the 1226-seat National People's Assembly, 177 national minority delegates (150 elected, 27 appointed) representing six per cent of the total population, occupy 14 per cent of the seats.

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The seats allocated to the minorities of the Northwest were as follows: Kansu 8, Chinghai 6, and Sinkiang 18, or a total of 32. Geographically, the distribution of seats were: Sian municipality 8, Shensi 19, Kansu 25, Chinghai 9, Sinkiang 20, or a total of 82. It was not explained whether the 32 minority delegates were added to the 82 or were part of the 82. If the total number of seats was 82 for the 35,358,000 people of the Northwest, it would come to one delegate for every 431,200 people. At any rate, the number of seats is unimportant, except as window-dressing. The delegates were all Communist officials, fellow travellers, labor heroes, military commanders, religious leaders, and educational and technical workers, who, having been screened and processed in the elections of successive levels, were not men who would entertain nonconformist thoughts.

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Moreover, the formation of people's congresses, like the establishment of regional autonomous governments, does not mean that the people have been given the right to govern themselves. According to the Organic Law on the Local People's Congresses and Local People's Councils adopted by the National People's Congress in September, 1954, the functions and powers of the people's congresses was "to ensure the observance and execution of the laws, decrees, and resolutions of the people's congresses of higher levels," (art. 6), and the functions and powers of the people's councils (or people's governments) was "to promote and carry out the decisions of the governments of higher level" (art. 27).

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VI. Further Consolidation of Communist Control
In the fall of 1954, as the elections were approaching their final stage, there were structural changes in the administration of the Northwest which gave the impression that Peking was relaxing its grip over the Northwest. Following the decisions of the

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* 175 leadership to mutual aid and cooperative organs in some places,
* 668 a number of mutual aid teams ceased to exist. In Han-ch'eng
424 and Ho-yang, in Shensi, 20-30 per cent of such teams were sus-
(476) pended." As to agricultural cooperatives, the number increased
from 1,970 or 1.32 per cent of the farming households in November
1954, to 17,000 or 16.83 per cent of the population by summer of
last year. Plans are to increase the number to 35,000 by 1957
to embrace 55 per cent of the households. However, by summer
of last year (1955) too, the number of handicraft and supply and
marketing cooperatives in Shensi embraced 13.64 per cent of the
agricultural workers, and the 5416 credit cooperatives had a
membership of 1,400,000 households, which was 45 per cent of
the total farming households.

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(476) Kansu: in this province, where it was claimed that 57 per cent
of the peasant population was organized, the number of mutual
aid teams dropped from 245,300 in the spring of 1954 to 212,000
in 1955 and only a third of these was permanent. Due to "rightist
ideology" of the cadres, the number of agricultural producers
cooperatives also dropped from 7,419 in the fall of 1954 to 7,151
in spring of 1955. However, this was quickly rectified and by the
end of the year, there were 16,849, embracing 23.43 per cent of
the rural households and plans are to have 47,400 by 1957 to com-
prise 60 per cent of the households.

Chinghai: The 575 agricultural producers cooperatives at the
beginning of 1955 embraced 80,000 households or 50 per cent of
the peasant population. Sixty-seven per cent of the rural popula-
tion was organized. (67.93 per cent)

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195 Sinkiang: Only five per cent of the 58,773 mutual aid teams in the
198 summer of 1954 were permanent. The number was increased to
424 75,275 embracing 63.32 per cent of the farming population, with
476 28.33 per cent of the teams permanent. The number of agricultural
producers cooperatives rose to 1,702 by fall of 1955, but they
occupied only five per cent of the cultivated area and their 47,328
households came to only 5.3 per cent of the farming population.
The plans for 1957 are for 11,216 cooperatives to include 41 per
cent of the households.

Only in the Ili Kazakh Autonomous District was the collectivization more satisfactory. In the summer of 1955, there were
6,200 mutual aid teams and 243 cooperatives embracing 65 per
cent of the farmers. The political organization of the rural popu-
lation in Sinkiang was also behind the other provinces. According
to Wang En-mao, first secretary of the Sinkiang Committee of the
Chinese Communist Party, 45.62 per cent of the farmers were
organized in spring of 1955. (Sinkiang jih-pao, March 2, 1955).

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B. Transfer of Cadres

The vast expansion of cooperatives and the intensification of the collectivization of the people demanded an increase in the number of cadres to supervise them. The number of cadres assigned to the task of cooperative building and the number of cadres to be trained for such work up to the fall of 1955 are shown in Table 6.

The assignment of the large number of cadres to the rural areas was, according to Chang Chih-chung, "to consolidate the mutual aid teams and producers cooperative work under a policy of active leadership." (Ch'ün-chung jih-pao, January 1, 1954). However, the demoralization, the lack of discipline, the incompetence and low degree of political consciousness of the cadres when employed as officials of the people's governments during the first four years of Communist rule have not only impeded government and party work but also incurred ill-feeling among the people. The assignment of the cadres to the cooperatives in rural areas was to remove them from sensitive positions in the government.

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Consequently, by 1955, when the work of the cadres in directing the elections was over, there were few cadres left in the upper levels of government. This was particularly the case of the national minority cadres. In Chinghai, out of the 3,400 native cadres, only 93 held responsible positions in the party organization in December, 1954, and in Sinkiang, only a third of the cadres in party committees on all levels were natives, two-thirds were Chinese. In the government and in state enterprises, the number of national cadres was even less. According to Wang En-mao, secretary of the Sinkiang Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, only 682 out of the 34,400 national minority cadres held responsible positions in the government above the levels of county, although it was claimed in other Communist publications that 84.6 per cent of the cadres in government offices below county levels were natives. In the state commercial, animal products, tea, silk, and export enterprises, 63 per cent of the officials were Chinese. One of the reasons for the demotion of the national minority cadres was their lack of education and training. Burkhan, governor of Sinkiang, seeking to rationalize this state of affairs, said that of the 36,000 national minority cadres (his figure) trained in all fields of work since 1949, only 2,500 showed enough initiative to be promoted to be leadership cadres. (JMJP September 24, 1955).

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To bolster the position of the Chinese cadres and to fill the ranks depleted by the transfer of local cadres to the work of collectivizing the peasant population, large numbers of cadres and workers were sent to the Northwest from the coastal provinces. The figures of Table 7, gathered from scattered items in the Communist press, are incomplete, but they give an idea of the horde of cadres and approved workers and students pouring into the northwestern provinces during 1955. [TEXT CONTINUED ON PAGE 523]

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Table 7. WORKERS AND CADRES TRANSFERRED TO THE NORTHWEST

Date	Profession	Number	Total Number	From	Destination
January to May	workers		16,000	Shanghai	Northwest
May	workers	1,600	3,620	"	"
	truck drivers	430		"	"
	govt. cadres	1,000		Peking	Sinkiang
	cadres	362		Kuangtung	"
	demobilized servicemen	238		Chekian	"
June	workers	1,865	2,665	Tsinan	Lanchou
	students	800		Peking	Sinkiang
July	doctors				
August	workers	900	5,640	Tientsin	"
	students from Indonesia				"
	govt. cadres	1,000		Peking	"
	" "	900		Tientsin	"
	students	540		Kiangsu	"
	"	300		Kuangtung, Shanghai	"
	"	2,000		Tientsin	"
November	govt. cadres	1,400	2,000	Peking	"
	" "	600		"	Chinghai
		Total	29,925		

1: Washington S-4 (no date) 1956 AF13 Northwest China AF13 Sinkiang A11

600 northwestern provinces during 1955.

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Thus, even from incomplete sources, the number of people sent out to the Northwest came close to 30,000. Of this number, the bulk were destined for Sinkiang. The influx of this horde of Chinese into Sinkiang was to safeguard Chinese Communist interest and Chinese ascendancy prior to the granting of autonomy to the native peoples of Sinkiang. As early as the summer of 1953, Burkhan had sought to prepare the ground for the invasion of the Chinese. In a speech, he said, "It has been due to the great help rendered by the Han Chinese cadres from other provinces and the People's Liberation Army during the past three years since the liberation that achievements of the people of all nationalities in Sinkiang in their construction work was possible. Therefore, after the enforcement of regional autonomy, autonomous organs at various levels should retain a certain number of Han Chinese cadres to take part in work." (Sinkiang jih-pao, June 20, 1953).

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C. Expansion of the Communist Party

Along with the assignment of cadres to the countryside to carry out the work of collectivization and the transfer of workers and cadres from China Proper to the Northwest, there was also an expansion of the membership of the Communist Party in the Northwest. The induction of men into the Chinese Communist Party and into its auxiliary, the New Democratic Youth League (Communist Youth League), had been active from the beginning of Communist rule. In 1950, out of the 3,600 national minority cadres trained in the short-term classes, 560 joined the Chinese Communist Party and 1,000 the New Democratic Youth League; in 1951, out of the 1044 graduates of the Sinkiang Chinese Communist Party Sub-bureau Cadre School, 88 joined the Communist Party and 726 the New Democratic Youth League.

In May, 1952, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party issued instructions to strengthen the work of party expansion, and ordered the directors of the Organization Departments of local party committees to convene and to work out methods for party expansion. "In rural areas where land reform has already been carried out, we must recruit more new party members and build up our party organizations so that we may vigorously promote mutual aid and cooperation of labor in production," stated a Central Committee directive (JMJP May 4, 1952). In 1954, the announcement of the General Line for the transition of the state to socialism brought a further acceleration of the work of party expansion.

Shensi: From June, 1952 to the end of 1954, a total of 3,625 basic level (hsiang) party branches were established, increasing the number from 60 per cent to 86 per cent, and 36,833 new members recruited. Up to the end of 1954, the majority of the new

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668 Sinkiang: Party work was also slow in this province. Although at the end of 1953, it was reported that 75.68 per cent of the 6,400 new Party members were recruited from the national minorities, only 26.1 per cent of the responsible personnel in party committees of county level and higher were natives. The Chinese members still predominated. As to the New Democratic Youth League, there were in 1955 a total of 57,228 members in Sinkiang, and this organization supplied 3,900 of its members to the Chinese Communist Party.

Compared to the rest of Sinkiang, the Ili Kazakh Autonomous Chou did much better in the recruitment of party members. From 1950 to March, 1955, it recruited a total of 1,100 new party members from the activists.

VII. Formation of the Sinkiang-Uighur Autonomous Region

A. Extend and Limitations of Regional Autonomy

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197 The expansion of Chinese Communist Party membership, the transfer of local cadres to the work of cooperative-building in the rural areas and the collectivization of the people, the relegation of native cadres to unimportant government posts, and the influx of hordes of cadres and workers from China Proper to take over the governments and state enterprises were preliminary steps preparatory to the conferring of regional autonomy to the non-Chinese population of Sinkiang. Self-rule has been an objective for which the minority peoples of Chinese Turkestan aspired and struggled, and the promises of self-determination and self-government were the chief planks of the political platform of the Chinese Communists. However, the definition of what constitutes autonomy for the minority peoples has undergone evolution.

As early as 1930, Mao Tse-tung had declared that the non-Chinese racial minorities "have a right to determine by themselves whether they want to secede from the Chinese Soviet Republic and form their own independent state, or to join the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, or to form an autonomous region of the Chinese Soviet Republic." (The Soviets in China, p. 440 quoted in Owen Lattimore, *Pivot of Asia*, p. 115). This was incorporated in Article 14 of the constitution of the Chinese Soviet Republic promulgated in 1931, with the omission of the right to join the USSR.

The Chinese Communists reaffirmed their promise of autonomy to the nationality minorities when they came to power in 1949, but autonomy was to be within the federal framework of the Chinese People's Republic and no mention was made of the right of secession by the non-Chinese minorities. The Common Program adopted by the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference in September, 1949, promised only regional self-government and preservation of the language, religion and culture of the minority peoples,

175 and equality and prohibition of discrimination.

177 The policies of the Chinese Communists were incorporated
668 into the "General Program for the enforcement of nationalities
642 regional autonomy" which was promulgated in August, 1952,
563 along with two supplementary documents, one for the enforcement
of local nationalities democratic coalition governments and the
other for the protection of the equality and interests of the national
minorities. Article 2 of chapter one of the General Program
declared explicitly that the nationality regional autonomous areas
were local administrations under the unified leadership of the
Central People's Government and the leadership of higher level
people's governments. Chapter four provides for the "rights" of
autonomy, which include the acquiescence to the leadership per-
sonnel, the use of their own language and literature, and the
privilege of having their "patriotic" activists promoted to be cadres.
No mention was made of the right of the nationalities to initiate
legislation, and matters of finances, public security forces and
militia were under the control of the Central People's Govern-
ment. Chapter five stipulated that the minorities should love the
Chinese and love and support the Chinese People's Republic, and
chapter six stated that they should follow the leadership of govern-
ments of a higher level.

These provisions were incorporated into the Constitution of
the People's Republic of China, adopted in October, 1954, which,
in article 2, reiterated that the autonomous regions were inalien-
able parts of the People's Republic of China. Autonomy for the
minority peoples, thus defined, meant only the preservation of the
language and literature of the minority peoples. The autonomous
regions were actually in the same status as a Chinese province,
with no legislative powers of their own and no freedom from super-
vision and control of the Central Government. The love of and
adhesion to the fatherland was reaffirmed and no separatist move-
ments permitted from "the great family of the fatherland."

B. Autonomy for Sinkiang

Since autonomy for the national minorities, as conceived by
the Chinese Communist who in turn copied it from Soviet Russia,
was autonomy in name only and a sham, it was not likely to satisfy
the people of Chinese Turkestan, with their tradition for indepen-
dence and their aspirations for self-government. To quiet them,
the provincial governor Burkhan Shahidi, in an article denouncing
pan-Turkestanism and pan-Islamism as destructive to the "fraternal
and cooperative family" of China, told his people that they did not
qualify for national independence. "It is conceivable," he said,
"that people who speak the Turkish language may not form a nation
as they lack common territory, a common economic life, and a
common psychology. Similarly, people who believe in Islam do

175 not ipso facto form a nation." And, he went on, "At this juncture,
177 any national movement which seeks separation from the Chinese
668 People's Republic for independence will be reactionary since...
642 it would undermine the interests of the various races and particu-
563 larly the foremost majority of the race concerned (that is, the
Chinese), and thus would work to the advantage of imperialism."
(JMJP October 2, 1951).

175 Later, in June, 1953, Burkhan enumerated the prerequisite
177 conditions for Sinkiang to achieve autonomy within the framework
668 of the Chinese People's Republic. The future Sinkiang autonomous
642 area, he said, must "be an inseparable part of the People's
[563] Republic of China and the autonomous areas of minority nationali-
ties in Sinkiang are likewise inseparable parts of Sinkiang and the
People's Republic of China."

The formation of autonomous governments in nationality areas,
declared Burkhan, was contingent not only on having a large num-
ber of representatives and nationality cadres in these areas but
also on the representatives and cadres of other nationalities in the
governments, and he went on to explain that by other nationalities,
he meant the Han Chinese cadres, whose presence was necessary
because the native peoples were politically and culturally backward.
"Autonomous organs at various levels should retain a certain num-
ber of Han Chinese cadres."

A third condition for the establishment of regional autonomy
was the extent of the organization of the people. "It is imperative,"
he said, "to conduct more penetratively and extensively publicity
and education to the people of all nationalities on patriotism and
Sino-Soviet friendship."

Fourthly, he told the people of Chinese Turkestan, they should
not be impatient and resentful just because other nationalities in the
Northwest had already been granted regional autonomy. Regional
autonomy in Sinkiang had to be achieved in five stages; at the
hsiang and ch'ü level, at the county level, at the district level,
at the administrative district level, and finally, at the provincial
level with the Uighur as the principal constituent.

Burkhan, in conclusion, pointed to the Inner Mongolia Autono-
mous Region as "the example of the advantages of exercising
autonomy in nationality areas," and "the perfect example for other
minority nationalities in the implementation of autonomy in the
future." (Sinkiang jih-pao, June 20, 1953).

[563] By fall of 1954, the Commission on Nationality Affairs in the
Central People's Government in Peking was satisfied with the
"notable progress made in substantiating minority self-government
organs," which included the promotion of large numbers of native
cadres from the activists, the staffing of the governments with
cadres, the use of the languages of the minorities, and "in some
localities, armed forces of indigenous peoples have been built

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under the leadership of the local party and government organs." (JMJP, August 28, 1954).

Finally, in August, 1955, when out of the total of thirty-three autonomous areas in Sinkiang below the rank of districts, four were raised to the status of chou and six to the status of districts, it was announced that Sinkiang would be made into the Sinkiang-Uighur Autonomous Region in September.

Large numbers of dignitaries journeyed from Peking to attend the second session of the Sinkiang People's Political Consultative Conference at Urumchi, where the change in the status of Sinkiang was proclaimed on September 20. Among them was vice-premier Tung Pi-wu, who, in his address, told the local leaders that the bases for the establishment of the Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region lay in elevation of the patriotism and socialist consciousness of the people, the training and employment of large numbers of cadres, and on the degree of unity among the nationalities. To preserve and consolidate the Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region, he said, the people of Sinkiang must (1) welcome the assistance of the Han Chinese cadres, (2) actively assist the other nationality autonomous areas in construction, (3) pay serious attention to education in patriotism and socialism and prevent the tendency of great nation and provincial nationalism, and (4) consolidate national unity and wipe out the counter-revolutionaries. (NCNA September 21, 1955).

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Burkhan, in his speech, elaborated on the statements of Tung Pi-wu by saying that the main task of the Chinese Communist Party on the problem of nationalities during the transitional period was to consolidate the unity of the fatherland and the solidarity among the nationalities in a common effort to build the big family of the fatherland and to follow the centralized leadership of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, the Central People's Government, the Sinkiang Sub-bureau of the Communist Party and the provincial people's government. Just as the Uighurs, who are the majority people in Sinkiang, need the help and support of the Han Chinese of China Proper, so the other minority peoples, such as the Kazakhs in Ili, need the help and support of the Uighurs.

"With the establishment of the Uighur autonomous region in Sinkiang, we should all the more warmly welcome the sincere and selfless help extended by the Han Chinese and cadres of brother nationalities. This is because the Han Chinese and their cadres have gone through a long period of revolutionary training and experience.... Only under the unified guidance of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, the Central People's Government, and the party committee in the autonomous region as well as the warm help of the Han Chinese and cadres, and further efforts to consolidate and strengthen unity among the

- 175 nationalities, will it be possible for Sinkiang nationalities to exercise fully the rights of being masters of their own domain and vigorously develop the political and cultural activities in the Autonomous Region." (NCNA September 24, 1955).

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[666] On October 1, 1955, the Sinkiang-Uighur Autonomous Region officially came into being. The last act of the Sinkiang People's Congress was the election of the 37-man people's council of the new Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region (the names of the members have not yet been published). Saifuddin, the vice-chairman of the erstwhile provincial council, was elected chairman of the Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region, but at the end of the month he resigned and Burkhan, the former chairman, was reelected chairman. The vice-chairmen included Kao Chin-shun, former vice-chairman, and two natives, a Uighur and a Kazakh.

The Sinkiang Sub-bureau of the Chinese Communist Party, formerly subordinated to the Northwest Bureau, was made independent and renamed the Sinkiang Committee, but the party officials remained unchanged. The first secretary was Wang En-mao, a native of Kiangsi who spoke none of the local languages, the second secretary was Kao Chin-shun, concurrently vice-chairman of the autonomous region, the third secretary was Chang Pang-ying. Only the fourth secretary, Saifuddin, was a native. These men had held their positions since 1949. Both the Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region and the Sinkiang party committee thus came directly under the control of Peking.

VIII. Prospects

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[642] The formation of the Sinkiang-Uighur Autonomous Region brings to a close an important phase in the political domination of the Northwest by the Chinese Communists. By 1955, under the intensive program of party expansion and the staffing of the governments by party men and by tried and tested cadres, the provinces of Shensi, Kansu and Chinghai were already under effective Communist control. The United Front of the period of "New Democracy" came to an end with the transition of the country to socialism. The non-Communists in the government were cowed and eliminated. Those who survived the purges of 1952 were weeded out in the elections of 1953-54. The granting of autonomy to the Uighurs and other minority peoples in Chinese Turkestan was to placate their discontent and to satisfy their yearning for self-rule, but it was rigged in such a manner as to make the domination of the Chinese Communists over Sinkiang and its ties with China Proper firmer and stronger than that accomplished by any governments in the past.

However, the efforts of the Chinese Communists to consolidate and centralize their control over the Northwest provinces are still impeded, internally, by the clash of interests within the ranks

195 of the Communist hierarchy and externally by popular resistance.
197 The temporary setback in the program of collectivization in
668 Shensi and Kansu in 1954 had been attributed to the hostility of
the peasants and the ineptitude of the cadres. As late as March,
1954, it was revealed that "the cultural standard of the cadres
was low; only one in every three cadres could read.... The work
of political propaganda and education of the peasants in some
areas has not been carried out well and penetratingly enough."
(Kansu jih-pao, March 15, 1956). One of the main reasons for
the inertia of the cadres and party members, said Chang Chung-
liang, secretary of the Kansu Chinese Communist Party commit-
tee, was their fear of the new situation created by the transition
from New Democracy to socialism, which has been added to their
rightist ideology. (NCNA November 2, 1955).

195 Besides the fear of the future, another demoralizing factor
668 was the unwillingness of the cadres and party members to leave
494 their positions in the governments and to work in the cooperatives
578 in the countryside, in defiance of the orders of their superiors.
As Wang En-mao, first secretary of the Sinkiang Chinese Commun-
ist Party sub-bureau, pointed out: "The largest defect during the
past year was the failure on the part of party committees of all
levels to resolutely, effectively, and properly transfer the leader-
ship center to rural work in mutual aid and cooperation. Certain
defects also exist in our work in the nationalities and religious
fields." (Sinkiang jih-pao, March 2, 1955).

195 The defects in nationality work were still charged to "the
668 vestiges of great nation chauvinism and local nationalism," caused
563 by "the practice of usurpation by Han Chinese coming from other
578 parts of China," and their disrespect to the minority cadres, and
by the minority cadres who were "conceited, unwilling to study,
refusing to observe discipline and doing things not according to
policy and principle." (NCNA September 17, 1954.)

The incompetence and demoralization of the cadres and party
members, who constitute the main working force of the Communists
in the domination of the Northwest, and the discord and friction
within their ranks went, pari passu, with the opposition of the
people, to undermine the rule of the Chinese Communists. As in
the past, popular opposition to the government was often carried
on under the trappings of religion. In the Chinese inhabited
areas of Shensi and Kansu, the Taoist secret society known as
I-kuan-tao was still alive and active in the summer of 1955, and
the farmers were required to sign pacts pledging to support the
government in banning this sect.

195 Out in Sinkiang, pan-Islamism still gripped the mind of the
668 people who are predominantly Moslem. "Individual counter-revo-
669 lutionary elements have infiltrated into Islam," said Burkhan last
578 year, "and, putting on the cloak of religion, are carrying out
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175 counter-revolutionary activities." He said that they were carrying
178 on "rumor spreading, sabotage, and the deception of the masses in
179 an attempt to undermine our revolutionary unity." (Sinkiang jih-
578 pao, February 25, 1955). Consequently, he went on, only "legal"
795 religious activities would be permitted by the people's government.
[198] By spring of 1956, as the heavy hand of Communist rule was
668 intensified, the counter-revolutionary activities of the people also
669 increased. Su Chen-yung, deputy director of the Bureau of Public
578 Security in the Kansu People's government, revealed the extent of
popular unrest in the Northwest when he said: "The counter-
revolutionaries have unceasingly waged their destructive activities
against the socialist transformation enterprises in both the cities
and the countryside. With the purpose of impeding the work of
peasants joining the cooperatives and sabotaging the agricultural
production, they concentrated on certain reactionary landowners,
wealthy peasants and Taoist leaders to cheat backward elements
into establishing false cooperatives and even organizing uprisings.
Counter-revolutionaries hidden in factories, mines, and basic
construction projects resort to such base acts as sabotaging tech-
nical reforms, stealing government secrets, and purposely com-
mitting errors of work in order to proceed with their destructive
activities. Counter-revolutionaries also hid themselves in religi-
ous circles. Under the cloak of religion, they proceeded upon
various kinds of destructive activities." (Kansu jih-pao, March
18, 1956).

This revelation of popular opposition to Communist rule almost
six years after its establishment in the Northwest shows that the
age-old conflicts of culture and ideology, which in the past have
divided the region, and the stubborn recalcitrance of the people,
which makes government difficult, still remain despite the efforts
of the Chinese Communists in centralization and domination, in
indoctrination and repression, which were unprecedented in their
severity and ruthlessness. The divisive nature of the region and
the discontent of the people are intrinsic conditions and cardinal
factors in the political life of China's Northwest. Even the Com-
munists themselves, in their public statements, have candidly
acknowledged the difficulties and foresee greater resistance from
the people as the program for socialism gets under way.

PUBLIC ORDER AND SAFETY

I. Introduction

A. Historical Administration of Area

1. Ch'ing Dynasty

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During the Ch'ing dynasty, Shensi and Kansu were two of the eighteen provinces which formed China proper. The police system and the problems of public order and safety were similar to those of the other provinces. (See Section on Public Order and Safety in General Handbook.) However, in the Chinghai area, the maintenance of order was mainly entrusted to the native local chiefs. In Sinkiang, a network of military garrisons under the rule of Manchu military officers was established. Its main purpose was to suppress possible rebellions by the minority groups. The daily administration and maintenance of order among the minorities at the lower local level, however, here also rested with the minority chiefs and local leaders. The efficiency of this system is illustrated by the record of the riots. Periodically, at intervals of roughly thirty to fifty years, a major rebellion broke out. Numerous small riots occurred between the big conflicts. As a whole, however, the Ch'ing dynasty's maintenance of public order in the northwest was considered to be successful.

2. Post 1911

When the revolution came in 1911, the situations varied in the different provinces. The weakness of the central government in Peking helped further the development of local forces. In Shensi, Kansu (and Ninghsia) and Ch'inghai, there were various warlords who occupied and dominated a certain portion of the land at various times. The purpose of the police forces under the warlords was to maintain their dominant position. Their police forces were efficient or less so, depending on the personalities of the leaders. Often they were backward and cruel, but usually they followed the traditional pattern of the Chinese bureaucracy. Most of the warlords adopted the "closed-door" policy. Outsiders, especially those viewed as potential trouble-makers, were not too free to travel around. This simplified police work since the local population was comparatively less educated and, except for the Moslems, more submissive than the outsiders.

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In Sinkiang, the situation was complicated by two factors.

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First, it was exposed to foreign agitation, particularly from Russia and Great Britain. Second, it had a mixed population with the Chinese in the minority. Therefore, the purpose and mission of the police forces in Sinkiang were traditionally difficult. Maintaining the leader's power involved dealing with foreign influences and with the various local peoples. These constant challenges made the police forces in Sinkiang more alert and efficient than in other

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• 175 places. For instance, during the first two or three years of the
625 Republic, when Sinkiang was controlled by the governor Yang
Tseng-hsin, numerous local officials lost their lives in local riots.
However, Yang built up a police force efficient enough to maintain
peace and order for almost two decades, a record much better than
that of the average warlords who controlled other provinces during
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[177] the same period. However, Yang finally was assassinated. Later,
when another ambitious man, Sheng Shih-ts'ai, controlled Sinkiang,
he developed a modern police system patterned after the Soviet
secret police. Purge after purge made Sinkiang a police state,
though people had to give credit to Sheng for his efficiency in main-
taining public order. With the removal of Sheng, this police force
declined and the province gradually fell into a chaotic situation again.

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B. Problems of Managing Diverse Groups

Managing the different ethnic groups was a common problem
throughout the Northwest, but it was especially serious in Sinkiang
where more than a dozen different peoples lived. The problem can
be viewed in terms of the different moral standards which were the
result of their different cultural patterns and their historical and
geographical backgrounds. For instance, among the Chinese, to
give shelter overnight to a stranger is a favor, not an obligation.
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[671] But according to V. A. Riasanovsky: Customary Law of the Mongol
[674] Tribes, p. 88, among the Mongols, refusal to give shelter for the
night is a crime. Obviously over the barren, bitter cold desert and
steppe refusal to grant shelter may mean life or death to a wander-
ing traveller, while among the Chinese agricultural society it was
usually only an inconvenience. Among the Moslems, Muhammad Ali
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681 in The Religion of Islam, p. 759, reports that it is believed that
184 people are equal before God, so that punishment must be inflicted
674 without respect of persons. On the contrary, the Mongols pay much
respect to their leaders. Riasanovsky op. cit., p. 93, states: "The
punishment changes not only with respect to the object, but also
with respect to the subject of the crime: there is no equality before
the law." Hence, ibid., p. 88, "for the murder (with arson) of a
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[565] nobleman the punishment is ruin (confiscation of all properties);
of a man of the middle class -- 300 animals, 30 valuable things;
of a man of the lower class -- 15 times nine animals and one valu-
able thing." Adultery and rape are serious crimes among the
Chinese. However, the Tibetans, according to Robert B. Ekvall:
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681 Cultural Relations on the Kansu-Tibetan Border, p. 11, permit
184 more freedom in sexual intercourse than most people. Theft is
674 punished by the Mongolian laws, Riasanovsky, op. cit., p. 91,
reports, especially if a third theft, the punishment for which is
ruin. But to the Tibetans "a crime is determined by the position of
the one against whom it is committed. Robbery of a stranger is
laudable; robbery of another Tibetan is serious only if he is powerful

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*175 military riots on a large or small scale.... The Chinese at Tien-
*563 tzu-wa of Ku-yuan county (in Kansu) were unwilling to be annexed
*668 to Chang-hua-tien where the Moslems were the majority. They
669 repeatedly petitioned to the county government, but the county
magistrate insisted on upholding his own opinion.... This ended
in the tragedy of the magistrate being beaten and numerous people
murdered." (Ibid., p. 444).

3. "(NCNA Sian, December 10, 1950)"

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• 175 "Bandit remnants remaining in Sinkiang, native bandits,
579 and special agents working for the US-Chiang elements, led by
668 Ulachibai, Stiga and Pulungchiafu who had been determinedly pur-
669 sued by the People's Liberation Army, were forced on December 1
to surrender their force of 127, bringing with them 70 rifles, 4,000
rounds of ammunition, and a number of horses.

"Ulachibai, a Kazak, was formerly the puppet (i.e. Nation-
alist) deputy magistrate of Chinghua hsien. Stiga, also a Kazak,
was Commander of the Kou-mintang Self-Defense Corps at Nanshan.
Pulungchiafu, a Mongol, was formerly puppet deputy magistrate
of Ashan hsien, and a company commander of the forces of the
bandit Osman.

"During the months of June and July, 1950, the aforemen-
tioned three bandits, in collusion with the US-Chiang agent, Osman,
undertook to shelter special agents and army deserters, and pro-
ceeded with an orgy of rebellion, massacre, and robbery, in the
Ching-hua, Nanshan, and Yenki areas.

"For the protection of the interest of the people, the People's
Liberation Army, after the successful suppression of the bandit
gangs led by Osman, Yollbars (Yolbar), and Janimkan (Janim Khan),
since July has conducted operations against the bandit remnants of
the three bandit chiefs.

"After overcoming many difficulties, the People's Libera-
tion Army finally dealt annihilating blows to the remaining bandits."

An editorial in the Peking Jen-min jih-pao, (December 28,
1950) reported:

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*175 4. "Liu Yung-nien, chief of the technical division of the
669 Kuomintang's 'Second Bureau' in Lanchow... is an arch criminal,
who, after liberation of Lanchow, planted 1,200 mines and destroyed
the Hsiang-t'ang bridge."

5. "In the spring of 1952, the anti-Communists guerrillas
in the P'ing-liang area of eastern Kansu started two open rebellions
on April 2nd and May 8th under the leadership of Ma Hsiao-tung
and Ma Kuo-yuan. They attacked the counties of Hsi-chi, Hai-yuan
and spread all over eastern Kansu and continued their activities,
commented Lo Chun in "The Construction and Management of the
Highway in Northwest China," in Chung-kung wen-t'i, No. 3, p. 120.

6. "(NCNA Sian, September 7, 1952)
The Ang-la tribe is located 300 li southeast of Sining in the

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*195 "Under a call of the correct nationalities policy, Hsiang Ch'ien
*668 yielded to the people in Chiencha in the afternoon of July 11, and
*669 arrived at Sining on July 31....
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"The Chinghai Provincial People's Government has appointed
Hsiang Ch'ien to continue to hold the post of chieftain."

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7. In an article entitled "The great achievements of People's
Sinkiang during the past three years", in Sinkiang jih-pao, January
1, 1953, Burhan, the governor of Sinkiang, gave the following report:

"During the past three years, (1949-1952)... we have wiped out
more than 20,000 of the remnant of the KMT bandits, basically
cleared out the hidden spies...."

8. In the same paper, in April of 1953 there appeared the
following:

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*(195 "(NCNA Lanchow April 6, 1953)... Northwest Regional Admin-
*563 istration Council called a meeting of the Kazakh chiefs along the
*668 border of Kansu, Chinghai, Sinkiang at Lanchow from March 23,
*669 to April 3, 1953.... The Kazakh chief A-t'ung-pai-k'e said: 'In
the past, being deceived by the bad people and believing in the
rumors, we did not cooperate with the People's government. In-
stead of punishing us for our past faults, you are now helping us...'"

The above cases all clearly indicated political disturbances.
Judging by what has been revealed here, the Communists did try
to modify their laws and standards to woo the minority groups.
They also did use the minority people as their own agents to police
as well as to pacify the resisting minorities.

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9. (NCNA Sian, February 28, 1955)
"According to statistics of the people's procuratorates in 48
administrative districts, hsien, and municipalities, 3,500 cases
were taken on in 1954."

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10. (Urumchi Sinkiang jih-pao, January 20, 1955)
"The Provincial Public Security Department has also dispatched
five work teams to various places and adopted a combined policy of
carrying out penetrating detection, investigation and research to-
gether with the resettling of vagrants and the pronouncing of sen-
tences with great fanfare. According to incomplete data from
various localities during the past 11 months, 71.7% of the crimi-
nal cases have been brought to light. The data from the two spe-
cial districts of Tacheng (Chuguchak) and Altai, from the two mu-
nicipalities of Ining and Kuche as well as from Shache hsien reveal
that a total of 25 major criminal cases have been unearthed."

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11. (Urumchi Sinkiang jih-pao, January 20, 1955)
"Judging from the events that have taken place in our province
during the past year, there are still some habitual robbers, habit-
ual thieves and other criminal culprits who have not been disposed
of. Some elements who have gone through reform through labor or
who have been released on termination of sentences still refuse to
repent and continue to jeopardize social order. Some landlords

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who are recalcitrant in maintaining their reactionary standing and military and government officials of the former Chiang government still cling to the shameful and parasitical way of life without engaging themselves in proper employment but commit various practices of theft and swindling. Some ruffians indulge in drinking and assaulting women. Some illegal prostitutes and professional gamblers convert their brothels and gambling houses into dens for robbers, thieves, and ruffians, and into hotbeds for nourishing crimes. Some unscrupulous second-hand goods dealers and hotel keepers collude with burglarious elements to dispose of spoils and even act as chief planner of crimes. More serious still, a batch of habitual thieves who sneakily move around various places even collaborate with one another to commit theft and robbery in an organized manner, using arms to threaten people and to carry out violence. Some culprits refuse to repent during reform through labor and even escape from jails to continue their crimes. Some burglarious elements who sneaked into our province from other provinces and who also belonged to the category of counter-revolutionaries carry out their counter-revolutionary sabotage activities in the form of criminal offense or impose themselves as military and government personnel to commit extortion and blackmailing. Some ruffians even intensified their activities to rob and rape women."

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12. "An address delivered by Hsi-jao-chia-ts'o, a deputy from Chinghai, at the 2nd meeting of the 1st session of the National Congress:

"Recently, in some nomadic areas (in Chinghai) we discovered rumors spread by the enemies, saying, "To start cooperatives in nomadic areas is just another form of confiscation of cattle and sheep." It definitely hurt the productive morale of the people....

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"Furthermore, there are numerous counter-revolutionary elements carrying on sabotage under the cover of religion. This is often discovered in the area of minority groups. For instance in some nomadic areas in Chinghai, people rumored that a Heavenly mandate had descended, saying that the world would be destroyed soon. The people would suffer in great calamities, etc. It was a disguise of the devil to disturb the common people... But a lot of those who had faith but were short of wisdom believed it.... They interrupted their productive activities and devoted their time wholly on chanting Buddhist scriptures every day, hoping that by doing so they may escape from the disasters....

"The counter-revolutionists are so active that we cannot afford to neglect them. We must get rid of the idea that everything is in order.... We must suppress them." (Hsin-hua yueh-pao, 1955, No. 8, p. 69.)

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13. In the Hsin-hua yueh-pao, 1955, No. 8, p. 197, there appeared

"An address delivered by Sun Tso-ping, a deputy from Chinghai,

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*175 at the 2nd meeting of the 1st session of the National People's Con-
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"Chinghai is an area where many nationalities live.... There are hidden counter-revolutionists and reactionary landlords, rich farmers who are still trying in every way to sabotage the unity of the nationalities. The methods used by these enemies for sabotage are dangerous and shrewd, mainly along two lines, namely, under the cover of religion or by upsetting international relations. The counter-revolutionists also sabotage our productive activities through arson, robbery, spreading of rumor, etc. They even organize open military rebellions. The reactionary landlords and rich farmers also stir up trouble between the middle farmers and the poor farmers. They infiltrate into the mutual cooperative groups and cooperatives to sabotage the mutual cooperative movement."

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175 14. The Sinkiang jiu-pao, September 30, 1954, reported
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"In the first half of 1954 alone, we have discovered 3429 cases of counter-revolutionary plots in Sinkiang. According to incomplete statistics, we have made arrests in at least 15,000 cases of various criminal offenses during the past 5 years." (A Report on the Achievements of the Political Works in Sinkiang Province during the Past Five Years, " by Vice-chairman Kao Chin-ch'un of Sinkiang Province.)

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[674] The above reports clearly indicate that there have been disturbances, resistance, sabotage and open rebellion besides ordinary crimes in every province of the Northwest from the very beginning of the Communist conquest until the present.

4. Conclusion

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105 The regular police system under the Communists is huge, yet
*668 it is only a very small part of the whole police system, much like
625 the part of an iceberg floating above the sea level. Strictly speaking, every branch of the Communist government, no matter whether it is legislative, administrative, judicial or economic, is a part of the police system and under the control of the Party. Moreover, every person in the country is organized and enlisted in the secret service. He is watching and being watched. Violators are subject to very heavy penalty. (See "The Regulations for Punishing the Counter-Revolutionaries" adopted by 11th meeting of the Central People's Government Council on February 20, 1951, in 1952 Jen-min shou-ts'c.)

FOREIGN RELATIONS

I. Strategic Importance of Sinkiang

175 Sinkiang has been one of the most strategic areas of China in
648 imperial and modern times. Ever since the area first came under
439 Chinese control during the Han period (206 B.C. - 220 A.D.), it
has been for China a key position for the control of central Asia.

[487] The two caravan routes to the north and south of the Tien-shan
range linked China with the steppes of western Turkestan and
with Europe and the Near East. The control of the oasis cities
along these caravan routes gave China not only a dominant position
in the trade, but also a check over the states of central Asia
that profited from this trade. In the times of the empire the Chinese
control over tribal groups in central Asia was strongest when
the corridor of trade was safely in Chinese hands.

175 Full Chinese control over Eastern Turkestan was maintained,
648 however, only over limited periods in imperial history. In the
period of division and chaos that followed the Han period, Tur-
kestan was lost to China and became a contested area between rival
tribal states. Chinese control was reasserted in T'ang times
by a Chinese dynasty which itself was partly of Central Asian origin.
The area was included in the Mongol empire when the Mongols es-
tablished their rule over China. Lost again under the Ming dynas-
ty, Chinese Turkestan was finally reconquered by the Manchus in
the eighteenth century and has been recognized as a part of China
since the time when the modern West came in contact with the
Chinese world.

The strategic role of Chinese Turkestan has become somewhat
modified in modern times. When Czarist Russia expanded her
frontiers across the Asiatic continent towards the Chinese border,
the Inner Asiatic frontiers of China were threatened by a new type
of attack by a modern Western state. The Russian expansion across
Asia found its counterpart in the British conquest of India.
From that time on the British regarded the high plateaus of Asia
as potential basis for an attack on India through the mountain passes
of the northwest. Chinese Turkestan became an area of conflicting
British-Russian policies, and at the same time an anchor of the
whole Chinese defense of Central Asia against Russian and British
invasion.

Of the two powers, Russia was by far the more dangerous to
Chinese control. Through her move into Asia, Russia became
China's neighbor along a frontier of 3,000 miles. Her pressure
was exerted in Manchuria and Mongolia as well as in Turkestan.
The British-Indian border with China was shorter and the high
mountain passes of the Himalayas and the Karakorum provided a

- 195 much greater physical barrier than existed on the Turkestan-Man-
448 churian-Mongolian border with Russia.

II. Russian Advance in Sinkiang

In the middle of the last century when the Western powers, including Russia, opened treaty ports along the coast and in China proper, Russia had combined this coastal penetration with an inland advance. In the Treaty of Kulja of 1851, which was made public in 1861, the Russians secured the right to trade in Northern Turkestan by the establishment of trading centers in the Ili valley at Kulja. In the Treaty of Peking in 1860 Russia also secured the right to establish a consulate at Kashgar in southern Turkestan.

195 The Russian-British pressure on Turkestan came to a head in
648 the 1870's when Chinese control was temporarily thrown off by the
669 rebellion of Yakub Beg. This was the period when major rebellions were taking place within China, and the revolts against the ruling dynasty spread to the northwestern border. The Moslem rebellion began in the Northwest region of China and extended to Chinese Turkestan where one of the former ruling Moslem families which had been driven out by the Chinese administration into western Turkestan attempted to re-establish its power. Its leading military figure was Yakub Beg who soon took over the rebellious movement and attempted to set up an independent government over the southern and northern parts of Chinese Turkestan. During his stay in power, he negotiated treaties with both Britain and Russia. The British recognized Yakub Beg and permitted him to secure arms through India. A British envoy signed a treaty with his government at Kashgar in 1874, a treaty which was formally ratified by the government of India in 1876. In this treaty Sinkiang was opened to trade with India, and a British trading company was formed with the assistance of India. Through India, Yakub Beg established contact with the Sultan of Turkey in a Moslem religious alliance. At that time, the British believed that Yakub Beg would be able to maintain himself and hoped that Chinese Turkestan would become an independent or at least autonomous area, a buffer between India and Russia.

The Russian reaction to Yakub Beg's rebellion was a direct attack on the territory of Chinese Turkestan. When Yakub Beg had occupied Urumchi and moved towards the northwestern border area, the Russians moved troops across the border and occupied Kulja and the territory of the Ili valley in 1871. In 1872 they forced Yakub Beg to conclude a commercial agreement which opened Eastern Turkestan to Russian trade. In 1874-75, Russia concentrated troops on the border of southern Sinkiang. But unrest in Russian Turkestan prevented them from further military action. In 1876, they forced Yakub Beg to surrender the strategic moun-

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- tain passes west of Kashgar to Russian control. The Russian government had thus used the unrest in Turkestan for military expansion into Chinese territory, although it declared at the time that the occupation was only a temporary move for the protection of Russian commercial interests and that the area would eventually be given back to China.

This Russian attack gave the Turkestan rebellion an even more dangerous character in Chinese eyes. What was at stake now for China was not only the subjection of a rebellious leader but the defense of the whole Chinese Inner Asian position. China's realization of this danger became very clear in the discussions that preceded the Chinese military campaigns to reconquer Turkestan. Two views were expressed at that time on the importance of that area to China. One was represented by Li Hung-chang, who had come to power as the leader of the Anhwei army, one of the regional forces that had been established to suppress the Taiping Rebellion. In this campaign Li had had his main base at Shanghai and had come to control the financial resources of the central coastal region. Later his army had been used in the suppression of the Nien Rebellion in Anhwei and Shantung and after this successful campaign he had become governor-general of the capital province of Chihli and was the leading military figure in the north. Li Hung-chang was willing to abandon China's position in Central Asia in favor of strengthening coastal defenses. According to him the expenses of a Sinkiang campaign would seriously endanger the coastal defense, so important for holding the capital.

III. Policy of Tso Tsung-t'ang

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In contrast to Li's regional view on the importance of China's coastal area, Tso Tsung-t'ang, then in charge of the suppression of the Moslem Rebellion in the northwestern provinces of Shensi and Kansu, saw the control of Sinkiang as a vital part of the defense of the whole Chinese Inner Asiatic frontier. According to Tso Tsung-t'ang, "The reason why great weight should be given to Sinkiang is the protection of Mongolia. In protecting Mongolia, one ensures the defense of the capital. When the fingers and forearms of the West and North work in unison and the topographical position is continuous then there is no break in the country's defenses. But if Sinkiang is not strong, then Mongolia will not be safe. Not only the border provinces of Shensi, Kansu, and Shansi would be constantly open to invasion and it would be difficult to defend them, but also Northern Chihli and Shanhaikuan would not have a day of rest or sleep." (Tso Tsung-t'ang, Tso Wen-hsiang-kung Ch'üan-chi, chüan 50, pp. 76a, b.) Tso argued that the defense of Sinkiang would be less expensive in the

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648 long run than would be an inland defense of the northwest, if the Sinkiang passes were lost. The defense of Peking depended on the Chinese military garrisons at Kalgan, Uliasutai, and Kobdo in Mongolia; the defense of Mongolia depended on the control of Sinkiang; the defense of Sinkiang depended on the passes at Kulja and Chuguchak. He did not believe that there was a real military threat to the Chinese coasts because in his opinion the Western powers were interested in commercial privileges rather than in military conquest. When at that time the British minister to Peking intervened in support of Yakub Beg and suggested that the imperial government should allow the rebel leader to maintain his rule over Turkestan as an autonomous area under Chinese suzerainty, Tso Tsung-t'ang sent a memorial to the throne stating that the status of Yakub Beg was purely a domestic question, and that "if Britain wished to create a buffer state in central Asia she was herself well able to furnish the territory." (Arthur W. Hummel *Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period*, Washington, 1944, vol. II, p. 766.)

Tso Tsung-t'ang's main concern, however, was the Russian military invasion. It was his avowed strategy to use such overwhelming force in the defeat of Yakub Beg and to make the reconquest of Turkestan so convincing that Russia would have to live up to the promise which she had given at the time of the occupation in 1871 and return the Ili area to Chinese control. But the diplomatic negotiations between China and Russia which followed did not bring the results for which Tso Tsung-t'ang had hoped. In the draft treaty concluded in St. Petersburg in 1879, Russia returned only the city of Kulja and the eastern part of the Ili valley but retained the western part of the Ili area including the valley of a tributary, the Tekes, and most important of all, the strategic mountain passes of the Altai and related ranges. This treaty aroused a storm of indignation at the court in Peking. The government refused to ratify it and imposed a death sentence on the returning envoy who had negotiated it. The sentence was not carried out, but a new envoy signed another treaty at St. Petersburg in 1881 with somewhat more favorable conditions. While Russia retained some of the territory she had occupied, she returned the Tekes valley and the strategic passes to China.

After it had reasserted its authority over almost all of the Turkestan area, the Chinese government carried through an administrative reorganization in order to strengthen the ties with its outlying region. In November, 1884, an imperial edict made Turkestan into a Chinese province under the name of Sinkiang ("The New Territory"). Urumchi (the Chinese Ti-hua) became the provincial capital and the province was divided into more than twenty districts. Thus, while Chinese political control

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648 was re-established, economic penetration from Russia and to a lesser degree from British India continued. In the treaty of 1881, Russia had established consulates at Kulja, Chuguchak, Kashgar, and Turfan. The treaty also stipulated that consulates should be established at Urumchi, Hami (Qomul), and Ch'i-t'ai, if the development of Russian trade warranted it. England arranged in 1884 for the stationing of a British trade agent at Kashgar.

In the following period the Chinese political position in Sinkiang was not threatened again by either Russia or England. Chinese control created, in effect, something of a buffer area for the conflicting expansionist interests of these two powers. Towards the turn of the century, attempts were made to delimit Russian and British areas of expansion in order to diminish chances of conflict. In 1895 the two powers agreed to delimit their respective areas of expansion in the Pamirs. In a decision of the Pamir Boundary Commission the two powers agreed to set aside a narrow corridor of Afghan territory which would extend from Afghanistan to the Chinese province of Sinkiang. This corridor would prevent a direct Russo-British-India frontier. The Anglo-Russian tensions came to a new height during the time of the Russo-Japanese War in 1904-05. When the war was over, Russian and England came to settle all their conflicting interests in the Triple Entente of 1907. By that time the neutralization of the central Asiatic area of possible conflict had already been recognized for so long that Turkestan was no longer mentioned in the agreement.

IV Policy of Yang Tseng-hsin

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635 The Chinese position in Sinkiang entered into a new phase with the Chinese Revolution of 1911. The Revolution changed the relationship between the province and the new types of central governments that succeeded each other in China. In imperial times the Chinese governors were a part of the imperial bureaucracy, and the court had been able to appoint and recall governors more or less at will. It had also given the provincial administration a yearly subsidy of over two and a half million taels (a tael equals about 1.28 U.S. dollars). With the revolution, the central control over the province was greatly weakened. No more subsidy was forthcoming from China and the governors had to base their power and position almost entirely on local support. Yang Tseng-hsin, the Chinese governor of Sinkiang from 1912 to 1928 gained such support by giving the non-Chinese population groups greater economic autonomy. At the same time he maintained good relations with Russia by permitting Russian economic activities which had considerably increased since 1905. The Russo-Asiatic Bank had its branches at Urumchi, Kulja, Chuguchak, and Kashgar with the right to issue paper currency. These branches played a large role in the local trade.

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648 • The isolation of Sinkiang from the Chinese government became even more pronounced as a result of the events in Outer Mongolia. The Chinese Revolution of 1911 gave the Mongols the opportunity to declare their independence from Chinese control. This move was in part inspired and supported by Czarist Russia which established its own control over Outer Mongolia. Though Outer Mongolia remained nominally a part of Chinese territory, Chinese control ended and Outer Mongolia became in fact a Russian protectorate. The loss of Outer Mongolia changed the position of China in central Asia and greatly affected her hold over Chinese Turkestan. Tso Tsung-t'ang had described Turkestan as the key position for the defense of Mongolia, which in turn was important for the security of north China and of the capital. Now Turkestan itself was outflanked by the Russian position in Mongolia. From Mongolia, Russian forces could at any time cut the corridor that led from the Chinese province of Kansu to Urumchi and Kashgar. Sinkiang, formerly the central basis of the Chinese military position in Inner Asia, now became an exposed advance position which could only be held in the long run if a new and safe connection with China Proper could be found.

Of still greater importance for the power struggle in central Asia was the change brought about in Russia by the October Revolution. The new Soviet Russia soon resumed the Czarist policy of expansion in central Asia. But to the economic and strategic interests which had been the motivating force behind Czarist advance there was now added the Communist aim of infiltrating the neighboring area with its ideological and political organization. This Soviet advance began slowly and accelerated with the growing strength of the Soviet government. During the early years of the civil war in Siberia, Soviet Russia was in no position to resume an aggressive policy in central Asia. The Russian position in Outer Mongolia was also temporarily lost and regained only in 1922, when after the defeat of the White Russian leader, Ungern Sternberg, Outer Mongolia became a Soviet satellite.

[167] The outcome of the red victory in the civil war in Siberia had the immediate result of bringing a stream of White Russian refugees to the central Asiatic areas. In addition to smaller groups, two White Russian armies retreated into Sinkiang in 1920 and 1921. The number of these troops has been reported as 30,000 to 40,000 men, a much stronger force than the Chinese army of governor Yang Tseng-hsin. In Outer Mongolia, White Russian forces retreating at that time had been able to take over the government, but the Chinese administration of Sinkiang managed to bring the Russian influx into its territory fully under control. Most of the Russian troops let themselves be disarmed and were interned at Kuchengste. Other troops which had retreated to the Altai border region of Russia and Outer Mongolia retained their arms.

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The Altai region has been an area of conflict all the more critical because of the potential value of its mineral resources. In imperial time some control had been exerted over part of the area by the Imperial Amban in Kobdo in Outer Mongolia. The border between Chinese and Russian territory was also not clearly delineated, and the Chinese claim that the highest mountain ridge formed the border being at times contested by Soviet Russia. The area was mainly inhabited by Kazakh tribesmen who were closely related to similar groups at the other side of the border in Russian Turkestan. During World War I a number of Kazakhs from the Russian side had moved over into Chinese territory to escape the draft for labor conscription, and no control had been exerted over these groups. Of all the Turkic people of the province of Sinkiang, the Kazakhs were the most nationalistic and unruly. The attitude of the Kazakh people played, therefore, an important role in the relations between Russia and Chinese Turkestan.

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At the critical time, in 1920, when the White Russian influx became a problem, the Chinese governor negotiated with the Soviet authorities an agreement which established friendly relations across the border but at the same time enabled the governor to deal successfully with the problem of White Russian immigrants. He gained a Soviet promise of amnesty for all those White Russians who wanted to return to Russian territory and encouraged as many as he could to go back to Russia, while others continued their journey to China proper. At the same time, he asked for Soviet support in removing the armed White Russians from the Altai region and strengthened the Chinese position in that area by dividing it into regular Chinese districts and sub-district administrations. Connected with this political agreement was a trade agreement in which the Ili valley area was opened to Soviet economic activities. Two Soviet consulates were established in this area, in contrast to the seven consulates which the Czarist government had maintained in its last years in Sinkiang. In exchange for the Soviet consulate the Chinese administration was permitted to maintain two consulates in Soviet territory. These consulates were to be established at Semipalatinsk and at Verkhnevelinsk on the border of Outer Mongolia. The agreement also abolished extraterritoriality, and in opening economic relations with the Soviets, Governor Yang gained Soviet release of the property of Chinese merchants in Russian territory which had at first been confiscated by the new Soviet regime. Through this agreement of 1920 Chinese-Soviet relations were established in Sinkiang long before the beginning of official relations between the government at Peking and the Soviet government and even before the arrangement of Soviet support to Sun Yat-sen at Canton. The agreement of 1920 was broadened by the Soviet-Chinese treaty of 1924, signed at Peking, which provided for the opening of additional Soviet

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648 consulates. Soviet consulates were opened at Chuguchak, at Sharasume in the Altai region, and at Urumchi and at Kashgar in exchange for the opening of Chinese consulates at Tashkent, Andijan, Zaisan, and Alma Ata.

The Chinese administration under Governor Yang thus maintained a very cautious policy of friendly economic relations with the Soviet Union. This policy was continued even after the leaders of the Kuomintang had broken with the Chinese Communists and had sent the Russian advisers home. The economic relations between Turkestan and Soviet territory remained close; the Chinese consul at Semipalatinsk was quoted by Izvestia as stating that Sinkiang had nothing in common with central China and that the commercial as well as the political relations between western China and the friendly republic of the USSR remained unchanged. Even after Governor Yang accepted the nominal authority of the National Government at Nanking, this policy did not change.

From the side of the National Government, however, the first attempts were now made to strengthen the physical link with Sinkiang. These attempts were later to be renewed during and after the years of World War II and led to the building of new communication links, a policy to be continued later by the Chinese Communists.

In 1928 the Sven Hedin expedition was sent by the National Government to explore a new road connection from Inner Mongolia to Chinese Turkestan as well as to investigate the possibility of using older caravan routes to the south of Qomul. The expedition was treated politely by the Chinese administration but was closely supervised and restricted in its movements. Even so the routes which the Sven Hedin expedition investigated would not have provided a road between Nanking and Sinkiang which would not have been in easy reach of Russian forces based on Outer Mongolia.

V. Foreign Relations under Chin Shu-jen

While Sven Hedin's expedition was still in Sinkiang, the Russian influence was greatly increased when the Chinese administration of the province was changed. Governor Yang was assassinated, and the former chief of the Political Department, Chin Shu-jen, assumed power. The assassination was carried out by Fan Yao-nan, the Commissioner of Foreign Affairs, at a feast at which the Soviet consular officials and several other Russian guests were present. The Commissioner of Foreign Affairs was in turn seized and executed by troops under the control of Chin Shu-jen, who himself then became governor. Under Chin's governorship there was soon an opportunity for great expansion of the Russian influence. In 1929 the Russians reputedly began building up Communist Party cells in

- 175 Sinkiang. In 1930 the completion of the Turksib Railroad in Rus-
648 sian Turkestan along the Chinese border enabled Soviet Russia
to intensify the exploitation of the Sinkiang economy. Ever since
the Russian development of central Asia, the weight of Russian
influence had increased and the Chinese National Government
lagged behind in its attempt to answer this threat by a new develop-
ment of the communications between Sinkiang and China.

175 The greatest increase in Russian influence came as the re-
648 sult of the revolt of the Chinese Moslems, the Tungans, in 1931,
669 who called in as their leader Ma Chung-ying, a Moslem from Kan-
su who came close to capturing the provincial government.
Governor Chin's administration was saved by Soviet Russia, which
gave him arms and military support under the pretext that some
Japanese had been on Ma's staff, implying that Japanese schemes
were endangering Soviet interests in the province, although no
proof has ever been brought forward for such Japanese activities.
In order to get Russian support, Chin concluded in November,
1931, an agreement with Soviet Russia which was kept secret from
the National Government. By this agreement, eight Soviet trade
agencies were set up at Urumchi, Chuguchak, Kulja, Kashgar,
Aksu, Kucha, Yarkand, and Khotan; the tariff for Soviet products
was reduced, and telegraph and radio communications were estab-
lished with Soviet territory. Chin Shu-jen did not succeed, however,
in suppressing the rebellion, and according to one account by a
Mr. Tshumabay, then chairman of the GPU mission in Sinkiang,
the Soviets, in order to weaken the Chinese military forces, did
not at first provide the military support they had promised.
When a Moslem force reached the outskirts of the capital of
Urumchi, Chin turned over the defense to Sheng Shih-ts'ai, an
officer of Manchurian origin. Sheng was placed in command of
Chinese troops from Manchuria who had in their fight with the
Japanese retreated on to Soviet territory and had been transported
by Soviet Russia to Turkestan. Thus from the outset Sheng derived
his military power from Russian support. He was substantially
supported by another military force recruited from the White Rus-
sians living in Urumchi and neighboring cities. Within the ranks
of this force could reportedly also be found Red Russian soldiers.
When asked about this comradeship-in-arms the White Russians
stated to members of the Sven Hedin expedition that there was no
difficulty in working together for a common purpose. The equipment
of both these forces was provided by the Soviet Union.

With these troops Sheng succeeded in driving off the Moslem
attackers. In April, 1935, a coup d'etat by these Russian troops
forced the retirement of Governor Chin, who fled to Russian ter-
ritory and from there returned to China. Sheng Shih-ts'ai became
governor and, with the help of Russian war materiel, including

- 175 military planes, succeeded in destroying the Moslem forces of
648 Ma Chung-ying who was eventually driven to Kashgar from where in
669 June, 1934, he fled to Soviet territory. All the three leading figures
in the struggle for power, Chin Shu--jen, Ma Chung-ying, and
Sheng Shih-ts'ai were thus in different ways under Soviet control.
Chin had been supported and at the same time handicapped by the
Russians who finally permitted him to return to China through
their territory. Governor Sheng, his successor, depended from
the very beginning on Russian support for his power. And Ma Chung-
ying, the defeated aspirant for power, who might have established
a closer link with the National Government, entrusted his fate to
the Soviet regime. He was reportedly seen in Moscow at the begin-
ning of 1936, but from that time on his fate has remained unknown.

VI. Policy of Sheng Shih-ts'ai

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669 From the outset Sheng Shih-ts'ai was strongly under Russian
dominance. Soviet Russia did not only have influence over the
locally recruited Russian forces and over the Manchurian troops
of Sheng, both equipped with Russian weapons; it also sent a special
tank regiment of 3,000 men, the so-called "Altai Volunteers," to be
stationed near Komul on the main caravan route from the Chinese
province of Kansu to Urumchi and Kashgar. This force was sta-
tioned in a strategic position ostensibly to guard against any
Japanese advance from Inner Mongolia. In practice it also could
interfere with any attempt of the Chinese National Government to re-
establish its authority over Urumchi. Soviet military advisors
supervised the training of the Chinese as well as the Russian
troops, and through their influence communists were reputedly
introduced also into the officer and private ranks of the Chinese
forces. They also trained political commissars for the indoctri-
nation of the Chinese forces. In addition to this control of the
forces the Soviet government had a hold over the administration
of the province. Two Russians, a Mr. Yuravlev and a Dr. Lapin,
held high positions in the civil administration of the province and
Russian advisers under the direction of the Russian consul-general
had decisive influence in all important departments of government.
Many of the Turks employed in the administration were recruited
from West Turkestan or Turkic groups living in the Soviet Union.
According to Chinese reports (see article by Yolbars Khan
"Sinkiang Under the Control of Chinese and Russian Communists,"
Chung Hua Nien Pao, vol. 4, 1954, pp. 52-55), Governor Sheng
was told by the Soviet consul at Urumchi that he had to follow
Party orders. This was the time when, after the Sian kidnaping
of Chiang Kai-shek, a united front had been established in China
proper for the war of resistance against Japan. During the time

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648 when this united-front continued in operation, in 1937 and 1938, a number of Chinese Communists were brought in who seemed to have worked in close cooperation with the Soviet advisers.

When he came to power, Governor Sheng was given a Soviet loan of five million rubles for reconstruction. For the plans of reconstruction he was provided with Soviet technical advisers. In 1937 Sheng introduced a three-year plan of reconstruction for which he received a further fifteen million rubles in Soviet loans; a second plan was introduced in 1940. These funds were used to build motor roads, among other things, and to introduce a large fleet of Soviet trucks. It was reported that 1,350 miles of telephone lines were installed by 1941. By 1939 twenty factories had been set up in the province and over four hundred tons of Soviet machinery had been imported for the exploitation of oil resources and the establishment of an oil refinery northwest of Urumchi. In November, 1940, Governor Sheng concluded a secret agreement with the Soviet Union which included permission for Soviet Russia to prospect for and exploit tin and other mineral resources in Sinkiang, and which gave Soviet Russia control over the mineral resources of the province. (The text of this agreement was published in 1950 in Formosa and appeared in 1954 in the American Journal of Foreign Affairs, and in November, 1954, in the German newspaper, Ost-Probleme.)

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669 While extending their military and economic influence over the government of Sheng Shih-ts'ai, the Soviet government attempted to deal separately with a group of Kazakhs in the Ili and Altai regions who had begun in 1940 to work for an autonomy of their region. When some of their leaders were invited to Urumchi and arrested there at the beginning of 1940, the Kazakhs rose in revolt in February of that year. A truce was concluded on May 15, 1940, in which the insurgents agreed to cease fighting provided that no more Russian troops would be brought into their area. But fighting soon broke out again and the Kazakh leader, Osman Batur, succeeded by the end of 1940 in establishing a provisional government in the Ili and Altai region which was called the National Republic of East Turkestan. A Soviet attempt to deal with the government of Osman Batur failed. Osman Batur turned down the Russian offer of arms which was coupled with a request to withdraw his forces from the Altai region and move them to the Ili area. In September 1941, the insurgent leadership split. Abdulaziz Kasim, a leader who was a Soviet citizen, concluded an agreement with the Soviets, while Osman Batur and his followers continued their fight against Soviet troops as well as the forces of Governor Sheng Shih-ts'ai. At the beginning of 1942, the Soviets brought 23,000 troops into the Altai area but the critical situation in the war with Germany forced the Soviets to discontinue their campaign and to concentrate on the protection of a few bases in Sinkiang.

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In the meantime Governor Sheng attempted to end his dependence on Soviet Russia and to turn instead to the National Government. When the pressure of the German advance forced the Soviet government to withdraw most of its forces from Sinkiang, it attempted to maintain its position by disorganizing the Turkestan administration. Aside from the negotiations with the Kazakh rebels, the Soviets made an unsuccessful attempt to assassinate Governor Sheng when they feared he would seek cooperation with the Chinese National Government. This Russian move precipitated a switch of Sheng's administration to the Chinese side. Sheng drove out his Russian advisers and arrested large numbers of his staff who had been cooperating with the Russians as well as with Chinese Communists who had been brought in through Russian support.

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The cooperation between the Soviet representatives in Sinkiang and the Chinese Communists during this time seems to have been close. While the Russian representatives conveyed the policy line as determined in Moscow and provided the military and political power behind it, the Chinese Communists infiltrated Sheng's staff and helped to work out many of Sheng's administrative measures. For instance a currency reform instituted in 1938 was claimed to have been the work of the brother of Mao Tse-tung, Mao Tse-min who had come to Turkestan with the Chinese Communist group under Russian protection. The Communists also established the Fan-ti-hui, or Anti-Imperialist Association which was used for propaganda and intelligence. When Governor Sheng broke with the Soviets and turned to the National Government, he attempted to eradicate this Chinese Communist group. Mao Tse-min and a number of others, including Governor Sheng's secretary, were executed, and many were imprisoned.

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VII. Chinese Nationalist Attempt to Reassert Nationalist Influence

The new active interest which the National Government took in Sinkiang was related to the military situation of the time. The Russian withdrawal was the result of the military defeats brought on Soviet Russia by the Nazi armies which threatened Moscow and forced a concentration of all available Russian troops at the European front. The Chinese National Government could not count on any further Soviet support in its war against Japan, and the further developments in Soviet Russia were uncertain. Even if Soviet Russia could hold out, this seemed an opportune time to eliminate the dangerous Soviet control which was no longer compensated by any military advantage.

The Chinese situation had become still more desperate after Pearl Harbor and the Japanese conquest of the mainland of south-east Asia. Cut off from the supply routes which could bring in

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• 175 support from its new military allies, the Chinese National Govern-
648 ment searched for new links with the outside world. In February 1942
N on his visit to India, Chiang Kai-shek explored the possibility of the
*175 supply route via Tibet through Chinghai Province. While this long
*648 and arduous route never became of major importance, it served as
491 a communication link over which large commercial caravans
S passed for many years, even after the war. This development
175 brought new importance to Chinghai Province where the Moslem
648 general, Ma Pu-ch'ing, was appointed Pacification Commissioner
by the National Government. This appointment was of still greater
importance for the Sinkiang Government. As a Moslem, Ma Pu-
ch'ing could become a potential rival of Governor Sheng Shih-ts'ai
in extending his influence over the Moslem Turks of Sinkiang Pro-
vince, as Ma Chung-ying had done before him. More important
still was his control over the strategically located province of
Chinghai. From Chinghai was to open a route to the Tarim Basin
and to the southern part of Sinkiang. Since this route passed to the
south of the Nanshan Range, it was better protected from any
Soviet threat from Outer Mongolia than was the caravan route of
the Kansu corridor. This corridor to Sinkiang had been controlled
by the Russian tank force at Qomul while the new route, if developed,
would give the National Government a passage to Sinkiang not so
easily threatened from Soviet-controlled territory. In fact, the
build-up of Chinghai as a strategic center was the logical Chinese
Nationalist answer to the Russian domination of Outer Mongolia.
Sinkiang, formerly a center of the Chinese Inner-Asian position, had
now become a contested frontier area which could be held only if a
relatively safe and practicable connection could be opened up.
From this time on, the Chinese position at Sining and the Kokonor
and in the Tsaidam area became of key strategic importance.

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175 While the Chinese National Government was beginning to re-
648 establish its position in central Asia, it negotiated with Sheng Shih-
ts'ai. Chiang Kai-shek himself came to Lanchow in Kansu and the
chief of the northwest headquarters at Sian, General Chu Shao-liang,
flew twice to Urumchi for negotiations with Governor Sheng. The
second time he was accompanied by Madame Chiang Kai-shek and
Wu Chunghsin, who was in 1944 to become successor to Governor
Sheng. At this time, Wu Tse-hsiang (Chaucer H. Wu) became
Governor Sheng's Commissioner for Foreign Affairs. In the fall of
1943, Governor Sheng himself flew to Chungking to confer with
Chiang Kai-shek. As a result of these talks, the National Government
began to subsidize the Sinkiang administration. Several thousand
S Chinese refugees were moved into Sinkiang between 1942 and 1943,
(167) and at the beginning of 1943 Nationalist troops were also sent in.

This Nationalist advance was paralleled by the withdrawal of
the Soviet troops which began in spring of 1942 and was almost

175 completed by March 1943. Soviet Russia not only withdrew its
648 military forces but also retreated from its economic exploitation
of Sinkiang. The Soviets capped the main oil well north of Urum-
chi and shipped back to Russia all the movable machinery from
the oil refineries and the gold, copper, and iron mines which
they had set up in Ili, Chuguchak, and in the Altai area, and
from the factories they had built in Urumchi and other cities.

This Russian retreat was, however, far from complete. The
Soviets maintained their consulates in all the larger cities of
Sinkiang with a staff of several hundred people. At these consu-
lates the Russians left military guards. At Urumchi a company
of Soviet infantry with a strength of at least four hundred men was
left behind to guard the consulate. Other consulates were guarded
by units of ten to fifty men each. Other units were left behind to
guard the gold, copper, and iron mines in the Ili and Chuguchak
regions as well as the oil wells at Wusu and at Urumchi where
the valuable machinery that could not be removed was protected
by these troops. Soviet troops also continued to guard the air-
fields at Kulja, Urumchi, Kashgar, and Turfan. In each Soviet

175 consulate the biggest department was the propaganda section.
648 These departments distributed among Turks, Kazakhs, Kirghiz,
208 and Mongols pamphlets printed in Soviet Russia. Agents of the
consulates traveled throughout the province giving out these pam-
phlets and explaining the contents to the illiterate. The pamphlets
gave favorable accounts of the Turkic people within the Soviet
Union and contained material on methods of agriculture, irrigation,
and animal husbandry. Altogether, the Soviet consulates concen-
trated more than before on the support and protection of the
nationality groups who had started to fight the Chinese administra-
tion. Although the Soviets did not establish Communist Party
cells among these nationality groups, they attempts to infiltrate
their leadership. And since Chinese policy aimed at the suppression
of this nationality movement, the nationality groups depended on
the intervention of the Soviet consulates with the Chinese adminis-
tration for the protection of the lives of their leaders. In several
cases the Soviet representatives prevented execution and in
other cases secured the release of imprisoned nationality leaders.
As a result the Turks, the Kirghiz, and the Kazakhs, and Mongols,
had to accept the orders of Soviet agents in their dealings with
the administration of Governor Sheng.

175 VIII. Soviet Efforts to Regain Power in Sinkiang. 648

[669] By 1944 the defeat of Nazi Germany enabled Soviet Russia to
return to an active policy in Sinkiang. The Soviets supported a
Kazakh uprising which broke out in the Ili valley on November

- 175 7, 1944. This Kazakh uprising occurred in the three border
648 districts of Ili, Chuguchak (Tacheng), and Ashan (Altai) and
669 resulted in the establishment of an "East Turkestan Republic."
These districts on the Soviet border were preponderantly Kazakh
in population and comprised almost one-sixth of the population of
the province. They are rich in oil, coal, iron, tungsten, gold,
lead, and reportedly also in uranium; they also have rich agri-
cultural soil. The revolt was in the hands of experienced Kazakh
leaders who had been in practical control of much of the area since
their earlier uprising in 1940. When they had attempted in 1943 to
declare their independence, they had been forced to abandon this
plan by the threat of military action from the Soviet troops that
were guarding the closed mines in the area. But by 1944 the
Soviets were willing to support them. Their uprising resulted in
fighting in the Ili valley for over a month until the Chinese provin-
cial troops gave up the city of Kulja which remained under the con-
trol of Kazakh insurgents. From Kulja the rebel forces moved
north to extend their control over the Chuguchak region and then
captured the town of Manass close to Urumchi. The rebellion also
spread to some cities of southern Turkestan. When attempts to
suppress the rebellion by military forces failed, the Chinese
National Government, which by this time was reasserting its
authority over Sinkiang, sent General Chang Chih-chung to
Sinkiang in September 1945 to negotiate with the rebels. These
negotiations were handled through the mediation of the Soviet
Consul-General in Urumchi. After many meetings between Octo-
ber 1945 and June 1946, the negotiations resulted in three agree-
ments signed by General Chang and three Kulja delegates. The
agreements resulted in the abolition of the "East Turkestan Re-
public" and of its local flag but they practically secured autonomy
for the rebellious districts and troops. They also resulted in the
[635] reorganization of the provincial government. The new governor,
Chang Chih-chung had two vice-governors as his assistants, one
[563] an Uighur, the other a Tatar. The appointment of representatives
of the nationalities to such positions was an attempt to pacify the
revolt of the nationalities against Chinese rule. Governor Chang
did not, however, regain any control over the autonomous group
which continued to rule the vital border districts of Sinkiang under
the leadership of Akmedjan, Burkhan, Isakh Beg, and Saifuddin.
The national government troops under Governor Chang did not
control the area west of Urumchi and the products of this region,
including the oil, coal, and mineral products, went to the Soviet
side. From 1943 on the Soviet resumed the working of the tung-
sten mines and since 1945 the Soviet s have reportedly obtained
diamonds, gold, bismuth, and uranium from this area. An attempt
by the Chinese government to end this secret exploitation of

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648 Turkestan resources by proposing an open trade agreement in November 1946 remained unanswered by the Soviets.

[491] The Chinese attempt to regain control by Chang Chih-chung's policy of negotiation was based on military measures aimed at strengthening the strategic position. Along the whole route from Lanchow to Urumchi, blockhouses were maintained at distances of about twenty miles. And at the same time a new effort was made to open up the route from Ching-hai. The new Moslem governor of the province, Ma Pu-fang, received Nationalist support in his efforts to build a road from Sining along Lake Kokonor towards the Tarim Basin. This road had been driven well past the Kokonor before the Communist victory in 1949. The National Government [701] had also strengthened the military force in Sinkiang. In addition to the six divisions which Governor Sheng Shih-ts'ai had left behind, four divisions of Nationalist troops had been sent to the province and two divisions of Ma Pu-fang's cavalry from Chinghai had also been brought in, bringing the total of Chinese forces up to twelve divisions, or about 100,000 men, which have remained there since the Communists took over.

In spite of this military force, Governor Chang Chih-chung did not succeed in transforming the agreements concluded with the Kulja group in 1946 into a working arrangement. He demanded that the reorganization of the forces of the Kulja area should be preceded by acceptance of Chinese control. He also wanted the approval of the Sinkiang Nationalist leaders for the railroad to be built from China into Sinkiang and the acceptance by Sinkiang of the Chinese Nationalist currency. The Sinkiang Nationalist leaders refused these conditions, and in May 1947, Chang Chih-chung resigned as governor and was succeeded by an Uighur, Masud Sabri, who was a compromise candidate acceptable to the Chinese National Government. In July 1947 the Kulja nationalists broke with Masud [669] Sabri and maintained their own autonomous administration under Akmedjan. The situation remained in a deadlock and the Kulja group was reportedly receiving aid for its troops from Soviet Russia. The Kazakh leader, Osman Batur, who had formerly joined the Kulja group, had broken with it on account of the Soviet support and had withdrawn with his own forces to the Altai border region.

To overcome the deadlock with the Turkic Nationalists, the National government agreed in December 1949 to the appointment of one of the Nationalist leaders as governor of the province. This was Burkhan who was by origin a Russian Tatar and a man with whom the Kazakh nationalists were willing to cooperate. In January 1949 Chang Chih-chung flew once more to Sinkiang to negotiate a new Sino-Soviet economic treaty. But all these moves by the National Government to appease Soviet Russia by economic concessions and to appease the Russian-supported Kulja Nationalists

- 175 a change of the provincial administration came to nothing because
648 of the rapid disintegration and collapse of the National Government
(635) in 1949. The Sinkiang Provincial Government had a formal decla-
[668] ration of adherence to the new Communist regime in Peking in
September 1949.

IX. Sinkiang Under the Chinese Communists

175 After the victory of the Chinese Communists, both Soviet and
648 Chinese policy changed in its attitude toward the Sinkiang Nationalists.
669 While they had been supported and equipped with Soviet arms against
668 the Chinese provincial administration under the National Govern-
ment, they were now suppressed by the Chinese Communists with
Russian help. Soviet troops which were greatly increased and have
been estimated as consisting of about 50,000 men during this
time were instrumental in defeating the independent forces of Os-
man Batur who was captured and executed in April 1951 at Urumchi,
together with over 13,000 of his followers. The key Nationalist
leaders of the Ili area who had been formerly supported by Soviet
Russia were eliminated in another way. While on their way to
Peking to participate in the opening of the Communist People's
Political Consultative Conference, Akmedjan, Isakh Beg, and
several other leading figures were killed in an airplane crash on
August 29, 1949. The leaders who remained behind, Burkhan and
Saifuddin, were willing to work with the Chinese Communists
and Soviet Russia along a new line of policy which condemned the
former nationalism and re-interpreted the previous fight in an
anti-Kuomintang line. The new leaders were willing to admit
former "mistakes in their nationality policy which had not made
a clear distinction between opposition to "rapacious Kuomintang
officials, plundering Kuomintang troops, and the oppressive
Kuomintang police," and hostility to the "entire Han race."
This previous "narrow nationalism" was described as harmful
and the aim was now to establish full unity between the formerly
rebellious districts and the rest of the province. The Ili armed
forces were dissolved and integrated into the Chinese Communist
Army and a new policy was introduced of ridding the province of
its "feudal oppression."

175 This new policy propagandized by both Burkahn and Saifuddin
668 aroused strong nationalist opposition. In 1951, a Kazakh revolt which
669 continued in the Ili area spread towards the east. The move-
ment was attacked by Burkhan as representing the "reactionary
bourgeois class, such as pan-Turkestanists and pan-Islamists"
who were trying to undermine the "solidarity among various races
in the People's Republic of China." He stated that "what has been
[66] regarded as progressive at one time may become reactionary at
another time," and ordered the liquidation of all "reactionaries."

175 counter-revolutionaries, and pan-Turkestanists" and demanded
648 that the "people of various races" be taught "the spirit of patrio-
668 tism and internationalism." Simultaneously, a large-scale
669 purge was undertaken to liquidate most of the original revolu-
661 tionary leaders in the three western districts who had not perished
in the airplane crash of 1949. These leaders were replaced by
Chinese Communist cadres. The new policy was carried through
with great bloodshed. According to a statement by Burkhan in
January 1952, over 120,000 "people's enemies" had been liqui-
dated. About 60,000 people attempted to flee from Turkestan, of
whom only about 35,000 survived and reached safety in other coun-
tries. Large number of people were arrested and used as
forced labor among the construction works introduced by the Chinese
Communists under Russian guidance. Following this purge, a re-
education campaign was carried on by "friendship delegation from
Peking, and in the words of the New China News Agency: "It was only
after all this that the entire Kazakh people returned to the fold of
the fatherland." (See Allen S. Whiting, "Nationality Tensions in
Sinkiang," Far Eastern Survey, January 1956, vol. 25, no. 1.)

175 This policy was carried through with the backing of Russian
648 troops as well as the Chinese Communist troops of the First
668 Army Corps which had moved in after 1949. At the time of the
669 Korean war, some of the Chinese troops were withdrawn
661 for Korea, and the Russian forces were reportedly increased
from 50,000 to 70,000 men. They were garrisoned along the
northern route at each important point.

These Russian troops have thus helped substantially in the sup-
pression of the Turkic nationalism which Soviet Russia had formerly
built up and equipped against the Chinese Nationalists. Once before,
in 1942, when Soviet Russia partly withdrew from Sinkiang, these
nationalists had been left at the mercy of the Chinese administra-
tion. Many had been arrested and executed, although the Soviet
consular officials had continued to intervene on the behalf of some
of these nationalist leaders. In 1949, however, the movement
was crushed and its very motivation was attacked. Only those
leaders survived who were willing to cooperate fully with the new
Communist line.

175 Although the Russians gave full support to the Chinese Communists
648 in their reconquest of Sinkiang, the potential remained for Sino-
668 Soviet rivalry over control in Sinkiang. For the economic develop-
ment of the province, the Chinese Communists remained dependent
on Russian equipment and on Russian technicians. In the Sino-Soviet
treaty of February, 1950, the two governments agreed on the
establishment in Sinkiang of joint Sino-Soviet stock companies for
exploitation of oil and non-ferrous metals in the province. The Soviet
control of these companies indicated the political importance of

175 the Soviet economic stake in Sinkiang.

648 Over the next years, the strength of the Chinese Communist
668 government increased within the Soviet-Chinese relationship.
The treaty of 1950, concluded by Mao Tse-tung in Moscow after lengthy haggling, was replaced in December 1954 by a new treaty concluded at the occasion of a visit of Krushchev and Mikoyan in Peking. Among other concessions, this new treaty provided for the liquidation of the Soviet shares in the former joint stock companies. Nevertheless some element of Soviet control remained since the Soviet shares were to be repaid through deliveries of raw materials and other commodities from Turkestan. The whole industrial and communications development of the province which was to be rapidly expanded under the Chinese Communist Five Year Plans depended also on Soviet economic and technical assistance. Most important, Soviet Russia has reportedly kept possession of the atomic energy center at Mirgrad in the Tula Mekan Desert and has through the maintenance of military forces full control over the exploitation of uranium deposits in the Altai region where a large number of Russians, estimated by one observer to be as large as 80,000, has been reported.

648 On the other hand, a recent British correspondent (New York
668 Times, August 13, 1956, p. 9) has reported that throughout the region "up to the Soviet borders, the direct control of the Central Government on development plans and on political life is everywhere apparent. There are Soviet advisers and experts and plenty of Soviet machinery, but no more than in other parts of China, and the over-riding impression is that China is in complete charge.

"Peking's orders stretch into the remotest villages, where the ever-present cadres and Party members are kept in constant touch with the capital through provincial committees. Nowhere is there any external evidence of Soviet influence outside the technical sphere."

This observation of a Chinese Communist administration directed from Peking does not necessarily exclude consideration of Russian military and economic decisions for Sinkiang by the Chinese policy-makers in Peking. Nor does it exclude the possibility of conflict in the distribution of the Turkestan resources between the Soviet and Chinese Communist economies, especially in the case of the uranium exploitation at present obviously in Soviet hands. The railroad from Lanchow to Aktogai in Russian Turkestan, which in 1956 has been pushed beyond the Yumen oil fields in Kansu, is the most important physical link between the two economies but is also a highway for a vast and growing stream of young Chinese immigrants who are brought in to work on the oil fields, the railroads, and the construction of new towns and factories. This movement, which is aimed at filling up the

N III. Resentment of Chinese Rule

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578 These internal differences have made it impossible for the people of the Northwest to cast off their Chinese rulers by united action and to establish a Turkic, Uighur, or federated government of their own. In Sinkiang, 90 per cent of the population is non-Chinese, yet the forces of nationalism and of religion, which at times made for a temporary unity, were not strong enough to transform the sporadic revolts into a lasting revolutionary movement and complete independence.

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[162] There always has been a great deal of friction between the Chinese and the non-Chinese as a result of the differences in cultural heritage. In addition, the Chinese form a ruling minority in many parts of the Northwest and appear to the native people as a foreign government of occupation. In this situation, the Chinese Moslems (the Dungan's) have found themselves caught between two fires. At times they sided with their Kirghiz and Uighur co-religionists, and at other times they were compelled to support their non-Moslem Chinese compatriots. As a result, they have been distrusted by everyone and have suffered a double persecution during times of upheaval and nationalistic or religious fanaticism.

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657 The Chinese method of ruling minority peoples involved the system of "divide and rule" and created friction not only with China, but also among the tribes themselves. The policies of Tso Tung-t'ang in the latter part of the nineteenth century, can be taken as an example. He managed to place great power in the hands of his own relatives and friends, and to strengthen the old social structures of the Mongols, Uighurs and Kazakhs through the existing Begs and princes who became instruments of Chinese rule. He considered the Chinese Moslems to be traitors and killed large numbers of them while showing leniency toward the Uighurs, Mongols and Kazakhs. After the Revolution of 1911, during the governorship of Yang Tseng-hsin, the tradition of setting one people against another was continued. Fearing that the Mongols of Sinkiang might unite with the Mongols of Outer Mongolia during the revolution there, heavy restrictions were imposed upon them, while the Kazakhs were even allowed to carry arms. Under the previous Manchu rule, the Mongols were favored over the Kazakhs; they were considered the rightful owners of pasture lands, while the Kazakh tribes were treated as their "tenants."

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669 In the case of the Turkic Moslems, nationalism and religion are almost inseparable. Their rebellions against the Chinese have been the most persistent and the most violent, but only one short period of freedom has broken two centuries of Chinese control. Ever since 1759, when the Manchu general, Chao-hui, drove the ruling Moslem Khojas into Khokand and extended Chinese rule into Turkestan, the bitter resentment aroused by foreign control has flared into periodic revolt. In the nineteenth century, while the

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Moslems were rising in China Proper, a descendant of the Khojas was able to move from Khokand eastward into Sinkiang. By 1865 he ruled Kashgar and Yarkand. Soon, his chief of staff, Yakub Beg, replaced him and conquered the rest of Chinese Turkestan. Helped by foreign aid and diplomatic recognition, Sinkiang remained independent and under Moslem rule for over a decade. After the death of Yakub Beg in 1877 and the recapture of Sinkiang by Tso Tsung-t'ang, the dream of a great Turkic Empire, extending from the Caspian to the western frontier of China, continued to exist. Turanism (Pan Turkism or Pan Turkistanism) gradually came to acquire the ideological formulations of modern nationalism.

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A Moslem uprising of proportions dangerous to the Chinese government broke out in 1931 under the leadership of Ma Ch'ung-ying, who led an army of Chinese Moslems from Kansu into Sinkiang. His defeat in 1934 by Sheng Shih-ts'ai was partly due to the aid of Russia. It regarded Ma as a collaborator and advance scout of the Japanese whose invasion of Central Asia seemed imminent.

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The most recent example of an anti-Chinese uprising culminated in 1944 in the establishment at Kulja of the "Eastern Turkistan Republic." Unlike previous purely Moslem uprisings, the Kulja movement was an expression of "coalition nationalism," and it attempted to unite all the non-Chinese of Sinkiang. The Kulja government was headed by a council made up of an Uighur, a Kazakh, and a "White" Russian. In the years that followed until the victory of the Chinese Communists, there were alternate periods of fighting, negotiations and near co-existence between the National Government and Kulja. The insurgents' chief demand was for autonomy and self-government, rather than for complete independence from China. Agreements, guaranteeing cultural freedoms and substantial independence in the administration of the local government, were made but were never really carried out. In 1947, Masud Sabri, a wealthy Uighur landlord, became Chairman of Sinkiang, the first non-Chinese to hold that position. But as he was considered by many members of the Kulja Government to be an agent of the C. C. Clique and the National Government, the movement split for and against him, and a new deadlock was created. In December, 1948, Masud Sabri was replaced by Burkhan at a time when no assembly was in session to accept or reject him. It is difficult to know to what degree the Kulja Government had been swayed by Communist or Soviet Russian influence. Only one thing was certain - the government was strongly anti-Chinese. But with the Communist victory, the entire provincial government of Sinkiang turned to the new regime and a completely new situation emerged.

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Thus, there have been two major types of independence movements in the Northwest, one purely Moslem and the other seeking

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ning in agriculture has become more complex and difficulties are encountered in realizing annual targets. The absence of trained technicians to introduce new farming techniques, the lack of accountants and organizers in the cooperatives, and the so-called ideological backwardness of many of the Communist cadres themselves have prevented rapid cooperativization. We will now examine very briefly the progress achieved in the different regions of the Northwest and the problems which have arisen to prevent agricultural development. In this way, the pattern of Chinese Communist agricultural planning can be observed more clearly. Henceforth, all statistics concerning the number of co-ops, agricultural output, etc., are Communist claims and, of course, must be carefully considered.

B. Application of Communist Agricultural Policy to the Northwest

1. Sinkiang

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By June, 1955, nearly six years after the area was occupied by the Communist Army, there were 75,215 mutual aid teams (it is not known how many of these were on a permanent basis) and the agricultural producer cooperative numbered 1,702 with roughly 66.4 per cent of the peasant population participating in some form of co-op. By the end of 1956, in response to Mao's directive to hasten the creation of agricultural producer cooperatives, it is planned to increase their number to 5,100 and by 1957 to 10,240. (Far Eastern Economic Review, December 1, 1955, pp. 686-87.)

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Emphasis has been on raising the production of wheat, oil seed bearing plants, and cotton, by extending cultivation. The Communists attribute all increases in production to a result of further consolidation and development of the cooperative movement. Although there is a paucity of data on output, acreage, and output per acre, the following table has been pieced together from the information available, in an attempt to give some comparisons of increases attained during the Communist period with that of 1949. The figures for the Communist period have been obtained from 1954 and 1955 reports. See Table 1.

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The government has established agricultural stations, in order to show the peasants of various nationalities how to improve their farming methods. In 1955 it was reported that Sinkiang had seventy such stations. Two tractor stations have also been opened in Urumchi and Sui-ting. These stations have sought to improve production by planting Ukrainian winter wheat and S-3173 cotton, and promote better procedures of farming such as summer ploughing, autumn ploughing, winter irrigation, sowing in rows, close-planting, and cotton-pruning. They have made efforts to wipe out insect pests. The Soviet Union sent

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242 The Soviet Union sent
668 thirty-three airplanes and large numbers of locust experts to
433 spray insecticides over an area of some 2,669,000 mow (or
[177] 405,688 acres) during 1952-1955. On the state farms, the Army
[475] has done the lion's share of the work of reclaiming land, building
[701] irrigation works, erecting experimental farms and stations and
operating them. (Union Research Service, Oct. 14, 1955. p. 7,
No. 9.)

654 The Communists reported that they have given financial and
668 technical assistance to the various nationalities who till the soil
241 or engage in pastoral activities. By the end of 1954, agricultural
175 loans totalling some 26,140,000 yuan (U.S. \$1,061) and some
46,000 farming implements had been supplied to the peasants,
enabling every peasant household to have one trowel of its own
and every 1.3 households to own a plow. These small figures
indicate that assistance has been meagre; but even this might
enable the peasants to increase output as compared to output ob-
tained by previous farming implements.

241 Whether agriculture will prosper in Sinkiang depends entirely
312 on the steps taken in water conservancy and the proper utilization
668 of water. Already five million additional mow of land (160,000
175 acres) have been irrigated in the past six years and the irrigated
acreage in 1954 has been increased by 30.2 per cent since 1949.
Reservoirs have been constructed like the well-known "Red Wild
Goose Reservoir" and the "Peace Reservoir" which both now
irrigate more than 237,000 mow (36,024 acres of land). Three
[475] state farms, collective farms, and a dozen or so agricultural co-
[474] ops have been formed in the area.

231 By the end of 1954, the total number of livestock in the whole
433 province numbered 17,105,000 head, an increase of 7.47 per cent
175 over 1953. (In 1947 the total number of livestock was 15,037,000.
668 The figure reported for 1954 indicates a 13 per cent increase.)
The plan for 1955 is to raise the number to 18,987,567 head, a
net increase of 11 per cent. This will include 537,280 head of
large and small animals of improved breed (including 515,792
sheep, 7,930 large domestic animals, 13,538 pigs); 2,839,140
head of livestock will be inoculated against or cured of various
diseases. The Chinese Communists complain, however, of many
defects in animal husbandry. During the past winters, insuffi-
cient feed was gathered and many animals died. It was estimated
that some 200,000 died in the spring of 1954, an approximate loss
of one per cent per annum.

313 The forestry policy has been to protect existent forests from
668 fire and damage, to survey forest areas suitable for afforestation,
to plant saplings there, and to afforest areas near rural villages
for the development of co-ops and state farms. Each year, the
quota mow to be afforested is set and state departments under-
take to meet these quotas. Nurseries have been built and seedlings
planted in these tracts.

4 Sinkiang

473 Industrial development in Sinkiang is perhaps the fastest
175 in the entire Northwest. As early as 1950, four Sino-Soviet
177 joint-stock companies were established in Urumchi, of which
three were industrial plants. They were: (1) Sino-Soviet Non-
ferrous Metals Company, (2) Sino-Soviet Rare Metals Com-
pany, (3) Sino-Soviet Petroleum Company and (4) Sino-Soviet
Airlines. All the Soviet stocks were reportedly transferred
to China at the end of 1954, but the Soviet technicians have
remained there to help train the Chinese workers.

668 After the Communists took over, the Sinkiang Petroleum
175 Company has been greatly expanded. Its crude oil output in 1955 is
315 said to have been sixty-three percent higher than in 1954, and
473 deep testing wells were being sunk in five new districts in the
Gobi Desert to investigate their oil reserves. The five districts
are located in the Turfan and Dzungaria Basins in the Sinkiang-
Uighur Autonomous Region.

175 Another important industrial plant in Sinkiang is the July
288 First Cotton Mill, which began production in 1952. In early
1955, 16,500 spindles and 600 looms were added, which will
double the mill's cloth output. The total number of spindles was
then over 30,000 and of looms, one thousand. This is the first
modern textile mill built in Sinkiang, and it supplies the thirteen
nationalities there with a rich variety of fabrics manufactured
from the cotton grown in the province itself.

471 According to the province's initial plans, the investment in
capital construction during 1955 is to be increased by over
sixty percent as compared with 1954. A total of twelve construction
jobs are to be newly built or rebuilt. Preparations are under
way for these works. Among the new projects are a modern
471 cement factory, a sulphuric acid factory, a small hydraulic
339 power plant and an oil pressing mill. The cement factory was
381 expected to have its first stage of construction completed in
[327] 1956. When completed, this factory will save the state a total
[258] of ten million yuan each year in the cost of transporting cement
from China Proper. When the sulphuric acid factory starts
production, it will supply all the raw material needed for
printing and dyeing works by the July First Cotton Mill.

491 The eight units to be rebuilt in 1955 include the Liu-tao-wan
316 Colliery, the Sinkiang Machine Works, the Ceramic Factory,
392 and the First Cement Factory. When the underground tunnel of
339 the Liu-tao-wan Colliery is rebuilt, it will be possible to
323 produce more coal for the industries and local residents of
Urumchi. The output of modern farming tools will be increased
when the Sinkiang Machine Works is rebuilt. After a set of
automatic equipment is added to the glass workshop of the Ceramic
Factory, there will be nineteen additional kinds of new products
to supply the market.

439 motor traffic under the name of Sinkiang-Suiyuan highway. In
491 1935 there were about fifty trucks or buses running on this high-
494 way, making four trips a month. The historical Great Northwest
175 highway has also been open to motor traffic since 1930. During
the Sino-Japanese War, this traditional highway was one of the
most important outlets of free China. It is reported that in the
first half of 1942, some seventy million rubles worth of tea,
tung oil, bristles, wool and other goods were exported from
China to Russia through this route. On the other hand, there
were some fifteen million rubles worth of dried goods, metal,
canned goods and wine imported to China during the same period,
together with an unidentified amount of weapons and war mater-
ial that the Soviet Union sent to China under the 1939 Sino-Soviet
Military Agreement. The total number of five-ton trucks used
during the period was 3,600; but those actually in operation were
only about a thousand. The total capacity, including camels, of
that route was not more than two thousand tons per month. (Cf.
Shina Shōbetsū Zenshi, Vol. 8, pp. 636-39. It must be taken
into account that this is a Japanese source.)

175 Table V: Trade Between Sinkiang and Tientsin, 1930-32 average

439 Description	Value (yftan)	
435 A. Exports:		5,298,900
sheep intestines	2,400,000	
furs and hides	2,809,000	
raisins	54,000	
medical herbs	17,200	
dried mushrooms	18,000	
B. Imports:		2,743,562
cigarettes and tobacco	808,720	
woolen cloth	104,550	
silk	223,600	
linen	285,200	
cotton goods	110,200	
medical herbs and drugs	84,730	
stationary and books	70,700	
hats and shoes	99,000	
tea	868,852	
leather goods	6,800	
cosmetics	26,350	
paints and dyes	1,200	
hardware	2,160	
seafood	4,100	
chinaware	1,560	
miscellaneous	2,240	
Grand Total		8,042,462

Source: Chung-kuo Ching-chi Nien-chien, 1935 ed., vol. 3, pp.88-90.

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[487] It is understood that there was also considerable trade between Sinkiang, Lanchou and Sian, which, in fact, was the main trade route, but detailed information is not available.

According to a Japanese estimate, the Chinese goods were distributed to the various cities in Sinkiang in the following proportions, which also show the relative commercial importance of the different cities or areas:

Table VI: Distribution of Chinese Goods among Cities in Sinkiang

Place	Percentages of Goods Distributed
Urumchi (Tihua)	25.0
Li (Huei-yüan)	20.0
South Sinkiang	18.0
Ta-ch'eng (Chuguchak)	15.0
Ku-ch'eng-tzu (Chitai)	12.0
Sharas'me (Cheng-hua)	4.0
Hami (Qomul)	3.0
Khobdo (Jirgalantu)	3.0
Total	100.0

Source: Shina Shōbetsū Zenshi, Vol. 8, pp. 534-35.

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175 As to the direct foreign trade, the main country is Soviet Russia. According to official Soviet reports, the value of the Soviet-Sinkiang trade is as follows:

Table VII: Value of Soviet-Sinkiang Trade (unit: 1,000 rubles)

Year	Imports	Exports	Total
1931	13,954	10,212	24,166
1932	15,698	12,305	28,003
1933	10,826	18,822	29,648
1934	4,730	5,945	10,675
1935	6,049	4,550	10,599
1936	36,145	25,671	61,816

Source: Shina Shōbetsū Zenshi, 1943 ed., Vol. 8, p. 514.

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175 The main exports of Sinkiang to Russia were grain, fruits, wool, fur, meat, paper, cotton, silk, animal intestines and cattle; and the main imports of Sinkiang from Russia were textiles, sugar, metals and metal manufactures, glass and china-ware, oil and matches. The exports of Sinkiang constituted 1.01 per cent of the value of goods that Russia imported from East Asia in 1931, and 1.77 per cent of that in 1932. The imports of

- 439 Sinkiang from Russia constituted 1.58 per cent of the value of
 • 175 goods that Russia exported to East Asia in 1931, and 2.78 per cent of that in 1932.

Aside from Russia, Sinkiang has also entered a close trade relation with India and Afghanistan. According to 1927 statistics, the trade between Sinkiang and India amounted to 5,001,413 gold rupees. The details are as follows:

439 Table VIII: The Trade Between Sinkiang and India, 1927
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<u>Description</u>	<u>Value (rupee)</u>	
A. Imports:		1,186,648
European cotton goods	276,916	
leather goods	41,448	
dye	326,254	
hide (other than sheep)	61,663	
drugs	29,426	
pearls	71,335	
velvet	115,334	
Indian silk	24,876	
spice	36,562	
Indian black tea	27,386	
other black tea	23,098	
European woolen goods	42,000	
Russian metal goods	41,298	
B. Exports:		2,814,565
horses and ponies	101,235	
cotton cloth	35,698	
cankas	96,434	
iron and copper	742,654	
raw silk	31,294	
woolen goods	358,451	
felt carpet	25,524	
iron goods	66,789	
gold	72,631	
Russian metal goods	189,242	
silver	110,377	
leather goods	16,339	
wool	17,288	
woolen thread	16,037	
donkeys and mules	7,508	
jade	8,272	
Grand Total		5,001,413

Source: Chung-kuo ching-chi nien-chien, 1935 ed., Vol. 3, pp. T. 94-95.

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435 The trade between Sinkiang and Afghanistan of the same year
175 amounted to 1,378,040 gold rupees. The details are as follows:

Table IX: The Trade Between Sinkiang and Afghanistan, 1927

Description	Value (rupee)
A. Imports:	830,500
opium	675,000
horses	10,000
furs and hides	52,350
Russian metal goods	8,550
almonds	3,600
B. Exports:	547,540
cotton cloth	176,500
cankas	94,500
woolen carpet	80,000
horses	57,000
chinaware	21,200
felt carpet	16,800
donkeys and mules	13,000
Khoten silk	12,500

Grand Total 1,378,040

Source: Chung-kuo ching-chi nien-chien, 1935 ed., Vol. 3, p. T.95.

II. The Communist Period

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43 Trade in the Northwest under the Communist regime may be described in two parts: (1) changes in volume and kind, and (2) government control.

A. Changes in Volume and Kind

[198] N As far as the physical characteristics are concerned, trade in the Northwest under the Communist regime seems to have remained more or less the same as it was before, because economic reconstruction in this region is still in its initial stage.

N The following changes, however, may deserve special attention:

* 668 N
496 First, the Communists have taken great pains to improve transportation in the Northwest. The most ambitious project, of course, is the Lanchou-Alma Ata Railway, which they plan to complete by 1957. Other improvements include: (1) the Lanchou-Pao-t'ou Railway, which is still under construction; (2) the Hsi-ning-Lhasa Highway, which was opened to traffic on November 16, 1954; and (3) the Tunhuang-Chinghai Highway, which links Kansu and west Chinghai, and was opened to traffic in December 1954. Besides, it is also reported that the original Lanchou-Chengtou and Lanchou-Urumchi highways have been improved upon, and the Outer Mongolia Great Grass Route between

THE WONDERFUL CITY OF HAMI 219

King,' they always acquiesced, but added, ' Truly the *Holy man, Jesus*, is coming soon, and he will rule the earth in righteousness.'

CHAPTER XXXVII

ASIAN TRIBES

THE town called by the Chinese 'Hami' is known to the Turki as 'Kamul,' while Marco Polo wrote of it as 'Camul.' Its inhabitants are called 'Kumuliks.'

The Venetian traveller wrote: 'Camul has customs of the husbands giving up not only their house but their wives also for the entertainment of strangers. The women are, in truth, very handsome, very sensual, and fully disposed to conform in this respect to the injunctions of their husbands. In the middle of the thirteenth century Mangu Khan stopped the practice, but after three years the people petitioned him to allow them to return to it, saying that it was pleasing to the gods, who blessed them in consequence. His answer was: "Since you appear so anxious to persist in your own shame and ignominy, let it be granted as you desire. Go, live to your base customs and manners." ' It is impossible but that such an ancestry should have left its impress on the unique population found in this town to-day, and the geographical position of the oasis also plays its part in forming the distinctive character of the Kumulik, in whose blood are strains of every tribe inhabiting the Central Asian plateau.

The first inhabitants and makers of the oasis were the ancient Uigurs who, ~~on~~ being driven by the Mongols from northern Dzungaria, in the Altai region, settled on

THROUGH JADE GATE

- 175 the land flanking the Tian Shan, notably in Urumchi, Turfan, and Hami.

[179] The Kumuliks demonstrate the strange instance of a people who have completely abandoned Buddhism to embrace Islam. Marco Polo, in the fourteenth century, spoke of them as 'idolaters,' but at the present time they are uncompromising Mohammedans. During the years of the Mohammedan insurrection, Hami was reduced to ruins, and later was used as a base by the Chinese armies which came up to quell the rebellion. As late as 1875 a Russian traveller refers to the town as lying in ruins and serving as an encampment for Chinese troops.

Hami has been called the 'Key of Dzungaria'—that great tract of land stretching to the border of southern Siberia, which has played so important a part in the history of Asian occupation.

563 From Hami onwards we met men of so many tribes and nations as to make us realise how little we had hitherto known of the peoples of this vast continent. There were Chinese, Tungan, Turki, Mongolian, Kalimuk, Qazaq, Kirghiz, Nogai, Manchurian and Russian.

Of Chinese, we met men and women from all the eighteen provinces, including officials, soldiers, tradesmen, colonists and fortune-seekers. There were also many prodigals and outlaws who dare not again pass the portals of Kiayükwan. Apart from these were the residents of the second and third generation, many of whom, doubtless, are descendants of those who, from all ranks of society, have in past years been condemned

[147] to life-exile from China. We were much impressed by the capacity of the Chinese for colonisation, for though the conquerors of Turkestan, and thus holding all important governmental and military posts, they are acceptable to the populace. Moreover, they show a great aptitude for accommodating themselves to the

[inhabitants of Hami--Analyst]

ASIAN TRIBES

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Perhaps the most interesting *rencontre* of any was with Manchurians from Kulja in Ili. They owe their territory to the Emperor Chien Lung, who, in the course of the campaign he conducted on the North-West frontier of China in the eighteenth century, gave grants of land as rewards for faithful service to loyal soldiers. The Manchurian language is thus still spoken in Ili, although it has vanished from Manchuria, and copies of the Scriptures transcribed into that language by George Borrow for the British and Foreign Bible Society, and which had lain useless (as it was reckoned to be a dead language), at last found their way through Mr. Hunter into the hands of the people who were able to read them. These are the descendants of the 'Solon' and 'Sibo' referred to in the chronicles of Chien Lung as the troops who were rewarded for their faithfulness, with land in the new colony. Thus, remnants of each of the races which have successively held Dzungaria are still to be found within its borders.

In the beginning of the Christian era the Huns held supremacy in Central Asia, and in the thirteenth century the marauding tribes from Mongolia burst all barriers and carried the Mongol Empire from the Yellow River to the Danube. At this time Nestorian Christianity had considerable hold in Asia, and under Kublai and Jenghiz Khan the Franciscan missionaries were welcome and given facilities to carry on their work, but with the destruction of the Mongol Empire owing to the incessant attacks of the Chinese, Christianity declined, and, under the Chinese policy of isolation, the missionaries were expelled, while the converts, having no Scriptures in their own language, and being dependent upon tradition for the understanding of the faith they professed, became submerged by heathen practices and gradually disappeared. On the other

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THROUGH JADE GATE

175 hand, Islamism, which had been temporarily repulsed
779 by the Mongols, again closed in, so that Turkestan
791 became one of the strongholds of the Moslem faith.

186 The trend of political events during the last few
years has resulted in movements no less epoch-making
than were the invasions of the Mongols and the Huns.
A wave of race-consciousness and of national enthusiasm
has swept over the peoples of Central Asia and caused
them to hearken to any voice which has promised to
secure them the liberty and self-determination they so
much covet. 'The East is undergoing a concentrated
process of adaptation which, with us, was spread over
centuries, and the result is not so much *evolution* as
revolution.'

600 The situation is pregnant with spiritual possibilities,
for the old and the new are struggling fiercely, and that
struggle will result in anarchy and lawlessness, unless
the hearts of men be captured and re-created by the
Christ Who alone makes men free.

797 The Church Militant is represented in the territory
stretching from Suchow to Siberia by *one* Mission
Station occupied by *two* men.

CHAPTER XXXVIII

TRAVELLING IN THE 'GREAT HEAT'

132 THE trying season known to the Chinese as Ta Shu—
'Great Heat'—was upon us. Hami was indeed hot,
and Mr. Hunter warned us that not until we reached the
other side of the Tian Shan could we hope for any
487 alleviation. From Hami two main trade-routes, known
as the Nan Lu—'South Road'—and Peh Lu—'North
Road'—run in the respective directions their names

CHAPTER XLI

THE CAPITAL OF SINKIANG

• 175 URUMCHI first comes into historical prominence under the name of 'Bishbalik,' the capital of the kingdom established by the Uigurs in southern Dzungaria. Driven out from their first home in the northern part of this province, they wandered south until they found a resting place on the slopes of the Celestial Mountains, and also in the watered land as far as Hami, which territory they transformed so as to make of it the fertile district which it is to-day. The middle of the eighteenth century marks the period, when under the great Emperor Chien Lung, Chinese ascendancy finally asserted itself in Dzungaria.

487 Urumchi is situated at the junction of four great
175 trade routes. One crossing Mongolia, another leading
361 through Hami to Kansu, a third connecting it with
Ili and Russia, and a fourth with Kashgar. It thus occupied a position obviously suited to make it the capital of the New Dominion, called by the Chinese 'Sinkiang.' The city has been the battle-ground of many contending forces, having been taken and retaken by Mongols, Chinese and Mohammedans, while during the great Mohammedan rebellion in 1865 it is estimated that 130,000 Chinese were murdered in the vicinity. The word 'Urumchi' is of Mongolian origin; to the Chinese the town is known as 'Tihwa,' but colloquially it is referred to as 'Hungmiaotz'—'The Red Temple.'

[312] It is well supplied with water, and with coal of various
[438] qualities, and is in easy communication with Manas,
439 from which it draws grain, especially rice; with
Turfan which helps to supply it with fruit, and with